THE VAIÇEṢIKA-SYSTEM,

described with the help of the oldest texts,

BY

Dr. B. FADDEGON.

Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam.

AFDEELING LETTERKUNDE.

NIEUWE REEKS.

DEEL XVIII N°. 2.

AMSTERDAM,

JOHANNES MÜLLER.

1918.

PRELIMINARY NOTE TO THE TRANSLATIONS FROM THE NYĀYA-KANDALĪ.

The Nyāyakandalī is a difficult book.

This is partly due to the inaccuracy of the tradition of the text; the deviations in the quotations specially show this. Moreover the editor might have offered more help; a fuller use of daṇḍas, a division of the text into more paragraphs and some more indexes would certainly have been useful.

Yet the difficulty is for the greatest part to be found in the composition and the exposition of the work itself. The works of the Indian scholiasts are for a great deal works of compilation; this method may be easy for the author, but never leads to unity or clearness of composition. Then these schoolmen are too prone to polemics and unfortunately these polemics are in the Kandalī directed against Buddhistic works of philosophy which we cannot consult any more in their original form.

Further the exposition approaches the form of a dialogue, without however fully accepting it. Thus the objections, raised in the course of an examination, need not always be attributed to one antagonistic school. And although the alternating objections and answers give a certain liveliness to the style, we never obtain a clear notion about the convictions of the opponents.

Another difficulty is the dialectical method which is applied. The *anumāna*, which is mostly used, is (as I have shown in book II chapter 5) a combination of inference and superficial induction. The general thesis is, in principle, expressed in a positive and a negative form; each form is supposed to be proved by one example. Then the antagonist gives counter-examples. After this the two parties try to find logical mistakes in each other's argumentations. Pages and pages are filled in this way and the result is never convincing.

My translation of fragments is principally meant as an effort to make the study of the Sanskrit text easier. For myself I am just as deeply convinced of the shortcomings of my work, as I am of the difficulty of the task which I have undertaken. I have added only a few annotations to my translation; for the rest I refer to book I chapter IV and book II chapter V which may be considered as an introduction to the following part of my book.

NOTE. I am sorry I have not been able to consult the translation of the Nyāyakandalī which appeared in the Paṇdit (cf. Colonel G. A. Jacob, *A handful of popular maxims* I, 2d ed. Bombay 1907 p. VIII).

TRANSLATIONS.

---

1. *Sattā.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 12 l. 4. [1])

[Pūrvapakṣin]: Some say: the daily doings of people have to do with that which is proved by a *pramāṇa* (a trustworthy means of knowledge); this does not take place in the opposite case; therefore, existence is only based upon such means of knowledge.

[Siddhāntin]: This is wrong. Because the unwished-for consequence would be the non-existence of an object before the arising of the *pramāṇa*; and the seizableness of a something non-existent, f. i. of a donkey's horn, does not exist; and because a mutual dependence [of the two notions: existence and trustworthy means of knowledge] would take place [in as far as trustworthy knowledge is such knowledge as teaches us what exists, and existence is that which is based on trustworthy knowledge]. And [finally] because, if an existent *pramāṇa* is the seizer and existence must be defined as the something seizable by *pramāṇa*, an endless regress takes place in as far as the seizer, the *pramāṇa*, itself, depends on another seizer &c.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: But we do not assert the opinion: existence is relation with *pramāṇa*, but we mean: existence is the individual nature of the thing which is fit to enter into relation with *pramāṇa*. He who upholds the generality: existence, has to accept the individual nature of things (*padārthas*) as well, since existence cannot inhere in something non-existent, as f. i. a hare's horn. If this is so, let only this [individual nature] then exist; what is the use of existence [as a generality]? We may add to this: the individual natures of things (*padārthas*) are separate from one another, how then can a notion of one form (*ākāra*) and the use of one name arise in reference to them, for there is no seizing of any relation in [an] infinite [number of] things?

[Siddhāntin]: But we maintain that one reason [for such a single denotation] is existent in these [individual natures of the things].

---

1) Cf. here book IV Section VII Table E.

[Pūrvapakṣin: We answer:] though the cognition of a precedent form arises in reference to a second individual [cow] in [the mind of] him who has formerly seen a first individual cow; yet after having formerly seen a mountain, there is no appearance of a previous form in one's mind, when perceiving a mustardseed. How could there be the acceptance of a generality [:„existence"] in this case?

[Siddhāntin]: Is there not a complete correspondence of form in a mountain [and a mustardseed] &c., or is it not found partly? If the denial of a generality [:„existence"] in these [individual things] is pronounced, because a complete correspondence of form is lacking, then the general notion: „cow" has to be rejected just as well, because there is no community of qualities is every respect between a *çābaleya* and a *bāhuleya*. But if the correspondence of the individual natures is only partly lacking, then this [reasoning of yours] is wrong, because an appearance of correspondence [or equality] arises in reference to all these [individual things, mountains, mustardseeds &c.], namely in their form as being different from non-existence. This, namely, is the difference [between the notions *sattā* & *gotva*]: The notion of sameness in kind arises suddenly with regard to individual cows, as there is a correspondence of sameness in a greater number of parts. This notion arises slowly with regard to mountains &c., as the generality is not clearly manifested through the correspondence of sameness in a fewer number of parts, as f. i. [there is a slow arising of] the intellection: „notion of earth" in reference to a pot after one's having seen a jewel. — By this [reasoning] [the definition of] existence as „that which causes practical efficiency [1]) is rejected. For a non-existent cannot take the function of practical efficiency, and if the practical efficiency does exist, then, because such is existence, an endless regress comes in, namely in as far as the existence of something practically efficient presupposes another practical efficiency &c.; [from which logical fault of endless regress] the non-existence of everything would be the unwished-for consequence.

2. *The physical process of visual perception.*

Nyāya-kandalī, p. 23, l. 4:

Some say: The senses do not consist of material elements, because they are effective without having reached [the object]; for it is a property of the material elements, for instance a light, to be effective after reaching [the object].

1) Cf. Nyāya Kandalī p. 73 l. 19 &c., fragment 18 of translations.

[Siddhāntin]: This is not right. For one does not perceive [,see — in the whole argumentation sight is the real topic] what is hidden. If the senses were effective without reaching, then they would grasp (perceive) a thing, hidden by a wall or something else; for there is no difference in respect to the absence of reaching.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: They do not grasp (perceive) a hidden thing, because fitness is wanting.

(Siddhāntin]: In the first place the fitness on the part of the senses is their capability of grasping an object, as in this case [when the senses are in a healthy condition and open for impressions] they grasp a not-hidden object. In the second place the fitness on the part of the object consists in its largeness [size, *mahattva*, as opposed to *aṇutva*], its being inherent in (i. e. component of) some [parts], its possession of a certain colour &c.; this fitness does not cease because a thing is hidden. The condition of straightness [the fact that we see the things along a straight line] too is of a similar nature [i. e. proves that eyebeams go out of the eyes and reach the object].

[Pūrvapakṣin]: But this is not what I mean. The non-existence of a covering is a cause of the percept of a thing, just as the not-being of conjunction is the cause of the action (movement) of falling. When there is a covering, then the not-being of the covering vanishes; therefore no percept arises, because the cause is absent.

[Siddhāntin]: This is not right, as we see that the hidden state really means the hindrance from reaching a tangible thing, f. i. an umbrella obstructs [the reaching] of the falling water and the sunshine; but it does not merely cause the not-being of itself to vanish [as you mean by saying: „when there is a covering, then the not-being of the covering vanishes"].

So then the inference (syllogism, *anumāna*) for my thesis can easily be understood:

The eye gives apparency to what it has reached,
as it does not do so to a hidden object,
so as a lamp;
and as it is an external organ,
like the skin, the organ of touch.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: But how then is the grasping of a remote object possible?

[Siddhāntin]: Because there is a contact between the eyebeams and the object. The eyebeams which have a latent colour and touch, after going far, grasp the thing which is. For the same reason one is wrong in making the objection: „how is it possible that the

organ consists of material elements, as it shows its power of manifestation [even] in reference to large things"; for this is brought about by its rays, as is the case with the rays of a lamp. And where the eyebeams with reference to the greater number of their parts come into contact with the whole of the thing and its parts, in that case the grasping is clear, since we perceive the thing, provided with all its properties; but where the contact only takes place with reference to a portion, there the perception is unclear, as it grasps the object only as characterised by its generality (general features).

[Pūrvapakṣin]: That which goes, reaches the near and remote objects successively, therefore how can a simultaneous perception of a tree and the moon take place?

[Siddhāntin]: Because the activity of the organ [of sight] takes place quickly just like the penetration through a hundred of leaves. This [simultaneous perception] is an illusion, caused by the non-perception of the succession, but the simultaneity does not exist really.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: But in the case of the theory of [manifestation after] reaching, the percept: „this is at a distance" would not occur.

[Siddhāntin]: You are not right; for this takes place in another way. Since the contact with the organ [of sight] cannot be seen itself, the impression of farness and nearness are not produced by the occurrence or non-occurrence of this [fore-mentioned contact], but by the occurence or non-occurrence of the contact with the body. Where there is a perception of a thing, connected with the body, there the impression: „this is near" takes place; but where there is perception of a thing, not connected with this body, there we have the impression: „this is at a distance".

3. *Uddeça, lakṣaṇa & parīkṣā.*

Nyāyakandalī p. 26 l. 15.

As long as the categories are not enunciated, their definitions are not possible, since they would have no reference; and no notion of truth can exist with regard to things undefined, since one of the factors which cause it, is lacking. Therefore, for him who undertakes the explanation of the categories, there is a twofold procedure in the doctrine: enunciation and definition; but there is a limited use of examination. In those cases where the truth is not ascertained in reference to the given definition, because another opinion forms an obstacle, an examination is instituted in order to refute the position, advanced by the other. But in such cases where the

truth is already ascertained by the sufficiency of the mere exposition of the definition, then this procedure, as being useless, is not required. He who requires a threefold procedure of the system, does not need an examination concerning the *prayojana* (usefulness or importance of a discussion)[1]) &c. Why is this? Because these [matters like *prayojana*] are already known from the definition. If it were so, [i. e. if *prayojana* &c. had to be examined], then the procedure would not be threefold, in compliance with the notion of the topics.

Enunciation is the mentioning of the categories by their names. Definition is a property of the defined [notion], which property excludes all notions belonging to any class other than its own. Examination is an investigation of the defined [notion] in reference to the way in which it is defined.

The division of what is defined, is not a separate, [a fourth] procedure, as it is included in the definition of enunciation. For [division] is only separately mentioned in order to settle [the statement]: only these [genera belong to a certain category], and in order [to make it possible for us] to give definitions of the genera. These definitions of the genera of categories are given after the categories themselves have been subdivided; otherwise these definitions would have no reference. For instance the substances are enunciated in the formula: „substances, qualities & actions"; they are subdivided in the formula: „earth, water, fire". Now a new section is begun in order to define the genera of this [substance].

4. *Lakṣaṇasya prayojanam.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 28 l. 21.

[ÇRĪDHARA after having discussed PRAÇASTAPĀDA's definition of *pṛthivī*, continues thus]:

As has been said by UDDYOTAKARA: the aim of the definition is to exclude objects belonging to another class than its own class". By this the following is also refuted:

[Objection quoted]: If the things are known, then they need not be defined; if not known, then still less, because [the defining is thus] impossible.

[Siddhāntin]: [This is wrong], because definition either serves to teach us the particular use of language in reference to a thing of which the nature is known, or to give us particulars about a thing which is known in general.

[1]) Cf. Nyāya Sūtra I, 1, 1.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: in case this were true, then there would be a regressus ad infinitum, in as far as every time the defining [notion] is to be defined in the same way as was the [last]-defined notion.

[Siddhāntin]: No; because a definition is unavoidable when the notion is lacking; and because the notion is not lacking in every case [in other words: in our definitions we need go only back until we meet with notions immediately known]. Thus skilful people will bind the cows' heads to their forelegs, but they do not think [of binding] these [legs] to something else. But instruction is not meant for him who is ignorant in every respect, because we take such people just as little into consideration as we do infants or mutes.

5. *The explanation of variegated colour.* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 30 l. 2:

[Siddhāntin]: Several colours inhere in one *genus* of earth owing to the difference between the individual specimina. Sometimes too, many kinds of colours inhere together in one individual thing, [namely] where the aggregate is formed by parts which have connection with [i. e. in which inhere] several colours.

[Opponent]: If I should ask: how is this?

[Siddhāntin]: In the same way as the aggregate is brought about by the parts, so will the colour in the aggregate be effected by the colours of the parts. And in the parts we do not find exclusively the colour white, nor the colour blue, but blue, white, yellow &c. And of these one certain coulour alone is not effective, and neither are the others; that is the rule; for we see in other cases that all the colours of the parts, without exception, are capable [of producing the colour in the aggregate]. Neither are we allowed to say that all the colours are ineffective in consequence of mutual opposition. Because we have the notion of an aggregate with variegated colour and there is no perception of an object without colour. And it is not the colours of the parts, as a plurality, which are conceived in the notion „variegated''. If we should suppose that the aggregate becomes apparent only by this [perception of a plurality of colours], then because the same thing would necessarily happen in other cases, the putting aside of the colour of the aggregate would be the unwished-for consequence. Therefore [the colour of the aggregate] is effected by these [separated colours]

[1]) Cf. here book I p. 93.

through blending together. And this effect has for essence blue, white, yellow, in as far as it follows the nature of the several causes, and is called variegated.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: it is wrong that something that is one, could have the nature of several, because there is a contradiction (mutual opposition)? Moreover the saying of us, opponents, (*prāvādukas*) runs: „This [thing] here is one and is called „variegated" too, this [variegatedness] is more variegated than that [oneness]!" [1])

[Siddhāntin]: What mutual opposition is there between blue &c.? This opposition is not of such a kind that one [colour] is the nonexistence of the other, because they follow each the nature of being, and we should get entangled in a circulus vitiosus.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: This opposition is the being something else in particular nature.

[Siddhāntin]: You are right in so far. But there is nothing reprehensible in a colour characterised as variegated. For [this colour], equivalent to the capability of its different causes, exists according to the perception, relied upon by everybody.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the unwished-for consequence would be that we should perceive the variegated colour in the plain side of f. i. a piece of cloth in which this [variegated colour] inheres, because this piece of cloth is one".

[Siddhāntin]: No, because the perception of variegated colour is effected by the seeing of several colours of parts, which is according to agreement and contrariety (*anvaya-vyatirekau*) fit for that effect, and this does not take place on the other side [of the piece of cloth].

[Opponent]: So then we do not grasp the variegated colour in a substance, effected by double atoms [2]) which have different colours, since we do not grasp the colours of these parts.

[Siddhāntin]: Whoever would say „no" [to this question]? For the colour of an absolutely small object is not perceived discriminately [3]), but we see the colours of the parts of that thing whose [colour is discriminately] grasped. Whoever thinks: „variegated colours, [as being] many, do not cover [the object]", [is answered]: in this case no colour could arise in a double thread made of a blue and a yellow thread, since the colour of either part separately is not *the* effective factor. But our opinion is, that one colour: „varie-

---

1) The çloka, quoted, is placed after „iti cet", as often happens in such a case.

2) Cf. here p. 367, exposition of the atom theory.

3) Cf. SPEYER, *Sanskrit Syntax* § 381.

gated" is then produced by these two; and it will be thus in other cases as well, since there is no difference.

The variegated-coloured object, the existence of which was the topic of our dispute, is connected with one colour [1]),
because it is an object,
so as another object.
The colour of this object is one,
because it is the colour of an aggregate,
so as the colour of another object which is an aggregate.

6. *Exposition of the atom-theory.*

Nyāya-kandalī, p. 31 l. 16:

What trustworthy means of knowledge assures us of the existence of earth in its atomical form?

[Siddhāntin]: The following syllogism (*anumāna*):
At a certain point the continuant series of smaller and still smaller extensions comes to an end;
because it is a continuant series of extensions;
like the continuant series of greater and still greater extensions.

The point where [the series] stops, that [extension] than which there is no smaller, is the atom (or infinitesimal part).

For this reason too it is eternal:
because it does not possess parts, whilst at the same time possessing substantiality;
just like (physical) space [2]).

[Opponent]: But the atom possesses parts; and thus it is not infinitesimal, because the notion will occur to simple people that the extension of the parts [of this, your supposed, atom] is again smaller in comparison to the [atom, their] product.

[Siddhāntin]: Let then this part of that [which was at first considered to be an atom] be the atom.

[Opponent]: Neither will this be the case, because there will be again other parts.

[Siddhāntin]: So an e n d l e s s r e g r e s s would ensue; and consequently neither could the smaller and smaller [extensions] of aggregates exist in as far as the greatness or smallness of the number of the causes — [a greatness or smallness which is] the reason

---

1) Read: *ekarūpasambandhi* I. e. the one colour, called „variegated".
2) In physical space parts only exist by imagination, not in reality.

for the pre-eminence or inferiority of the extension — could not exist, since all things without exception would be produced from [an] endless [series of] causes. But this difference of extension [in the aggregates] *is*; ergo the atomical extension at a certain point does not allow a transgression. So the infinitesimal part is proved.

And this [atom] is one, and unproductive. For suppose: this one eternal to be productive, then an uninterrupted arising of the effect [i. e. of the aggregates] would take place, in as far as it, [the atom], would not be limited [in producing]. The indestructiveness [of everything] also would be a consequence; as neither an annihilation of the abode [i. e. of the atoms in which the aggregate „inheres"] nor a separation of the parts — [which annihilation or separation is] the cause of decay — would ever take place.

Neither can we attribute creative power to three atoms [1]). For, with reference to the arising of „large" effect-substances we learn by experience that only an effect-substance which [possesses in an absolute sense „largeness", *mahattva*, but] is of small extension compared with the extension of the thing in question [i. e. the product], is capable [of producing]. [To summarise this in a syllogistic form]:

The threefold atom is only produced by effect-substance[s];
because [this threefold atom] possesses „large" extension;
like a pot.

Thus having rejected the productive power of three and one, we have proved: „that which is effected by two atoms, is the double atom".

There is only effectuation by several [i. e. three or more] double atoms, (also this restriction must be made); but not by two pairs of atoms. For if things which have infinitesimal size, were effective, then this effectuation would be useless in as far as only infinitesimality would arise in accordance with the nature of the cause. [2]) There is, however, no restriction for higher numbers. Sometimes [an aggregate] is effected by three [double atoms], this is called a *tryaṇuka*, sometimes by four, sometimes by five; thus you may imagine as you wish [i. e. without limitation]. — And there is no uselessness in effect; for we obtain [this result]: the greater the

---

[1]) The following proof is based on the implied admission of *tryaṇuka* being a „*mahat-parimāṇa*". This is only produced by *kāryadravyāṇi*, therefore the *dvyaṇuka* must exist as a link between the *aṇus* and the *tryaṇukas*.

[2]) Paraphrase of the argumentation given: a *dvyaṇuka* is still infinitesimal; one *dvyaṇuka*, added to one *dvyaṇuka*, would remain infinitesimal; for „two" not being considered a sufficient number, does not bring about any change in the character of the *parimāṇa*. Thus the smallest aggregate, possessing „largeness" (*mahattva*), consists of three pairs of atoms.

number of causes [i. e. constituent parts], the greater the degree of largeness. Neither, with matters standing thus, would the consequence be that a pot is effected by mere double atoms [without intermediate parts], for when a pot is broken, we see a separation of smaller and smallest parts and therefore we may conclude that the effectuation is correspondent to that.

7. *The body is not built up of five elements.* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 38 l. 5:

[From the standpoint] of those who have accepted the theory that an organic body originates from the five elements as inherential cause, the body would be without smell; because the smell of the causes [i. e. the constituent parts] would remain ineffective; and it would possess a variegated (mixed, *citra*) colour, taste and touch, because several colours, tastes and touches are possible in the [same] effects [i. e. aggregates]; but experience teaches us otherwise. Therefore the material of the body is not the five elements.

For the same reason it neither has earth and water, nor earth, water and wind for its material.

If the material were wind [2]) and (physical) space, then the body would be without smell and without taste. And you may continue thus for all possible combinations.

Moreover, if the five elements were the inherential cause [of the body], its oneness would never take place, because difference would result from the difference[s] in its nature. But:

The human body possesses [oneness, viz.] the nature of earth;
because it has smell;
like earth in its atomical form.

If one should ask: how is it that we perceive here [in the human body] the qualities of water? — then we answer: in consequence of inherence in the conjunct [i. e. because these qualities inhere in something conjoined to the main material of the body].

Thus it is enough.

[1]) According to the Vaiçeṣika system an organic body consists in its main formation only of one kind of atoms. For instance the human and the animal body inheres in [i. e. consists of] earthly atoms, to which other kinds of atoms are conjoined. Thus the atoms of the eye, being of the nature of light, are conjoined to the earthly atoms of the body. The argumentation, given by Çrīdhara, is based on the following admission: if the qualities of the constituent parts of an aggregate differ, then either they blend into one variegated, mixed quality, or they hinder one another, so that the aggregate is void of the correspondent quality. The first alternative is seen in the case of colour, taste and touch.

[2]) Read: '*vayv-ākāça*'.

yet included in their qualities (in other words: the thing is not merely its qualities). [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 41 l. 2:

...[Opponent]: If I should answer: we do not accept such a thing as gold[2]) which has an undeveloped colour and touch, because there is nothing else besides the perceived colour and touch.

[Siddhāntin]: No; because we possess an idea of a total thing, characterised in the respective cases as: this is a pillar, this is a jar, though there is no difference in the particular nature of colour &c. in all these cases.

[Opponent]: If I should answer; with reference to the respective composition there is a difference in our ideas, caused by the differences in our *vāsanās* [*vāsanā* = impression of anything remaining latently in the mind].

[Siddhāntin]: Let us suppose that also the differences between our ideas of blue &c. are caused by the *vāsanās*. What avails [your accepting] differences such as [an objective] blue &c.?

[Opponent]: If I should answer: [we are obliged to accept] the hypothesis of [objective] differences such as blue &c., because, if no objectivity existed, there would be no reason why the ripening of our *vāsanās* — a ripening which would merely depend on the series of [these *vāsanās*] themselves — should happen at and during a certain time; nor why our ideas of blue &c., which [according to your objection] are caused only by those [*vāsanās*], should be at a definite time.

[Siddhāntin]: Neither can limitation in time be applicable to the different ideas „pillar" &c. which do not comply with external things. Therefore, we are obliged to suppose a particular totality in addition to [the qualities] colour &c., a totality, different [in each case], as being a cause of the awakening of a particular *vāsanā* in accordance with the composition [i. e. in accordance with the different manner in which the qualities in a thing are combined], and by this [existence of an objective totality] also our grasping of one thing by means of seeing and touch is rendered possible [i. e. our sensations of sight and touch can in some cases refer to one

---

1) Cf. here book IV section VII letter C n°. 13.

2) According to the Vaiçeṣika system gold (and other metals) as known to us, are really a mixture of earthly matter and light. Light in its unmixed state possesses warm touch and lustre as qualities. The light forming a part of metals, has these qualities, however, in an undeveloped condition.

and the same object]; but if the objective thing was merely [its qualities] colour &c., then this would be impossible, because [these qualities: blue, white, hard, soft &c.] are grasped by their respective sense-organs exclusively.

9. *The existence of aggregates*[1]).

Nyāya-kandalī p. 41 l. 12:

[Opponent]: Moreover, [those qualities as] colour &c. which are of an infinitesimal nature[2]), transgress without exception the ken of the sense-organs; and an accumulation, independent of them, does not exist; therefore, what, according to your standpoint, is the objeet of sight and touch?

[Siddhārtin]: Though the atoms, [i. e. the infinitesimal qualities of colour &c., which you uphold] taken separately, transgress the ken of the sense-organs, yet they become attainable to sense, whenever they come forth fitly and the internal organs of sense &c. are present.

[Opponent]: No; for even on their fitly coming forth they do not abandon their innate nature of being ultimately subtle; moreover, when visibility is a mere consequence of the fitly coming forth, then both the internal and external organ of sense would be perceptible, since there is no difference [in this respect between the organs of sense and the external elements].

[Siddhāntin]: But if I should answer: my idea is this. Though the atoms, taken separately, are not gross (material, *sthūla*), yet heaped up together like a mass of hair, they get a gross appearance and become visible, and in as far as there are no interspaces between then, they are [collectively] apprehended under [the idea of] oneness.

[Opponent]: Does then a one and gross form originate in these many [atoms], or is this [one and gross form] not really formed, but only perceived in them in consequence of our [own mental] projection, as it is in the case [of the oneness] of hairs?

[Siddhāntin]: If it really originates, then we have what we call an aggregate; but if it is experienced, when not being, then it is a false impression (*bhrānta*); and a false impression has a correct impression for its counterpart (*pratiyogin*); so then somewhere a

---

1) For an analysis of this passage see here Table of contents of the Nyāya Kandalī, in book IV. Cf. moreover book I p. 50 Appendix II, and book IV section VII letter E. (Nyāya Sūtra IV, 2, 4—17).

2) Cf. the passage Ny. Kand. p. 41 l. 2, translated here pag. 370.

one and gross [form] must be accepted as existing, and it is not true that its existence would only be in our cognition, because the idea: „I am something material" does not arise and because the unwished-for consequence would be that the fact of [a thing] being a common object of several perceivers could not exist. Therefore this one and gross [form] is the object, since it always appears in a definite form and exhibits practical efficiency. This then is the proof for [the existence of] the aggregate.

[Opponent]: No doubt, a notion is proved when no (logical) impediment (*bādhaka*) exists; in that case we use the expression: „so [it is]". But a refuting argumentation exists with reference to the existence of aggregates. To wit: when the hand trembles, then the body of which this hand is a part, does not tremble, or if the foot trembles, then the body to which this foot belongs does not tremble. So then the consequence would be that one thing would possess contradicting qualities [scil. the body is at rest and at the same time in movement]. This is [logically] non-coherent; since no fixed rule exists for the body trembling necessarily whenever the hand trembles. But when a cause exists to make merely the hand move, then that only moves; and not the body, for [with reference to the latter] a cause is lacking; but when there is a cause for the movement of the body as well, then the body moves and has no rest. So where does contradiction come in, when the hand moves and not the body? Therefore there is *yutasiddhi* (relation of separability) between part and aggregate.

[Siddhāntin]: No; the relation of separability means an abiding in separate abodes. But movement and non-movement are no [examples for that], because, when a thing moves and its quality does not move [according to the general thesis that qualities do not possess action, i. e. do not move], then there is no relation of separability between this [thing and this quality]. The abiding in separate abodes is not seen in part and aggregate, even in the case when these two are separated from each other [f. i. when the hand is cut off from the body; in this case namely the former part begins to form an aggregate by itself]; so then there is no question of a relation of separability.

And the other point of refutation which is mentioned:

[Refutation]: When one part is hidden, then we do not perceive there the aggregate which inheres in that [part], but we perceive it so far as we perceive the parts uncovered; so then of one and the same thing a perception and non-perception at the same time ensues.

[Answer]: This is neither right. For when [only] one part is covered, then there is no concealment of the aggregate. For this, being one, abiding in many parts, is even perceived — though several parts are covered — by means of the perception of the many other, uncovered parts; because this [aggregate] is everywhere [i. e. over its whole extent] unremoted [i. e. present]. With reference to anything which is characterised by the perception of several parts [and not by the collective notion of oneness], the idea of grossness [gross = solid = *sthūla*] does not arise, because we do not perceive the accumulation of its several parts, whereas the perception would effect a notion [of ours] concerning an extensive dimension. But where a concealment of more parts and a perception of fewer parts take place, there the aggregate is not seized, f. i. when we see only the head of some one, submerged in water. When one part is painted, then the aggregate in that part is painted and in the other parts it is not painted; so then the consequence would be that the same thing is painted and not painted? With this we have no difficulty, because there is no inconsistency. The state of being painted means the conjunction with paint; and the state of not being painted is the non-existence of that [conjunction]. And both [states] are found in one [thing], since conjunction does not cover [the whole object; i. e. need only take place in a part of it].

[Opponent]: This again is another point of refutation: Does an aggregate abide only partially or totally in each of its several parts? — a third way namely is not possible. The abiding then does not take place partially, since the [aggregate] without [all its] parts would not exist in that one place. On the other hand, if the [aggregate] abides [in any of the parts] totally, then it could not abide in the other parts, because should the nature of the thing be defined by its blending (*saṃsarga*) with one part, then the other parts would be excluded and another *svarūpa* (individual existence) [of the aggregate] could not be admitted in addition to the *svarūpa*, just now described.

[Siddhāntin]: We may give the following answer: Do you state the thesis: „whatever exists, exists (*vartate*) either partially or totally", as one upheld by yourself or as one defended by others? Certainly not as one upheld by your own [school]; no existence (abiding, *vṛtti*) of anything in any place is upheld by the Buddhists [i. e. they neither believe in the existence of aggregates nor of atoms]; and the abiding of a thing in an either partial or total respect, is not asserted by others, because the abiding is not of those two [of the whole and the parts] and because these two are

neither causes of the abiding. Whatever exists (or abides) in reality, exists in a form which we may define as the relation of the abode and the abiding. And the blending (*saṃsarga*) of one thing with several is not contradictory. For the blending with the *ākāra* „yellow" &c. is experienced in the cognition of variegated colour [1]) which is [also] characterised by the *ākāra* „blue". And no differentiation of this [cognition] takes place according to [the manifoldness of] *ākāra*s. If it were not possible for one [cognition] to arise from the seizing of several *ākāra*s, then the absurd consequence would be that you could not possess the notion: „variegated". Neither may the oneness of the *ākāra*s be concluded from the unity of the cognition, since this is repugnant to [that which happens in the case of the] perception of variegated colour. And in the same way as [one objective phenomenon, f. i. one colour], enters [so to say], by our perception, into the other parts, *so that there arises* [literally: with reference to] the independent nature of one aggregate which is characterised by [or: in which dominates] one of the parts — similarly at the manifestation of one [thing] of a solid (*sthūla*) character, we become aware of a blending of several into one. And if [you refer to the case] where one abides in several, this does not make the slightest difference, in as far as in both cases equally the blending of one is particularised by several. So then we have refuted both absurd consequences [which you, our opponents, try to deduce from our premises], namely, [the thesis]: „whatever is one, abides in only one place, so as one colour or one aggregate" and [the other thesis]: „whatever abides in many [parts], is manifold, as f. i. the *tāla*-fruits which are divided into many portions or an aggregate which abides in many, [in a manifoldness]". And the [two instances of] universal concomitance, [expressed in these two propositions] are refuted both from our own and from another's [the opponent's] standpoint. From our own standpoint, namely, [as follows]: one cognition abides in several [factors]: object, external sense-organ and internal sense-organ, in as far as it abides in them by causal relation, whilst it possesses one undivided, individual nature. And also for the other, [the opponent], one thread abides equally in several jewels in a form [which is called] conjunction. So then the aggregate will abide in its parts by the relation of inherence and will yet not be many. Moreover, whilst this whole argumentation [of yours], based on *prasaṅga*, destroys [the notion of] abode, it annihilates too itself

---

[i. e. makes all argumentation impossible]. For if no aggregate should exist and [consequently] the world [should consist] merely of atoms, then the notions [used in argumentations, such as] *dharma* (characteristic), *dharmin* (that which possesses the characteristic), *dṛṣṭānta* (example) &c. would become baseless; and [in accordance with this] no abiding (or existence) of a thing which has no abode could take place. Therefore, by that [argumentation of yours] the aggregate which is proved by perception, cannot be annihilated; for it [scil. argumentation] is of less weight than that [i. e. perception], in as far as [argumentation] is dependent on perception.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: perception is mistaken (illusionary, *bhrānta*)?

[Siddhāntin]: Why this?

[Opponent]: Because it is done away with by a refuting fact (*bādhaka*).

[Siddhāntin]: If perception is mistaken, then the refuting fact is proving; and if the refuting fact is proving, then perception is mistaken; so there arises [the logical fault of] mutual dependence [of propositions]. But no such rule exists in reference to perception, in as far as it is independent [of other sources of knowledge]. And it is not right to say that such a thing [as perception] which is in agreement with the practical efficiency [of objective existence], which is trusted in by everybody, and which possesses an immediate evidence, should be mistaken. For [should it be so], then the unwished-for consequence would be that even the perception of [such elementary *ākāra*s as] blue &c. would be mistaken. So then your refuting fact has been put aside by us.

10. *The existence of the atoms.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 43 l. 17.

[Siddhāntin]: The atoms, [the existence of] which can be deduced from the [existence of the] aggregates, must be called existent.

[Opponent]: The conjunction of the atom simultaneously with a sixfold [i. e. with six surrounding atoms] leads us to accept [the idea] that the atoms possess six parts (sides), and [consequently] excludes the existence of atoms. [1])

[Siddhāntin]: How is this simultaneous conjunction to be taken? Is it either a simultaneous origination of the one atom with six other atoms? [2]) Or is it conjunction [which takes place] simulta-

[1]) Cf. here book I p. 71 letter *h*.

[2]) ... have the form of a cube?

neously? If it is a simultaneous origination — of a thing without parts [together with six other similar things] — in consequence of the simultaneity of the causes, what difficulty [could be raised]? But if it is a simultaneous conjunction, then neither is this inconceivable. For conjunction of objects does not concern their parts, for it also takes place with reference to (physical) space, which is without parts.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: You are wrong; for, supposing that one portion [of the atom] were [identical with] the other, then conjunction [would remain] within the limits of one atom and we should get the unwished-for consequence that it [scil. the object or aggregate] could not be perceived; however it is an object in reality.

[Siddhāntin]: The being subject to several conjunctions is possible, if simultaneous causes exist, just as well in reference to one undivisible atom, as in reference to a thing consisting of parts. Thus [you are] not [capable of] refuting [the existence of the atoms].

11. *The use of language restored, at the time of creation, by the Prajāpatis.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 54 l. 3:

mānasān iti; in reference to the expression: „spiritual":

„The man, who possesses a body from the womb, does not remember anything of former births, for the impressions (*saṃskāras*) have disappeared owing to the miseries undergone during the stay in the womb &c. Ṛṣis, Prajāpatis and Manus, however, possessing unseen (qualities of soul) which are distinguished by bodies, not born from the womb, clearly perceive their *saṃskāras*, and remember the complete use of word and meaning, just like a man who awakens from sleep; they then, many as they are, having this remembrance, make use [of the words and meanings] when among each other; through their use [of language] the creatures who are contemporaneous with them, get proficient in it; and from their use [of language] others again; thus the proficiency in word and meaning originates by tradition of use. This is the meaning [of the expression: *mānasān iti*].

12. *The proof for the existence of the Lord.*

(Nyāya-kaṅdalī p. 54 l. 10.)

But what is the proof for the existence of the Lord?

[Siddhāntin]: Sacred Tradition and Inference.

The quaternion of large elements is originated by a percipient being,
since it is a product.
Whatever is a product, is originated by a percipient being, as f. i. a pot.
The quaternion of large elements is a product;
therefore this too is originated by a percipient being.

[Opponent]: If I should say: that earth &c. are products is not proved, in as far as the *pūrvakoṭi* is not arrived at by a trustworthy means of knowledge. [i. e. Earth &c. are either products or not products. The truth of the first alternative is not sufficiently proved by you].

[Siddhānthin]: This does not hold good, since [the large elements] possess parts. That which possesses parts, is a product, as f. i. a pot; and earth &c. possess parts, therefore they too are products.

[Opponent]; We might object: we may use inference [only] after having grasped the universal concomitance (*vyāpti*). This grasping of the universal concomitance cannot take place with reference to the [large elements] being products and to their being originated by a percipient being. Because at the moment when we form the idea of a maker in reference to pots &c., then we become aware of the non-existence [of such a maker] in the case of sprouts &c. when coming forth. And you cannot argue thus: sprouts &c. form part of our *pakṣa* [the object or objects in which the existence of the probandum is to be proved]. The division of what is *pakṣa* &c., taking the opponent into consideration, [should be made] at the time, when we begin inferring, after the universal concomitance has been ascertained. But here the grasping of the universal concomitance does not succeed since a contradictory notion always and constantly steps in; as has been said before.

[Siddhāntin]: This conclusion of yours is contradicted as follows. If it were so, then the grasping of the universal concomitance would always be lacking, in consequence of the non-perception of the two cases. Thus [f. i.] the inference by means of the general notion, [which inference is] given by the author of the Mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya, in order to prove the movement of the sun, would fall short. For at the moment when we perceive Devadatta's arriving at another spot, preceded by his movement, then we observe in regard to stars [and other heavenly bodies] only their arriving at another spot [and not their previous movement as well]. However, in as far as the non-perception of their movement arises in consequence

of their remoteness in place, the reiterated-vision, taking place without *upādhi*s and [as such] the cause of the grasping of the universal concomitance is not obstructed by this [non-perception], since [the two cases: Devadatta's reaching another place after going and the sun's obtainment of another spot by movement] counterbalance each other. If so, then though we do not perceive in reference to sprouts &c. a maker who is to be conceived as not possessing a body (for this lack of perception is due to remoteness in essence, in nature), yet by this the capability of the reiterated-vision, proceeding without *upādhi*s, is not destroyed. [These two argumentations] are equal.

[Opponent]: Now then, is (the Lord] proved by this inference only as a maker, or as capable of the creation of earth &c.? Should he only be proved as a maker, then what was meant, is not proved; for not a maker as people like we are, is meant by you. For he could not, whilst looking downwards, create a product, such as earth &c. [i. e. if the Lord resembled man, the creation would be too tiring for him, since he had to bend during all that time]. On the other hand [the existence of] the Lord, as capable of the creation of earth &c. is not proved, because there is no [logical] agreement (*anvaya*), [required for such an inference]. Namely by means of *anvaya*, He is proved a maker similar to those, mentioned in the examples (*dṛṣṭānta*s).

[Siddhāntin]: This consequence does not follow [from what I have said]. Since one particular kind of maker is not proved? When we have proved by the force of universal concomitance the general notion, i. e. the fact that an intelligent being precedes [the product], then also is proved the particular species [of the general notion], having for qualification its fitness for creating earth &c., because it is impossible to prove a general notion, devoid of particular species.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: I fear that the general notion is not proved.

[Siddhāntin): No. For you do not contradict the universal concomitance [of a product with a precedent intellectual being] together with the fact that [the earth &c. are] products. Because [1 ly] if the pervaded [object f. i. earth &c. as products, or the smoke] is not proved, then the general notion of fire would not be proved from the smoke. Because [2 ly] we do not prove a particular kind of fire, for which no logical agreement (*anvaya*) exists, and because generality, devoid of particularities, cannot exist. But this is meant: inference has a double character: the universal pervasion and the fact of the [probans] being a quality of the *pakṣa*. In this the

general notion is proved by the sufficiency of the universal concomitance. By force of the *pakṣadharmatā* is proved the wished-for particular nature which may be illustrated by the fire as characterised by the mountain &c. Otherwise what connection [1]) would there be between the *pakṣadharmatā* and the convincing character (*prāmāṇya*) of an inference in which the proving factors are acknowledged? If so, the case is similar to the inference concerning the Lord, as we apply [the same rule] in other cases.

[Opponent]: But my idea is: in an inference the particular nature is proved too, when there is no difficulty owing to [other] trustworthy means of knowledge. So how could there be any illegitimacy in our conclusion from smoke: that there is a particular fire, [nam. such a fire] which dwells on the ridge of the mountain. For difference in place, time &c. is noticed in individual things. But in the inference, [given for the existence] of the Lord, this particular nature is not proved, since other trustworthy sources of knowledge form an obstacle. To wit, we have not to prove that [earth &c.] are preceded by a [person possessing a] body. For if [the Lord] possessed a body, then his makership would not be possible, in as far as necessarily [the possession of a body is accompanied with] the reaching [of objects] by organs of sense and the incapability of power and knowledge concerning factors such as material, implements, &c. which surpass the sense-organs. Neither can you prove that [earth &c] are preceded by [the Lord as possessing] no body. Every maker first (1) determines accurately the character of the factors [or ingredients for the action], then he (2) wishes „I will perform this by that'', then he (3) exerts himself (psychically), after that he (4) sets his body in motion; then he directs the instruments and finally he (5) makes. But without (1) determination [of the character of the factors], without (2) wish, without (3) exertion [i. e. resolution], without (4) setting the body in motion, one cannot make; so then it is proved by agreement and contrariety (*anvaya-vyatirekau*) that the body of the intelligent being is a means for the arising of the product. When we have grasped all the *upādhi*s by means of a trustworthy test [or: source of knowledge] which teaches us a universal concomitance, then we are not allowed to ignore the facts thus ascertained. For instance in an inference, [deduced from the presence] of smoke, we may not ignore the fact that fire possesses the property of consuming the fuel. And if we omit such [ascertained facts], then intellect might be put aside [in

---

1) Cf. Speyer. *Syntax* § 410 R.

our argumentation concerning the Lord as creator of earth &c.], for He, the Lord, will create without intellect, just as well as without a body, because he is all-powerful.

[Siddhāntin]: If I should answer: he could not create, if he were ignorant of the properties of the material, implements, &c.?

[Opponent]: Why do you say so?

[Siddhāntin]: If I should answer: because this is never observed?

[Opponent]: Now my tree of wishes has also brought fruit, since [observation teaches us that] wish, separated from psychical exertion [i. e. not developed into resolution] is not so important for the arising of a product, as the body from which the motion is not separated [i. e. the body in moving state]. So then what is the fate of your generality „the being preceded by an intelligent maker''? Total failure, since both its forms, with and without possession of body, cannot be upheld. And because a general notion, void of particular species cannot exist [1]). [If you ask:] What is this fault in inference to me? [then I answer:] just as little as we shall meet with any one striking a sharpened axt against (physical) space that cannot be split, so just as little is any one likely to be found using a probans in reference to a generality which is unfit to be proved, which resembles a hare's horn, [i. e. which is as impossible as a hare's horn], because it lacks particular species. And without [my proving] the fault in your argumentation you would not be satisfied. So then this argumentation [of yours, for the proposition] that [earth &c.] are preceded by a bodyless [being], is refuted by *kālātyaya* [i. e. the trespassing of the moment], in as far as it is obstructed by right means of knowledge, which teach us universal concomitances. — (1) That which is obtained by means of universal concomitance, obstructing the particular species, [i. e. the fact] of possessing no body, (2) [the general notion] debarred from particular species, and therefore (3) the obstructed subdivision — these are the epitome of the *pūrvapakṣa* [prima facie view, or view of the opponent].

[Siddhāntin]: The answer [literally: the correction, remedy] of this [is as follows]: Is the generality „makership'' equivalent to the generality „possession of a body'' or to the generality „employment of those factors the sufficiency of which is ascertained?'' In the first place „makership'' is not „possession of body'', since the unwished-for consequence would be that a man, fully asleep or inert, would still be making (acting). But [makership is indeed] „employment

of those factors the sufficiency of which is ascertained". In this case, in as far as products arise, this [notion of makership] also applies to a bodyless [Being] in the same way as it applies to the soul in reference to its power of setting its own body in notion.

[Opponent]: Also in this [case we meet with that] which the soul has earned by its [former] actions; just this [result of former actions] is our body.

[Siddhāntin]: You are right [in so far], but [the body] is not the factor of causation of movements; as it would contradict [the fact that] the actions [inhere] in the soul.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: [the body] is [such a factor], in as far as it is the thing to be set in movement.

[Siddhāntin]: Similarly the atom is the thing to be set in movement by the Lord.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: Because the causation of movements in one's own body arises from wish and volition, and because wish and volition [in their turn] take place when there is a body, and do not take place when there is no body, — [for these reasons] the body possesses a [necessary] function in the causation of its own movements, by means of giving rise to wish and volition.

[Siddhāntin]: No; since this [body] is only a cause of a secondary arising of wish and volition; but at the time when wish and volition, having their own [i. e. original] nature, incite actions, then the body is not a factor in their arising, since it is that which suffers the action. Thus there is an exception to the rule [which you intended to lay down]. Namely we may notice that consciousness, only accompanied by wish and volition, without requiring bodily movements, is sometimes able to act upon things void of consciousness. But the general notion „product" is bound to an intelligent being [as precedent factor]. Thus the existence of the Lord is proved.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: In the arising of wish and volition the body is an indispensable factor.

[Siddhāntin]: When [wish and volition] are dependent [upon the body], then they are only adventitious; but when they retain their innate nature, then their dependence upon the [body] is superfluous. Thus the existence of the Lord is proved.

13. *The eternity of the divine cognition, wish & voliton.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 56 l. 22.

And there is no objection against the eternity of cognition, wish

and volition. For a double character, a transient and a eternal nature, is also seen in colour and suchlike qualities according to the abode in which they inhere. And such is the case with intellect &c.

14. *The individual souls cannot direct the atoms at the time of world-origination.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 56 l. 26.

Here is finished the discussion between defendent and opponent on the proof of [the existence of] the Lord. What follows now, is an elaboration of a detail.

[Opponent]: Let me ask: Do not the atoms [at the time of every world-origination] come into action, whilst being directed by the [individual] souls, [and not by one particular form of soul: the Divine Soul or Lord].

[Siddhāntin]: No; because these [individual] souls, whose consciousness depends on a set of sense-organs, earned by their own [previous] actions, are deprived of knowledge concerning all objects, before the coming into existence of the body.

[Opponent]: The [individual] souls too possess an innate spirituality (*caitanya*) which penetrates all objects.

[Siddhāntin]: It is not innate in [those souls] which rely on the connection with a body. For what is it [according to you] that confuses [the soul] so that it always manifests [the things] as if occurring without a precedent?

[Opponent]: This confusion is laid upon the soul through the interposition of the concealment of the body; but it [i. e. the appearance of all things as previously not known] is not objective [i. e. does correspond to the real state of things].

[Siddhāntin]: But how can you prove this theory of interposition (*tirodhāna*), taking into consideration that soul is [all] -penetrating, that its connection with the things is never cut off, that it is eternal and that its essential properties of manifesting objets will not cease?

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the interposition (obscuration) of spirituality is [effected by] the impediment of its functions (*vṛtti*).

[Siddhāntin]: How then do the body-possessors [i. e. the individual souls] perceive the objects?

[Opponent]: If I should answer: Sometimes their functions (*vṛttis*) are not obstructed?

[Siddhāntin]: Whence this difference?

[Opponent]: From the alternative of nearness [or remoteness] of the sense-organs.

[Siddhāntin]: If so, then whether the spirituality [of the soul] uses [or does not use] its functions, that would depend on the sense-organs and not merely on the nearness [of the soul to the objects], because the functions do not always take place, notwithstanding that [the soul] is all-penetrating and because, [supposing that nearness of the soul to the objects were a sufficient fact] the unwished-for consequence would be that the sense-organs were superfluous. It was well said:

> „Souls without the support of a body do not possess knowledge about objects”

And others have said thus:

> „Svayambhu bored the holes [of our body] in an outward direction; therefore the soul looks outward and not inward”.

And if the souls do not possess knowledge, then they cannot direct [the atoms]; thus we must ackowledge [the existence of] a directing soul, who is different from these [individual souls], who possesses an innate knowledge perceiving all objects, and who is by nature a Doer; because inanimate objects cannot move without a directing spirituality.

15. *Is there one Lord or more?*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 57 l. 15:

Is this Lord one or more?

We say: He is one. Because if there were many and they were not omniscient, then they would be just as little capable [of creation] as we are. If we suppose them to be omniscient, then one would be sufficient and the others would be superfluous. Neither is there a reason why there should be unanimity among more [creators] possessing equal power; consequently the thing which was to be done, would sometimes be omitted. And suppose: all should act in compliance with the wish of one, then Lordship would belong to that one, and not to the others; so as we see in the councils of monasteries. If nobody should oppose the carrying out of the work which was to be done, then Lordship would belong to none of them singly.

16. *The qualities of the Lord.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 57 l. 20:

So then because this particular Maker, proved from the particular

character of the product, is omniscient, He will grasp the differences (*viçeṣas*) between things without exception. Therefore in Him there is no false intellection, based on this [non-perception of differences]; and owing to the non-being of false intellection, love and hatred (which spring from it) will not be in Him; and owing to the non-being of these two, activity (which arises from them) will not take place; and since there is no activity, there is non-existence of pleasure and pain, born from it; and because His direct perception refers to always [i. e. because everything, past and future, is present before His perception], remembrance and impression [caused by perception] do not belong to Him. So then the Holy Lord is the abode of eight qualities. — This is the opinion of some people.

Others, however, who affirm: „Only His wisdom is free from refutation, but his capability of acting is open to it", and who neither accept his wish and volition, say thus: „He is an abode of six qualities". [1])

17. *Is the Lord a bound or liberated soul?*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 57 l. 26:

Is He bound or liberated?

He is certainly not bound, because *kleça* (affliction) &c., which are acknowledged as a binding and are the cause of bondage, do not exist in Him. Neither is He liberated, since liberation is a synonym of „breaking of the bondage". He is an eternally-liberated soul, so as the honourable PATAÑJALI has said: „the Lord is a particular kind of soul, which is untouched by afflictions, ripening of actions and stock of actions." [2])

18. *Discussion of the Kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda.* [3])

A. General refutation of the thesis of momentary destruction.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 73 l. 19:

[Buddhist]: All this [i. e. this argumentation for the existence of soul] is not coherent. Because the relation of that which abides and the abode does not exist, on account of the momentariness

1) Cf. here book IV section IV table D.

2) Yoga Sūtra I, 24.

3) See detailed analysis, here book IV section IX table A and book IV section VII table E.

[of everything existing]. To wit: existence has for definition: *artha-kriyā-kāritva*", [1]) and this is contained under succession and simultaneity, since no medium is possible between succession and non-succession (or simultaneity). [2]) For succession is the belonging to several times (or moments) of several *arthakriyās*; simultaneity is the belonging to one time. And there is no third alternative, besides one and many; since the denial of one of two reciprocally contradictory [statements] means necessarily the affirmation of the other. But succession is not possible in the permanent, since the thing, capable [for an act], cannot put this off, and since the thing, not capable [for an action], will neither at another moment transgress its own nature, [consisting in] unproductivity.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the [permanent], by assuming successively subsidiaries (*sahakārin*) accomplishes successively [its actions].

[Buddhist]: They answer to this: If the subsidiaries do not afford an additament (*atiçaya*) to the [permanent] existence, then they are not required, for they do not do anything. If they afford [such an additament], is then [the latter] distinct or not [from the existence]? On the alternative that it is distinct, the effect arises [or does not arise] owing to [the occurrence or non-occurrence of] this adscititious additament, in accordance with agreement and contrariety (*anvaya-vyatirekau*). And so the non-momentary [entity] is not the cause, since in spite of its presence [the effect] does not exist.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: The [entity] produces its effects, whilst it is accompanied by the additament (*atiçaya*) which is effected by the subsidiaries (*sahakārin*).

[Buddhist]: If the additament, [afforded by the subsidiaries], does not give rise to [another] additament, how can there be companionship [between the entity and the additament, since a second additament which would serve as a link, would be lacking]. And if [the additament] gives rise [to another additament], what will then prevent an endless regress? — [So then] [3]) it is not well said: that an additament is effected by the subsidiaries and belongs to the permanent, for no connection can exist between that which cannot be helped and that which cannot help. [For] neither does it hold good, that an additament, identical with the entity, is

---

[1]) Cf. Nyāyakandalī p. 12 l. 23; here p. 361.

[2]) Read: *kramākramānātmakasya.*

[3]) Read: *na subhāṣitam.*

effected by the subsidiaries, because an entity which has previously originated, will not originate anew.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: The previous entity, that minus the additament, is no more, and a new entity, identical with the additament, comes into being?

[Buddhist]: [In this way] the theory of momentariness has been proved [even by you who intended to polemise against it].

[Opponent]: Of what use are the subsidiaries to the Momentary?

[Buddhist]: Of none whatever.

[Opponent]: [1]) Why are they then wanted?

[Buddhist]: But whoever has said that they are wanted? For the *kṣaṇa*s, which are the last *avasthā* [i. e. the last point to which an analysis of the world can go back] are quite fit by themselves [independently of each other] to produce any effect. For what mutual dependence [exists] between them? As for their collecting together at a certain time, this [happens] in consequence of the strict necessity of the cause for this approaching of theirs to one another; but there does not exist a fixed rule for the causes of the coming together [of these *kṣaṇa*s] at a certain time in order that they should unitedly effectuate an effect. The causes, being each by themselves capable of bringing about the effect, will do so each by themselves.

[Opponent]: How is it that the many accomplish the one?

[Buddhist]: In this case you must examine the causes of those [things] which, [as one], foster [the many, the causes], not inclined to perform a thing each by themselves. But we, who simply explain the innate nature of reality as it is seen, do not deserve any further cross-questioning.

[Opponent, not taking notice of the last request]: If I should say: an effet is accomplished by one cause, what do the other [causes] accomplish?

[Buddhist]: They do not accomplish what has been accomplished; but the other [causes] likewise accomplish what is being accomplished by the one.

[Opponent]: If I should ask: what is the use of other [causes] there where one is sufficient?

[Buddhist]: That is true; but they — [the causes] — do not act deliberately so as to remain inactive on such considerations [as you have brought forward].

[Opponent]: Stil the fact that one effect originates from several

---

1) Read: *te cāpekṣyante.*

[causes] remains a difficulty [for you], because a differentiation in the cause is the reason for a differentiation in the effect.

[Buddhist]: It is not [quite] so. For the differentiation in the effect results from a differentiation in the effecting complex (*sāmagrī*), but not from a differentiation in the subsidiary. To be a subsidiary (*sahakārin*), that means: to be a producer of one effect.

Therefore from the standpoint of momentariness, it is logical that an effect is brought about by the succession of existences, succeeding one another.

Also [the supposition that the Permanent] produces [all its consequences] simultaneously, presents difficulties, for the innate nature [of a thing], capable of producing its effects, will not be inactive at another time.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: there is no effecting of that which has been already effected, nor is there anything which is still to be effected by the [thing], as the complete bundle of effects have been produced together. Therefore, it does not act at another time (*kṣaṇa*).

[Buddhist]: But so this [thing] would then [i. e. at that other moment] be non-existent, since it is void of all *arthakriyā*s. Ergo: existence is excluded from the Non-momentary, since we do not see [in the Non-momentary] succession and simultaneity, which are *vyāpaka* [in reference to existence, i. e. which, either one or the other, in all cases where we meet with existence, are present]; consequently existence is proved to abide in the momentary (transient).

Whilst such is the case, the inference for the Momentary can easily be understood:

Whatever is existent, is transient,
And the twelve *āyatana*s [1]) are existent.

[Opponent]: To this we answer: The proof for momentariness from [the notion] „existence" does not hold good, in as far as we do not see that it [scil. existence] is excluded from the *vipakṣa* [i. e. all cases in which momentariness is lacking] [2]).

[Buddhist]: If I should answer:

That which is void of succession & simultaneity,
is not-existent,
like the horn of a horse,
and the non-momentary (the permanent) is void of
succession & simultaneity.

---

1) Cf. *Muséon* N. S. II p. 206 n. 167.

2) The argumentation is based on the admission that a „*kevalānvayī hetuḥ*" is fallacious. See here book II p. 323 § 5.

By this refuting argument the notion that existence is excluded [from the *vipakṣa*] becomes based on the fact that succession and simultaneousness are distinct from the non-momentary.

[Opponent]: No; for, if [you are right and] we cannot form for ourselves a notion of the non-momentary, then we cannot arrive at the notion that existence is distinct from it. For in the same way as one, when having perceived water, becomes aware in respect to this [water] that fire [the probandum] and smoke [the probans] are lacking there — so after the perceiving of the non-momentary we should be assured of the lacking of existence [*sattvābhāva*, as probandum] from the lacking of succession and simultaneity [*kramayaugapadyābhāva*, as probans]. But according to you there is nowhere a non-momentary.

[Buddhist]: If I should answer: Just as we feel sure in reference to a spirit (though he is not seen) that something else is different from him, f. i. „a spirit is not a trunk", so will it be in our case.

[Opponent]: No; since distinction (exclusion, *vyāvṛtti*) is equivalent to the trustworthy source of knowledge, called „non-perception". Because this non-perception has for its definition: the perception of a thing other than the thing distinguished by it [*tadvivikta* i. e. to which it refers] and because there can be no [trustworthy „non-perception"] without the perception of the counter-entity (*pratiyogin*). But, in as far as a spirit by its innate nature falls beyond [the ken of our perception], the notion of the *piçāca* being distinct [from the trunk] will not arise.

[Buddhist]: If I should raise the objection: but how then can we possess the notion: the spirit is not a trunk.[1])

[Opponent]: This is not a *saṃsarga-pratiṣedha* (a synthetic negative thesis), but a *tādātmya-pratiṣedha* (an analytic negative thesis). This latter results from our knowledge that the *piçāca* would be perceptible, if its notion were to be subordinated to the notion „trunk" [in other words, if an analytic judgment were to exist: a *piçāca* is a trunk]; but [the notion: the spirit is not a trunk does] not [arise] in another way. So as it has been said: „every negation which rests on the principle of identity, is formed by our assuredness that the property of perceptibility would necessarily arise. In our case the notion of trunk, only determined by its having the nature of trunk, is the reason for excluding all that has not got that nature. If a spirit were a trunk, then it too would be known by itself (*ātmanā*). But knowledge does not seize

1) Cf. SPEYER, *Sanskrit Syntax* § 16 n°. 2.

[directly] the „spirit", so as it seizes the trunk. Ergo a spirit is not that [i. e. is not a trunk].

[Buddhist]: But it is not my intention: let there be a non-momentary or a momentary apart from [the phenomena] such as blue. But a *kṣaṇa* [a momentary object of human knowledge] such as blue which was known by a previous cognition and is imagined (*āropyate*) to be identical with a *kṣaṇa* of blue which is known by a present cognition, is called the non-momentary. But a *kṣaṇa* which is established [by us] as distinct [from all other *kṣaṇa*s], is called the momentary. With reference only to these [*kṣaṇa*s] such as blue, [we haved mentioned] the idea of the non-being of existence on ground of [the non-momentary] being distinct both from succession and simultaneity; if the same *kṣaṇa* (or object of a momentary cognition) belonging to a previous perception is again perceived, then [this *kṣaṇa*] would have done its present *arthakriyā* (act) formerly, or its former *arthakriyā* just now, but it would not do its [two *arthakriyā*s] in succession [one previously and the other now], since it is contradictory that one and the same thing is free to do or not to do [an act]. But neither could it have done everything formerly, because the absurd consequence would be that [the *kṣaṇa*, existing at the present moment] would not exist now, deprived as it is of practical efficiency (*arthakriyā*).

[Opponent]: Even then, [we may again ask] have you shown a really existing *vipakṣa* of „existence" as a probans, or a *vipakṣa* which is a creation of our imagination (*kalpanā-samāropita*)? In the first place it is not really existing, because the non-momentary [as defined now by you], blue &c. is not real. [Yet] any one who wishes to arrive at a real conclusion by means of inference, must first always show the reality of *pakṣa* &c., a reality known by trustworthy means of knowledge, in the same way as is done in the argumentation concerning smoke [and fire], for only then is the threefold [1]) character of the probans settled. But the non-momentary [according to you] is not of this nature; thus the exclusion [of the probans from the *vipakṣa*] cannot be proved; and when this remains unproved, then there is no proof for the agreement (*anvaya*), because the latter proof depends on the former; thus the fallacy, called the *asādhāraṇatvaṃ hetoḥ*, takes place. — But perhaps the exclusion of existence from the non-momentary [as you have intimated before] is proved by a refuting argument (*bādhakà*)? By what means then is proved the agreement (*anvaya*) of momentariness and being? For

---

1) [illegible]

the character of probans cannot be upheld merely by its exclusion from the *vipakṣa*, because the unwished-for consequence would be that the probans were *asādhārana* (too special). And an inference only based on exclusion (*kevalavyatireky anumānam*) is in itself not desirable.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: since we have settled that existence is not in the non-momentary, then as a matter of course (*arthāt*) [1]), existence is the abode of the momentary, and thus [we arrive at] a proof for the agreement (*anvaya*).

[Opponent]: The consideration (*parāmarça*) of existence as a probans does not arise as a „matter of course"; for even then this, the agreement (*anvaya*) of which has not been proved, would afford a probans. But the refuting argument — whether possessing both functions [2]) or whether affording another trustworthy means of knowledge — still in as far as it proves a universal concomitance, does this only with reference to the twelve *āyatanas*, because a universal concomitance without a correspondent object cannot be conceived, and because no object except those twelve *āyatanas*, exists. If we have understood the positive rule [of a notion] with reference to the twelve *āyatanas* — [i. e. if we have understood: „we have to do with one of the twelve *āyatanas*, in those cases where we meet with a certain object *N*"] — then we understand also its concomitance with momentariness, in as far as the notion of the relation results immediately from the notion of that which bears the relation. Thus the notion of existence is superfluous [as a middle term].

[Buddhist]: If I should say: one only grasps the concomitance by means of a generality with reference to the *pakṣa*; but existence is the probans for its particular form.

[Opponent]: No; because one cannot conceive a generality void of particular nature [3]). When the general notions of momentariness and existence, have been understood as abiding in particular [objects], then it is understood that momentariness abides in blue &c., as it has been justly said. Therefore [the notion of] existence is superfluous [as a middle term].

[Buddhist]: If I should say: by means of the refuting argument (*bādhaka*) we arrive at the concomitance between the exclusion from non-momentariness and the exclusion from non-existence; but by

---

1) Compare the technical term „*arthāpatti*".

2) I. e. the functions of perception and inference?

3) [illegible]

means of [the notion of] existence we understand the momentariness in its form of an [individual] object?

[Opponent]: No, [you are wrong], because exclusions (*vyāvṛttis*) which are supposed to differ, in consequence of the difference (*bheda*) of the excludenda (*vyāvartya*) [1]), cannot be identical (*tādātmyābhāva*).

[Buddhist]: If I should answer: Identity is called a member of syllogistic argumentation. The identity of momentariness and existence, realised in a particular object, gives rise to an identity of the exclusions (*vyāvṛttis*) which are laid down because [the latter identity] is identical [with the former identity].

[Opponent]: No, [you are wrong], because the identity of the positive notions (*vastu*) cannot be proved from anything else; or if this were possible, then the refuting argument (*bādhaka*) would be superfluous. Neither, in case you should ascertain mutual obstruction of the two exclusions, would there be a proof for the positive notion (*vastu*), because there is difference and lack of relation between a thing (*vastu*) and a not-thing. — And with reference to that which has been said by DHARMOTTARA:

> After having proved the universal concomitance [of momentariness and existence] in a pot by means of a refuting argument (*bādhaka*), we prove the momentariness in sound by means of [the notion of] existence;

we may give the same answer: since nothing impedes us from applying the refuting argument (*bādhaka*) also to sound, the searching for another form of proof is useless. Thus.

[Opponent]: And it is not true that practical efficiency is incompatible with the non-momentary. Namely in the case when there is a subsidiary. For existence has for innate nature the effectuation of effets, but has not got the innate characteristic of a factor independent [of anything else]. Thus the arising of the effect takes place in accordance with the way in which the subsidiaries, whose fitness is ascertained by positive agreement and exclusion, (*anvyaya-vyatirekau*), join together. Also the unchangeable is effective in succession, because it is impossible for an effect, dependent on several factors, to arise from one [factor]. Neither is it right to say: „An effect, when dependent on a subsidiary, arises from the additament brought forward by [that subsidiary], and the existing thing [in question] does not effectuate". Because we have seen that this arising of the effect is in accordance with the innate characteristic of existence. For if [the existing thing in question] were not pro-

---

1) Cf. Ny. Kandalī p. 208 l. 9.

ductive, then a rice-sprout would come forth out of a barley-seed, earth and water being present; for the effectuation would not take place according to any rule (*niyama*). Neither do the subsidiaries supply an additament to the innate characteristic of the existent thing; but they are merely subsidiaries [i. e. they do not want an intervening link]. But [what you call] the additament, is nothing but the being accompanied by these subsidiaries; and similarly the lack of an additament means the not being accompanied by them. For when the subsidiary exists, then the effect exists, and when it does not exist, then neither does the effect.

The acceptation of a difference in the *kṣaṇa*s, some of which should be productive and others unproductive, is refuted by perception, which everywhere grasps [cases of] permanence.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: this mistaken perception (*bhrama*) of permanence is the result of not perceiving the difference of *kṣaṇa*s (momentary forms of existence) which closely resemble each other and are originated one after the other without any interruption.

[Opponent]: If the momentary were proved, then the fallacious character (*bhrāntatā*) of perception would ensue; and if this fallaciousness were proved, then the momentariness would be ascertained; thus there is mutual dependence [of propositions].

And neither, when the cause of the origination of it [i. e. of a *kṣaṇa*, of any existing thing] and the cause of its annihilation are found by means of positive agreement and exclusion, is the supposition allowed, that when (respectively) the former or latter cause is lacking, still its origination or annihilation takes place. And it is also a false thesis (*asiddha*), that annihilation is without any cause, and that the seed [of this moment] is the cause of the seed [of the next moment]; [for]:

The seed, produced by the seed [thus: the seed of the second moment, a seed which is supposed not to undergo the influence of surrounding subsidiaries, such as water and earth] does not produce a sprout;
because it is a seed;
like the seed which still stays at the top of the stalk of the rice-plant.

[If one argues:] „The thing is not divisible. The two parts, given to one thing, by attributing to it efficiency and inefficiency, are not allowable" — [then this reasoning is] of no importance [to us]. [For] fire possesses efficiency with reference to burning, but inefficiency with reference to swimming. And neither does a differentiation of the innate character [of fire] result from these two parts, and

similarly one existent thing can be productive in consequence of the existence of a subsidiary, but unproductive in the case of its non-existence.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: how is it that, when one thing is present, another thing acquires efficiency? And even if we may accept the [fact of this] efficiency, why is it of only one thing, and not of everything?

[Opponent]: In this respect you must examine the innate nature of the objects. But we do not deserve any reproach, when we attribute the function of an effecting complex (*sāmagrī*) to certain things in a certain respect, after having found the fitness of these things in this respect, by means of positive agreement and exclusion. And even from your standpoint, only earth, water and seed are the subsidiaries (*sahakārin*) towards the origination of the sprout; and no other things are such. According to you, what other cause than the innate nature of things exists?

[Buddhist]: If I should say: seed &c. are capable [of producing] each by themselves; they are not the subsidiaries of one another?

[Opponent]: Why then does the husbandman throw seed into soil which has been prepared, and then flood it?

[Buddhist]: If I should say: he uses the means in order to effectuate, in consequence of their mutual supremacy (*ādhipatya*) [1]), a moment (*kṣaṇa*) fit for the production of the sprout?

[Opponent]: But if the seed by its own causes has become capable of producing a moment fit for the production of a sprout, what is then the use of earth and water? And if it has not become so [by its series of causes], then the proximity of these two will not make any difference, because earth and water will not abandon their innate nature.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: the power of beginning a *kṣaṇa* of any other kind than the uncapable *kṣaṇa*s — which power resides in the [moment]-series of the seed — is frustrated?

[Opponent]: Let us grant that there exists an origination of [a series of] unfit *kṣaṇa*s; but the origination of a fit *kṣaṇa* is difficult to compehend, for a cause is lacking. Neither can a power which forms the innate nature [*svabhāva*, of a thing] be frustrated, because the absurd consequence would be that existence (*bhāva*) is frustrated. And that annihilation possesses its cause, is also in force; for we cannot attribute to the seed the power to produce a *kṣaṇa* different [from the former *kṣaṇa*s]; because of momentariness [i. e. because

1) Cf. [illegible] N. S. II, p. 103, n. 122

everything consists of loose, unconnected, momentary forms of existence and because consequently surrounding earth or water cannot bring about a change in the nature of the seed]; namely in the case when it originates a power not distinct from innate nature, the absurd consequence would be that it originates what has already been orginated. Thus you are placed before the dilemma: either there takes place no action of a [*kṣaṇa* which] is unfit and possesses origination; or there is activity of a [*kṣaṇa* which is] fit, but an activity not differing from origination; [so that in neither case does annihilation come in]; but that [*kṣaṇa*] is not active, when another thing is concomitant, because [this supposition] is not allowed [from your standpoint]. [Our] opinion, however, is: fitness is [to be attributed] to concomitant things, because an effect does not originate from one [cause] and because we see that it originates from several. How then can you still stumble before us, who say thus? Therefore in as far as practical efficiency is possible for the non-momentary, the probans [quoted by you] is undecisive (*anaikāntika*).

[Let us now consider the following argumentation] which has also been given [by the Buddhists].

[Buddhistic argumentation]: The annihilation of produced things is inevitable, and from this fact the momentariness [of everything] can be proved. As follows:

That [property] which is constant in certain things, is not based on any other cause with reference to those things,
as is e. g. the case with [the property of] ironness with reference to arrows, swords &c.;
and annihilation is a constant property of produced things.

And similarly an inference refutes the dependence of annihilation:
those properties which are based on other causes [than the thing itself] are not constant [in that thing],
like e. g. paint &c. to a garment.

Thus if an existent thing should require for its annihilation another cause than its own causes, then it might happen that this produced thing would not decay, namely in the case when this [required] other cause was obstructed or incomplete. On the other hand things which are born with an innate nature apt to decay by their own causes, will be annihilated immediately after their origination. Thus momentariness is proved.

Moreover:

suppose an existent thing to possess an innate nature of imperishableness

then its annihilation is without a possible cause [i. e. no circumstance can cause its annihilation],

like the coldness of fire.

But:

if [the existent thing] possesses an innate nature apt to decay, then no [extraneous] causes are required.

And further:

an annihilation which is non-different from existence [i. e. an annihilalion which is the quintessence of existence], is not brought about by an other [i. e. extraneous] cause,

because difference [which would exist between cause and perishing thing] would effectuate difference in the effect [whereas we have admitted that the „annihilation" is „non-different" from existence].

On the other hand:

suppose that a [thing], different [from the perishing thing] were to originate from the other [i. e. extraneous] cause,

then the unwished-for consequence would be that we should perceive &c. a [new] existent [thing]; because one thing [e. g. the pot] does not transgress its nature [i. e. does not become another thing], when another thing [scil. „non-existence"] is originated. For the expression „the pot has been destroyed", in which an existent thing is the [grammatical] agens, would not exist, but we should say: „an non-existence has originated". And on the same supposition, when any one asks: „was there a pot?" an answer, mentioning the annihilation of the pot, would be no answer.

So then annihilation is the nature of existence.

[Opponent]: To this we answer: does the originating existent [thing] remain in one moment, or does it remain in a second moment as well? If we accept the alternative that [it remains] a second moment, then momentariness is given up; in as far as [one thing] has several time-[moment]s. But if [the thing] lasts one moment, then there is non-existence of the abiding in the second moment; and so there is no oneness of existence and non-existence [as you would like to uphold], because of difference of time.

[Buddhist]: But we do not uphold the opinion: „existence is non-existence of itself", but: the second *kṣaṇa* is the non-existence of the first *kṣaṇa*.

[Opponent]: That neither holds good. Because the anterior and posterior moments are individual forms of existence (*vyakti*) and thus there is no contradiction (mutual negation) in their innate characteristicts. Just as a pot exists together with another pot which

abides in a [moment-]series different [from the moment-series of the first pot], similarly could [the „second *kṣaṇa*"] exist together with a [*kṣaṇa*] abiding in the one moment-series, because the one trustworthy means of knowledge which grasps the „second *kṣaṇa*" and which knowledge is positive (*vidhi*) with reference to the innate nature [of this *kṣaṇa*] and successful [i. e. of acknowledged value], does not afford reliable knowledge with reference to the negation (*pratiṣedha*) of the first *kṣaṇa*. Non-existence, however, may be defined as the negation of existence; because it arises from [such] a notion [as]: „the pot does not exist", so then the arising of this [non-existence] means the cessation of existence; the continuation of this [non-existence] means the discontinuation of existence; the perception of this [non-existence] means the non-perception of existence; so it is right, because they are the contradiction to each other. And if so, there is no momentariness of existence. Because [if this theory of yours were right], there would be no fixed rule for the close connection (*ānantarya*) between existence and its non-existence, which comes after it and which requires another [i. e. extraneous] cause. And this is confirmed through the destruction (by means of a hammer) of an originated pot a long time afterwards.

[Buddhist]: The destruction of the pot forms the quintessence of its existence, but the origination of the [moment-]series of the shards is caused by the blow of the hammer.

[Opponent]: That neither holds good. For as long as the power of the originating of similar [*kṣaṇa*s], located in a [certain moment-] series, is not obstructed, a series of dissimilar [*kṣaṇa*s] cannot arise. And when [you accept] the obstruction of this [power] through the blow of the hammer, why are you hostile to the obstruction of existence? — Neither, if we accept [non-existence] to be effectuated by a cause, would the consequence be that also non-existence is a thing; because perception &c. prove that its innate nature is [to be] negation of a thing. Its innate characteristic, namely, is as follows: although produced, it does not perish, as existence does; because we do not perceive that which is destroyed. [In other words: although existence and non-existence agree with each other in having a cause, yet they do not agree in all respects; for instance the one will be destroyed, the other will be eternal; the one is perceptible, the other is no object of perception; thus you may not infer from their agreement in one point agreement in other points]. Suppose that the innate nature of a thing — which nature is ascertained by a trustworthy means of knowledge — were without shape, because of

the similarity of its properties to something else [i. e. because it possesses e. g. *kāraṇakāryatva*, fitness of being produced by causes, just like non-existence], then the manifoldness of the world would also be without shape [1]).

Neither may the question „how is it that one thing transgresses its nature, when another is originated?" be used against us as an attack; for we have here to do with the innate nature of things; moreover the expression „the pot has been destroyed", [speaks for our opinion]; and because non-existence arises by a process which begins with the movements of the portions of the thing [and goes on through the different stages summed up in the Vaiçeṣika system]. Therefore *this* non-existence is of *this* [existence] and is not of every [existence]. And there is no inherential cause of it, [i. e. of this non-existence], because it [the non-existent thing] is not. Neither has it a non-inherential cause, for where do we meet with an effect [of such a cause], which has no abode? This, namely, is seen: the non-existence [of the pot] does not inhere in the pot, as this does not exist; neither does it inhere in the floor, because [this non-existence] is a property of something else [namely of the pot].

[Buddhist]: But how then is it explained as located in a certain place?

[Opponent]: Because it is in accordance with its counter-entity (*pratiyogin*). This, namely, is the innate nature of it [of non-existence], that in case of negation of the conjunct, it appears like the conjunct; that in case of negation of the thing inhered in, it appears like the thing inhered in; and similarly particularisation [borrows its character from the relation on which it bears]. But conjunction [of non-existence with a thing] or inherence [of it in a thing] do not exist, because they are properties of existing things. Thus we have proved that non-existence is the contradiction to existence, the object of the notion: „is not". With reference to the contradiction, made [i. e. accepted by man] between fire and snow, „there is non-existence of fire in snow, there is non-existence of snow in fire", — the contradiction of these two is not due to their innate characteristics, because there is no contradiction between one positivity (*vidhi*) and another positivity. — And as to your saying: „non-existence, in as far as it is the constant [property of things], is not dependent on another cause", this is [shown to be an] undecisive [argumentation] by referring to the rising and setting of the sun; because if these [two movements of the sun which are

---

1) **Read:** *nirākaraṇatvam.*

constant in it] were independent [of certain intervals], then no distinction of time would exist; [thus properties can be constant in a thing and still depend on other causes].

Also [your argumentation, based on the fact] that one [particular] effecting complex may be obstructed, is open to a similar objection. Because the cause of the paint in the garment [which you gave as an example of an inconstant property] is still regulated [by the course of circumstances], and its time too is defined, and only as long as that time has not yet approached, does the origination of the colour not take place; the causes now of annihilation are unlimited [in number] and similarly their fixed times; because it is impossible for all [causes] always to be frustrated; one [cause], therefore, whatever it may be, is effective, and being effective at another time [than might be excepted at first] will destroy the thing immediately. So then with reference to produced things, it holds good that annihilation is constant in them.

B. Momentary destruction is repugned by the fact of human reeognition.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 80 l. 7:

[Vaiçeṣika]: This complete argumentation for the momentary destruction is refuted by *kālātyaya*, for by „recognition-perception" (recognitive perception) we cognise again what was cognised before.

[Buddhist]: But this cognition (*pratyaya*) cannot inform us about the condition [of any thing] in a previous and posterior time. For this is not one act of knowledge, since there is no cause for this. The sense-organ embraces [literaly: plunges into] a near object, but not that which existed in a past time. And similarly the memory-impression, originated by a former experience and limited to the object of that [experience], does not bear upon a later time. Neither can we find any thing that, being one, distinct from both and [at the same time containing] the object of both, could bring into existence such an intellection. So then this one intellection does not exist, since [we have to do here with] a manifoldness by nature. For perceptibility is „this", and what transgresses [through belonging to the past] our sense-organs, is „that". Moreover, perceptibility and imperceptibility, being mutually contradictory, cannot unite in one spot.[1] Therefore, these two forms of consciousness (*saṃvitti*), namely seizing and remembrance, have separate objects.

[1]) Read *naikatra*.

[Vaiçeṣika]: We answer to this: One real object, characterised by the fact that it belongs to a past and present time, is indeed cognised by such an intellection. Moreover the opinion „that its object does not exist" is opposed to [what is taught by] our consciousness. The seizing and the remembrance, [considered separately] are not based on the same object; just for this reason we must accept [the existence of] this intellection which has both for objects, in as far as [this intellection, which I have previously called the recognitive perception] is capable of that notion [namely of the identification of the object of the perception with that of the remembrance]. Intelligent people will surmise even an unseen cause for the origination of a seen effect; but never will they ignore an evident effect, because they do not perceive the cause. For [if this were allowed], the unwished-for consequence would be that one could ignore even the manifold nature of the world. Therefore, although sense-organ and memory-impression, taken separately, are insufficient; yet this one effect, namely recognition, can be produced by them when combined; and it will have the [same] object as both [functions], since they both [when united] possess a sufficient causality, and it will fall under perceptibility, in as far as it follows the capability of the sense-organ by which the object [is perceived], [i. e. we recognise the objects either by sight, by ear &c., we can therefore, distinguish visual, auditive recognition &c.; so then recognition possesses a perceptive character]. And [the opinion] does not hold good: „wherever the factors, taken one by one, are insufficient, there they must be powerless even when united"; for we see that earth, water and seed, though ineffective when separated, produce a sprout &c., when they are brought into each other's neighbourhood. Where the totality of causes is manifold, there is the result likewise manifold; so it has been well understood. Therefore, perceptibility and imperceptibility, having respectively a near and remote object as characteristic, will not obstruct each other. For the same reason even where no contact with the sense-organ is met with, the [remembrance of a] past time possesses a perceptible character, since it concerns an object of sensorial knowledge and since perceptibility only means the concordance with that [object of sensorial knowledge] alone. The sense-organ, though embracing what is remote, yet only embraces the past time, but not the future; because of the absence of the memory-impressions as an auxiliary in this case. And nothing impedes one [state of consciousness] from bearing sometimes on two times, by which [empediment] the embracing of two times by one conscious state would be a

mere fancy. For a relation between one [as the thing to be distinguished] and several distinguishing attributes is a fact of experience; for instance that between Caitra and his umbrella and book. And there is not the slightest difference [in this respect] between the co-temporal relation towards the umbrella and book, and the relation of two times in successive arrangement; because in both cases we have to do with the notion of a particularisation of one [object] by means of both distinguishing attributes [or sets of attributes]. Similarly recognition, in as far as it ascertains one objective thing, subject to different conditions of place and time, puts aside the momentary origination and destruction of existent things. Thus.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: this notion is illusionary.

[Vaiçeṣika]: No, because there is no sublative cognition (*bādhaka*).

[Buddhist]: If I should say: „the proof for the momentary nature [of everything] is the sublative cognition which sublates it [i. e. the trustworthiness of recognition]."

[Vaiçeṣika]: The inference [i. e. the sublative cognition, alluded to by you] will arise, when [the trustworthiness of recognitive] perception is refuted, because then the objects [of your argumentation] are not refuted; and perception will be refuted when this argumentation arises; thus there is mutual dependence [of propositions]. But this rule [of dependence] does not exist for perception, because it is an independent [means of knowledge]. And since perception has the particular and inference has the general for an object with reference to fires &c. [the things of the surrounding world], and since there is no mutual obstruction [between these two facts], therefore the arising of inference will not be hindered by perception. This may be enough.

[Vaiçeṣika]: If any one should assert too boldly: „momentary destruction is a fact of perception", then we answer him: such a perception (*anubhava*, fact of knowledge not due to memory) does not exist. For what we are conscicous of, is: „this is blue", but not „this is momentary".

[Buddhist]: Momentariness is not separated from blueness, because it does not possess separately practical efficiency. Therefore whenever blueness is grasped, momentariness likewise is grasped. But since we do not grasp the difference between closely resembling *kṣaṇa*s, no apprehension of this sensation takes place.

[Vaiçeṣika]: O greatest excess of wisdom, that somebody who first mentions perception (*anubhava*) [as a reason for his accepting the *kṣaṇabhañga*], should put forward [the formula]: „that which is not apprehended [i. e. the *kṣaṇikatva*] is the same as that which is

grasped [i. e. the *nīlatva*]. This is a wrong doubling of the notion [literally: a mirage of the desert] on your part; because you [as a Vijñānavādin] do not accept, besides the apprehension which originates owing to perception, something else which is the basis (*nibandhana*) of the different forms in which an object is seen by perception. Moreover the identification of two things [*kṣaṇikatva* and *nīlatva*], one of which is as a rule not apprehemded whilst the other is, seems just as nonsensical, as to say that blue and yellow are identical.

[Buddhist]: Perceptional knowledge, [in itself] momentary, embraces the existence of a thing, as far as this abides in the same time as [the perception] itself; excludes whatever is not bound to that time; also excludes the relation between the thing, completely existing in that time, and all other times; and consequently grasps the momentariness, i. e. the remaining [of a thing] during that one *kṣaṇa*. [Bare perception thus bears merely on the thing; apprehension on the co-temporal relation of thing and momentary act of consciousness].

[Vaiçeṣika]: Now you support one absurdity by another. For a cognition is not grasped by itself, how then could it grasp the sameness of time of a thing with itself? But let us grant that it does so, then this perception in which we realise: „the object did not exist before and will not exist afterwards" is a dreamlike [i. e. an incoherent] perception, because we do not grasp in it either a past or a future time. When the perception embraces the present time, its exclusion of any other time [past or future] is fit, because existence [present time] and non-existence [past or future] are contradictory to each other, but not so the exclusion of the relation towards another time, because the relation between one and several — so as that between a string and the jewels — is not self-contradictory.

This topic has been treated at length by us in the *Tattvaprabodha* and the *Tattva-saṃvādinī*; therefore we need not dwell on it here any longer.

C. The notion „saṃsāra" is incompatible with the Buddhistic theory of universal momentariness.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 82 l. 2:

[Vaiçeṣika]: Moreover, who would be subject to *saṃsāra*, if we accept the momentariness of everything being?

[Buddhist]: If I should answer: the series of intellections?

[Vaiçeṣika]: No, because there cannot be a series independent of [a substratum] which possesses the series.

[Buddhist]: But my idea is: the *saṃsāra* is not the conjunction of one [being] with several bodies &c. What is it then? The non-interruption of the series of intellections; and this is not incompatible with the theory of momentariness.

[Vaiçeṣika]: This neither avails; because there is no proof that the intellection f. i. of an embryo is effected by a precedent intellection. Neither does a thing originate exclusively from another thing of its own class, since we see that smoke originates from fire which is not of the same class.

[Buddhist]: If a thing (A) regulates its presence and absence, and its accompanying surplus (*atiçaya*) after another thing (B), then the latter (B) is the material (*upādāna*) of the other and belongs to the same class as this. This is certain. And knowledge possesses for its accompanying surplus the state of consciousness, and this is not found in elementary matter such as earth; therefore, which thing (B) has the accompanying surplus of another thing (A), this thing (B) is the material cause of that other thing (A) and belongs to the same class. If we consider this as ascertained, then it follows that the intellection of the embryo must have another intellection for a precedent. For if there were an exception with reference to the cause, then the unwished-for consequence would be that the effect would lack a wherefore.

[Vaiçeṣika]: This neither holds good. For we see that fire which has burning (consuming) for an accompanying surplus arises f. i. from the rubbing of wood, which process has not got the burning for its intrinsic nature; similarly the accompanying surplus (*atiçaya*), the state of consciousness, can arise from the eye &c., which do not possess a conscious nature; so then we are not obliged to surmise a cause which is of a conscious nature; therefore, the proof for the birth out of a precedent intellection will fail. Neither will a following birth be proved. Because there is no proof for the thesis that at the time of death another intellection is to be originated by the last intellection.

[Buddhist]: If I should answer: there is such a proof. If a thing (A) has reached the complete condition of cause in reference to another (B), then it produces this thing (B). F. i. a seed is in a complete condition of origination with reference to the sprout. Similarly the last intellection [of the dying man] is in a complete condition of origination.

[Vaiçeṣika]: No; because we see an exception [to the rule which you try to lay down] in the last moment of a flame &c. [i. e. we

do not experience that the last glow of an extinguishing flame arises somewhere else in the form of a new flame].

[Buddhist]: If I should answer: there is not the [required] completeness in the last moment of a flame, since there is incompleteness in the condition of the causes, of oil, wick &c.

[Vaiçeṣika]: Neither is the completeness in the causal conditions proved for the last intellection [of a dying man], an intellection which suffers by the suffering of death. Thus it has rightly been said: in the theory of momentariness there is no room for the existence of another world. Here then we may stop.

19. *The difference between sentiment &c. and cognition.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 90 l. 22:

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I should say: pleasures have the nature of cognitions [literally: of something known], because they, [pleasure &c. and cognition], have the same cause; moreover the manifestation of pleasure is not seized by another organ. [1])

[Siddhāntin]; No; because if pleasure and pain were in nature cognitions, then the unwished-for consequence would be, that they could not differ from each other. And if they differ, then a cognitional character cannot be attributed to them, for, although both have in common the being forms of consciousness (*bodha*), yet they exclude each other mutually [i. e. pleasure is not pain, nor is pain pleasure]. Neither are both, [pleasure and pain], born from the same cause as cognition is; since cognition arises from the form of the object, whereas pleasure and pain arise from this [cognition], assisted by [our] *vāsanā*s. Otherwise the unwished-for consequence would be the impossibility of *upekṣājñāna*, (the conclusion that we must be indifferent towards certain objects).

20. *Discussion of intellection and reflection.* [2])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 90 l. 27.

[Siddhāntin]: Neither is the assertion „intellection is consciousness of self [i. e. in every intellection we become aware immediately of the intellection as such]" proved. For you can find no example of one thing being simultaneously: act, agent &c. [3])

---

[1]) *karaṇa* instead of *kāraṇa*.

[2]) Cf. GAṄGANĀTHA JHĀ, *The Prābhākara-school of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* p. 26 & 27, & Sāḍholāl Lectures p. 93 infra.

[3]) Cf. here book IV section VII table C n°. 15.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I should say: a lamp illuminates itself; thus there is an example.

[Siddhāntin]: Also this [lamp] is seen by man; and is brought to his cognition by the eye; the knowing of it is the act; but it is not itself and instrument and agent and object and activity.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I should say: just as the ātmavādins [i. e. the Vedāntins] assert soul [1]) to be simultaneously object and agent in self-cognition, so [do we contend that] intellection is instrument &c.

[Siddhāntin]: No, because there is no difficulty [in the Vedānta-theory]. To be the „*karman*" means to be the object (*viṣaya*) of the activity of knowing; in this [activity] the soul is the agent by its independence, and there is no contradiction between [the soul's] independence and its being an object (*viṣaya*). But to be the instrument (*karaṇa*) and the activity (*kriyā*), is mutually opposed in consequence of one thing functioning as *siddha* (that which exists) and *sādhya* (that which must be effected): for oneness does not exist in instrument and effect. [2]) Similarly to be an instrument means to be fit for somebody else's use, but to be the agent means to be not used by somebody else, [thus to be independent]; ergo there is contradiction between these two [notions], in as far as they are related to each other as position and negation. Therefore this state [of being simultaneously instrument &c.] cannot occur in one thing.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: My idea, however, is: the meaning of *svasaṃvedana* (reflection as necessary part of every intellection) is not the non-existence of [the four functions, above-mentioned]: instrument &c. in intellection; but the arising of that [cognition] which has self-illumination as innate nature.

[Siddhāntin]: With reference to this we may notice: is this then an illumination of the object or of [the intellection] itself? If it is an illumination of the object, then the cognition would be about the object in consequence of this origin, but not about the [the cognition] itself; and so the fallacious result would be that it [i. e. cognition] would be non-cognisable. But, if on the other hand it is an illumination of [the cognition] itself, then the illumination and the thing to be illuminated would be the same; and thus oneness of activity and instrument would reside in it. Neither is there an instance (*nidarçana*) for your [implicit] assertion that the origination of [a thing] itself is an activity [of the thing] with

1) Read *ātmano*.
2) Read *karaṇakāryayor*?

reference to itself. And as to the proof, given for the ascertainment of the *sva-saṃvedana* (reflection as necessary part of intellection):

> if [of two things] the one receives the illumination inherent in the other, then the former will shine forth, every time when the latter does so;
>
> > like a pot which receives the illumination inherent in the lamp;
> >
> > > and colour &c. receive the illumination inherent in intellection;

[I should like to make the following annotations]: If only intellection is meant as the illumination of the objects, then the thesis that colour &c. receive the illumination inherent in that [cognition], is unproved and is *anaikāntika* [i. e. contains a predicate which is „not limited to one side"], because of the sense-organ [which also shares the rôle of an illuminating factor]. And if the illumination of the object [is upheld as] born from intellection, and not as [identical with] intellection, then you cannot quote any instance (*dṛṣṭānta*), because it is not a lamp, as producer of intellection, which illuminates objects. By this we have also refuted the thought [expressed in the following half-çloka]:

> „A seeing of the object by means of an apprehension (*upalambha*) which itself is not perceptible (*apratyakṣa*), cannot take place".

For the seeing of the object is not the perceptibility of the intellection, but the origination of the intellection; for then, even if the intellection is not reflected upon, the cognition about the object takes place merely by the origination of that [cognition].

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I should say: how is the origination of one thing the cognition of the other thing?

[Siddhāntin]: What have we to do with this? For it is the innate nature of the object. And if it is this, then no intellection [takes place at one time] of everything; because it [the intellection, results] from the total complex of its causes, and because it originates as having the consciousness (*saṃvitti*) about defined object for innate nature and as being cognisable by a defined perceiver.

21. *Refutation of the tripuṭī-pratyakṣatā* [1] *and the self-illumination of intellection and soul.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 91 l. 23.

Others, however, say: when the object becomes apparent by

---

[1] Cf. GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, *The Prabhākara School* p. 32.

contact with intellection, then consciousness (*vijñāna*) becomes apparent, because it has apparency (or illumination) as innate nature, like a lamp; and also the soul [1]) becomes apparent, because it is the abode of the illumination, like the wick of the lamp. Thus perception contains a triplex [of factors].

[Vaiçeṣika]: Also this is not true. For when it is conceived „this is a pot", we do not [necessarily] become conscious of the knower and the act of knowing. But when these two [last-mentioned factors] appear and the knowledge [expressed in the words]: 'I apprehend the pot' arises, then we have to do with *mānasa-pratyakṣa* [i. e. perception in which the internal organ assists] of an object, characterised by [its relation towards] knower and knowing [2]). But no appearance of knower and knowing takes place in the [merely-]ocular perception, because otherwise the unwished-for consequence would be that these two [factors] were of an ocular nature.

22. *Knowledge in general.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 96 l. 21:

Some [the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas] think: „Knowledge is to be proved by inference and is not grasped (perceived) by the internal organ" [3]).

[Siddhāntin]: This is not right, as a mark (probans) is lacking. First, the object itself is not a mark (probans) of the intellection, as there is no fixed rule here [i. e. it is possible that things exist around us and yet we have no knowledge of them].

[A Pūrvamīmāṃsaka as opponent]: If I answer: the object known is a mark (probans)?

[Siddhāntin]: The *jñātatā* [4]), the being known [of the object], is a connection between [this object and] our knowledge. This state of being the object of our knowledge is not experienced, when the knowledge is not experienced, as the experience of the connection is dependent on the experience of that which is connected. How then can a thing, having this as a characteristic, be a mark (probans)? Just as in the case of the mark [in general], so must the characterised mark be known, before it can be the cause of an inference. Perhaps you mean:

---

1) Prābh. School p. 40 n°. 5; p. 79 n°. 9.
2) Sādholāl Lectures p. 93 infra.
3) Prābh. School p. 26.
4) Cf. Nyāyakoça, s. v.

[Supposed answer of the Pūrvamīmāṃsaka as an opponent]: By [our own] intellection, immediately after its own production, a certain state, called the *jñātatā* (the being known) originates in the thing, like the *pakvatā* (the being cooked) of the rice in consequence of cooking. This state is perceived at the same time with the thing, as it is a property of this thing.

[Siddhāntin]: This is not right either. For the *jñātatā* of the thing is not perceived in the same way as the *pakvatā* of rice: its condition of pulse. For the state of the object being within the reach of perception, and its fitness for our lines of conduct like avoiding, [seeking and indifference] is a connection between [it and] our intellection, and not a new property. Moreover, in the same way as one *jñātatā* exists in reference to the object known, so there would be again another *jñātatā* in reference to this first *jñātatā*, [and so on]; therefore [the fault of] an endless regress would ensue.

[Pūrvamīmāṃsaka as opponent]: But some people say: Here the self-illumination [1]) in regard to knowledge comes in. What objection [have you against this notion]? Besides, the object which really is characterised by three times [by the fact that it is either in past, present or future], when known by an intellection, is perceived as characterised by the present [in as far as I now know the thing]. And this condition of a three-temporal thing as characterised by the present, is what we call its *jñātatā*. And because [this *jñātatā*] is produced by knowledge, therefore this *jñātatā* is a mark (probans) of our knowledge.

[Siddhāntin]: Neither does this hold good in any way. The being characterised by the present means the being defined by the present time. And this characterisation is not made an innate property of the thing by our knowledge, but it is only an experience [of ours]. For he who upholds knowledge to be inferable from the *saṃvedana* [2]) of the object [i. e. from the manifestation of the form of the object in our soul], must be further questioned by us: Does this *saṃvedana* of the object inhere in our soul or in the object? Certainly not in the object, as this repugns the nature of spirituality. But if it inheres in the soul, is then the intellection, which [according to you] is to be inferred from it, something else than this *saṃvedana*?

[Pūrvamīmāṃsaka]: If I should answer: „[this intellection], the

1) *Jñānasya svaprakāça*, Prābh. School p. 22 no. 4.
2) Prābh. School p. 23.

cause of this [manifestation], lies in the activity of the knower?

[Siddhāntin]: Is this cause eternal or transient? If transient, then the cause for its origination must be mentioned.

[Pūrvamīmāṃsaka]: If I should answer: The conjunction between the knower and his internal organ, promoted by the object, the senses &c. as auxiliaries, is the cause of this?

[Siddhāntin]: Let these, [soul, internal organ, object & sense-organs] then be the totality of causes necessary for the arising of the manifestation of the object; why [do you adopt] such a useless notion? — But if [you accept] the supposition: „this intellection is eternal and, having an accidental meeting between object, sense-organ &c. as its auxiliary, causes an accidental (or transient) manifestation of the object, then there is superfluity of hypothesis with regard to this [notion of intellection], in as far as there would be an arising of a manifestation of the object, merely by the aggregation of accidental causes. For it is certain that the perception of things and consequently practical conduct [or language in reference to things: *vyavahāra*] are brought about only by the manifestation of the objects,

[Pūrvamīmāṃsaka]: If it is said: How can intellection, which is born from object, sense-organ &c. be inherent in soul, if the soul is not to consist of innate intellection; [1]) for in case soul is supposed to be an unspiritual entity, the inherence could also take place in the sense-organs &c. in as far as there would be no difference anymore in their causality?

[Siddhāntin]: This is wrong. Because the limitation follows from the limitation of the nature of things. Just as the threads, it is true, are not yet a cloth, but still in consequence of the limitation of the general notion of „threadness" the cloth inheres in them, and not in the shuttle and the other [implements of weaving], in the same way though the soul is an unspiritual entity, yet in consequence of the limitation of the general nature of „soulness" a limitation will appear with respect to the inherence of knowledge [in other words: knowledge only inheres in the soul and not in the sense-organs &c.]

By this we have refuted a dogma, held by some [of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas]: „Self-consciousness is the inborn spirituality of soul." For then the appearance of this [self-consciousness] would take place in the state of transmigration [whereas man only learns to know the real nature of soul when he is getting liberated].

---

1) Cf. Prābhākara School [illegible]

[Pūrvamīmāṃsaka]: If one should answer: an obscuration of this [self-consciousness] is possible by ignorance?

[Siddhāntin]: Is ignorance [to be attributed] to Brahman and how, if an eternal self-consciousness exists [in Brahman], can you give a proof for your theory of obscuration? [1]) But if this [self-consciousness of Brahman] is obscurated, then no intelligence of others exists; because the Holy Writ says: „All this is resplendent by His Lustre". [2]) If it [viz. the self-consciousness, the spiritual nature of Brahman] does shine, then every soul gets liberated, since ignorance perishes, when knowledge breaks forth. But this ignorance [of everybody's soul] does not perish, nor does knowledge, this cause of its annihilation, come forth. Thus there is no liberation of the (humane) universe; but the intellectual dawning here and there cannot be doubted.

23. *Thing and quality are not identical.* [3])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 104 l. 24:

Those who, desirous of [proving] the identity of colour and substance, bring forward the argument: the cause of the substance is also the cause of the colour, may be asked as follows: Does the colour of an atom originate another colour (*A*), or does it not (*B*); and when originating [another colour], does it originate this in its own self (*Aa*), or in its abode, the atom (*Ab*)? — If it does not originate [this other colour] (*B*), or originates it in its own self (*Aa*) or in its abode (*Ab*), then no colour would arise in the double atom, and consequently the world, which is based on these [double atoms], would be colourless.

But, on the other hand, if it originates [another colour] in the double atom, then — for it is unfit that something non-existent should be the abode of anything particular — after the origination of the double atoms the origination of the colour will take place in them. This one must necessarily acknowledge, because an effect cannot arise without an abode. And if so, how could there be identity [between substance and quality], as a relation of priority and anteriority exists [between them]?

Moreover in a pot which itself continues [existing], colour &c. will vanish by conjunction with fire, and if so, then they also have an origination; this must be acknowledged by you. Now if

1) Here the argumentations are directed against a Vedāntin.
2) Kaṭh. Upan. 5, 15, Çvet. Upan. 6, 14, Muṇḍ. Upan. 2, 2, 10
3) Cf. Nyāyakandalī p. 11 l. 2; here p. 370

two things are so related to each other, that the one does not arise or disappear when the other respectively arises or disappears, then there is no identity of these things; this is the rule.

Neither, although [thing and quality] are entirely different, will the consequence be that they are perceived separately, because colour is always abiding in a substance. Why so? Because this is the nature (*svābhāvya*) of things. Thus all disputes against our Masters come to an end.

24. *Qualities in earth, causea by fire.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 109 l. 6.

The atoms do not possess pores [1]), because they have no parts. And if the double atoms were porous, then they could not originate, because there is no conjunction between the [simple] atoms. But even if the two [component atoms] were conjoined [and not, as they are, united by the Lord's *apekṣābuddhi*] [2]), they would have no interspace, because only the conjunction of two things, composed of parts, possesses interspace, since in one portion the conjunction takes place and in another it is lacking. But this rule is not applicable to two things, void of parts. And in gross bodies, which we perceive, the pore does not appear. Now to suppose: „the pore occurs merely in the threefold atoms, but is not seen there, because the threefold atoms does not permit perception", is making matters unnecessarily difficult (*gurvī kalpanā*). Thus pots &c. are not porous. And no entrance of fire-atoms into them takes place, as long as the earthly atoms are not completely separated. For one body, possessing touch, wards off another body of a similar nature. But if the parts are being separated, then according to the process of action (movement), disjunction &c. [as described by PRAÇASTAPĀDA] [3]), the annihilation of the conjunction, originative of the substance, will necessarilly cause the annihilation of the substance; thus how could this be manifested by the entrance of the [fire-]atoms? The disappearance of colour &c. in effect-substances, is only seen in consequence of the disappearance of the abode; and, on the other hand, their origination is seen merely as a consequence of the qualities of the causes [i. e. of the component parts]. Therefore the origination and anni-

1) Read: *sāntarāḥ*.

2) Cf. here book II p. 147 § 3.

3) [illegible]

hilation of colour &c. cannot be the result of the conjunction between the pot [as an aggregate] and the fire. [Namely]:

The colour &c. of the pot only disappear through the disappearance of the abode;

because they are colours, tastes, smells, touches belonging to an effect-substance;

like the colour &c. of a pot, which is destroyed by the blow of a hammer.

And similarly:

The colour &c. of the pot originate from the qualities of the causes [i. e. the constituent parts];

because they are colour &c. of effect-substances;

like the colour of a piece of cloth.

Moreover formerly [i. e. before the influence of the fire], there existed looseness between the parts, but now hardness is perceived. And looseness and hardness cannot enter one abode, just as little as *nodana* and *abhighāta*, because they are mutually opposed; therefore when the previous aggregate is dissolved, then another aggregate is born. If so, the annihilation of the old substance [takes place] owing to the annihilation of its causes, and the origination of the new substance owing to the existence of its causes; thus there is continuation (*avatiṣṭhate*); and the recognition [of the baked pot as similar to the pot of clay] has the general notion for its object, as is also the case with reference to a fire [through which a regular current of sparks goes on] &c. Also the perception of every continuation (*avasthā*) takes place in consequence of the gradual disappearance of an effect which really disappears; for a pot is not brought about by a direct gathering of atoms; so that on the separation of the atoms [the pot] would disappear immediately, but it is brought about by the intermediance of double atoms &c. And as long as [the aggregate] which is slowly being annihilated successively through the annihilation of double, threefold &c. atoms, yea particles of innumerable parts — all that time our perception goes still on. In one part the old portions are decaying; in another, new portions are being originated in their place [in the place of such old portions] by atoms already possessing [qualities] originated by burning, and this through the series of double atoms &c. Consequently we see baked and unbaked portions; and when by the annihilation of other portions the former aggregate enters into a state of decay (*vinaçyattā*), then in the next moment owing to the origination of new portions the origination of the new aggregate will take place together with the

annihilation of the old aggregate; thus there would be a streamlike process (*ādhārabhāva*) and accurate determination (*avadhāraṇa*). As many parts as there were in the old pot, so many will there be to effectuate the new one; and the same extention and multitude will be preserved.

[For the passage which follows next and which for its absurdity is not worth translating, cf. a parallel passus in the Vaiçeṣika Upaskāra on VII, 1, 6 transl. p. 218, and here the explanation of the similar *dvitva*-theory p. 201].

25. *Number, compared with qualities as colour &c.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 113 l. 22:

[Pūrvapakṣin]: This notion [sc. number] has colour &c. as its object.

[Siddhāntin]: No, because there is a dissimilarity in these notions. For [if you were right], this notion [of number], having the colour [of the object] as its cause, would be [expressed by words as] blue, yellow &c. and not [by] one, two &c.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: Let us then say: it is without object, because there is no other object (objective existence) than colour [1]) etc.

[Siddhāntin]: From what does this peculiar from „one, two, three &c." [which exists] in it [in that objective existence], originate?

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I answer: from the ripening of the *vāsanā*s (impressions) fixed in the *ālayavijñāna*. [2])

[Siddhāntin]: Then forms [of existence] as blueness must have the same origin. For there is no difference whatever, caused by [perceptional] impression, of this [blueness], when brought under the reach of knowledge, and the form „number"; by which [difference] we could decide that one is born from the object and the other is not.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: But if I should answer: this difference exists, for the *ākāra* blueness [3]) is not mistaken, and the *ākāra* number is untrustworthy.

[Siddhāntin]: This is without value. For there is no proof in this

---

1) i. e. than the contents of our momentary impressions (*kṣaṇas*). Cf. the Buddhistic theory often mentioned: that a thing is merely the series of its qualities, i. a. here p. 370 and p. 409.

2) Magazine-like consciousness; cf. De la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, *Opinions* p. 201.

3) With reference to the term *ākāra* (contents, originally: form, of a percept) cf. here book I p. 92 sub 3

case [namely on the basis of your theory of *vāsanās* and *ālayavijñāna*] that the *ākāra* blueness is not mistaken. There is no confirmation anywhere in this respect, because these [*ākāras*] are defined as single intellections and are momentary. For this reason neither is *arthakriyā* (practical efficiency) possible. Nor can there arise a similarity of the *ākārās* subsisting in former and later intellections, in as far as all intellections without exception have only to do with their respective *ākārās*; and only such [a similarity] could establish a confirmation, since this requires the perception of a series of *ākāras* similar to the one [in question]. Moreover, since sometimes the perception of dissimilar *ākārās* must arise, we cannot always have the perception of similar *ākārās*. — Neither is the trustworthiness of the *ākāra* blueness proved by its origination from the object. Because, if the object is not cognised [i. e. in case you consistently accept the *vijñānavāda*], then it is not allowed to affirm that it, [the *ākāra*], is effected [by the object]; and because, on the other hand, if the object is [accepted to be] cognised by another source [than by your *ākāras*, namely by direct perception], then the hypothesis of *ākāras* becomes useless. [In other words], on the basis of the theory that the object is proved by the manifestation of the *ākāras*, the object is proved by the manifestation of a trustworthy *ākāra*; and in case [you accept the existence of] the object as immediately certain, the trustworthiness of the *ākāras* is proved by ascertaining that this [*ākāra*] is effected [by that]. In this way [the two proofs] suppose each other (*anyonyāpekṣitvam*). Similarly as in the case of the *ākāra*: blueness, so we cannot contradict the *ākāra*: number, which falls within the reach of knowledge [i. e. in as far as it is of a subjective nature]. Nor is it possible to refute it by going [with our perception] into the thing [itself]; likewise such a penetration would be difficult in the case of blueness &c., since these [objective facts] are separated [from our soul] by their innate nature [i. e. all our knowledge of things is relative and never absolutely adequate]; therefore the manifestation of mere *ākāras* governs all [our knowledge]; otherwise sometimes it would not be born from an object, and sometimes it would be; and so there would be no proof for [facts such as] blue &c.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I should answer: in the case of the not-being of an external object, we cannot logically expect that the ripening of *vāsanās*, which [ripening] depends for its origin merely on the series (*santāna*) of these [*vāsanās*], would take place at and during a certain time — therefore since such a temporal character is not

possible for an *ākāra*: blueness, &c. which originates only from that *santāna*, [we may accept] the supposition [that] blueness and such-like facts [exist independently from us].

[Siddhāntin]: An arising at and during a certain time would neither take place for *ākāras* such as one, two, three, unless they were based on external things; therefore similarly [an objective] number must be accepted, since the way of occurrence is the same in both cases.

26. *Viçeṣaṇa and Viçeṣya*
(an eggression in the discussion of *dvitva*).

Nyāya-kandalī p. 116 l. 23.

The intellection „two objects" must be preceded by the intellection concerning *viçeṣaṇa* (characteriser);

because it is a characterised (*viçiṣṭa*) intellection;

like the intellection about [a man] carrying a stick.

And thus when the intellection concerning the quality [„two"] is proved, then the precedence of the intellection about the *viçeṣaṇa* [sc. about „twoness"] may be inferred from the fact that [the intellection concerning the quality] is an intellection about a *viçiṣṭa*.

Those, however, who proclaim the characteriser and the thing characterised to be contained in one intellection, will find a difficulty with [the notion] „fragrant sandal", for the eye has not the smell for object, nor does the olfactory sense comprehend the object. Therefore the grasping of the relation does not take place by these two, since the grasping of the relation is dependent on the grasping of that which bears the relation, by means of both [sense-organs].

[Objection]: Some people propose the following: „Just as recognitive perception, born from latent impression (*saṃskāra*) and sense-organ, has the anterior and the posterior for objects, since these two factors are capable of that, so will this [notion: „fragrant sandal"], born from eye and olfactory sense when united, be the object of both, since these two factors are capable of that.

[Siddhāntin]: This is not any better, as [the notion „fragrant sandal"] is indivisible. If the intellection were to possess parts, then one portion would be originated by the olfactory organ, the other by the eye, this distinction would be logical. But if the notion in question, effected by both [organs] as one and indivisible, grasps both the smell and the object, then the smell would appertain to the eye, and the object (thus would be the absurd consequence) would be an object of the olfactory organ; since to be

grasped by a certain sense-organ means to be the object of the intellection produced by it. Neither can the internal organ, infininesimal as it is, abide in both organs at the same time.

Thus after the smell being comprehended by the olfactory organ, the eye, assisted by this comprehension, originates the intellection concerning the *viçeṣya*, [an intellection] which has merely the *viçeṣya* for its objective base. This must be acknowledged by you, even against your wish. And if this is so, then the following argumentation has force for other intellections concerning things characterised:

> That intellection concerning the *viçeṣya* (which is the topic of our dispute), has merely the *viçeṣya* for its objective base;
>
> because it is an intellection concerning a *viçeṣya*, whilst at the same time it is a perceptional [notion];
>
> like the intellection „fragrant".

[The addition] „whilst at the same time it is perceptional", is made for the purport of distinguishing it (*vyavaccheda*) from probantial intellection (*laiṅgikaṃ jñānam*).

[Opponent]: But if the innate nature of the substance were the objective base of the intellection concerning the *viçeṣya*, then this notion would also arise, when a *viçeṣaṇa* is lacking. But since the *viçeṣaṇa* gives rise [to this notion], so, when the *viçeṣaṇā* is lacking, no intellection about a *viçeṣya* can arise. The notion which would arise, namely, would not differ from the notion of the innate nature of the object, because another kind of intellection will not arise without another kind of object.

[Siddhāntin]: No, [you are wrong], for we agree [with that which you adduce, but not with your conclusion]. We do not assert the innate nature of the object as such to be the base of the intellection concerning the *viçeṣya*, but the characterised [innate nature]. That condition of being characterised, surpassing the innate nature qua talis, which manifests itself in the intellection „[this man] carrying a stick", is not simply the notion of the man as such; and neither of the possession of conjunction with the stick. Namely in the notion: „[the man] with the stick" we become conscious of a man who is different from other [men]; and this attributeness of the stick is that which differences. Therefore it is taught: *viçeṣaṇaṃ vyavacchedakam*, i. e. the characteriser is a factor of distinction. The stick, namely, whilst causing the assigning of its attributeness with reference to the man, distinguishes him from another.

The following is the difference [between a *viçeṣaṇa* and an]

upalakṣaṇa [1]). The *upalakṣaṇa* distinguishes, but does not give rise to the notion of its being an *upasarjana* (an attribute, or something subordinary), for whereas in the expression „*daṇḍin*" the stick is conceived as an *upasarjana* to the man, we do not conceive „the twisted locks of hair" as an *upasarjana* with reference to the ascetic, in an expression as „the ascetic with the twisted hairs (*jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ*). The stick, in the first instance, is secondary, and the man primary, in accordance with the surplus or non-surplus of enjoyment in the practical efficiency.

[Opponent]: But is then this relation of *viçeṣaṇa* and *viçeṣya* not of a reflective kind (*āpekṣika*) and therefore unreal?

[Siddhāntin]: But do you not see that verbal usage with reference to doer, act. &c. is both reflective and real? This has been extensively explained in the gloss on the *Saṃgraha*.

27. *General proof for duality.* [2])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 122 l. 22:

[Vijñānavādin]: Why! This whole explanation of the originating &c. of duality is wrong, as there is no proof for the existence [of duality].

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the intellection: „two" is a proof?

[Vijñānavādin]: No, it is not; as a quality of „seizable"-ness does not exist. For an object, which would be seizable by knowledge, is either originating or not originating. In both cases an impossibility arises, as the non-originating thing is not, and the originating thing does not possess continuance.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the past thing is seizable by knowledge, because it causes this [knowledge]?

[Vijñānavādin]: No, since the fact that the thing appears as present refutes it; moreover, the unwished-for consequence (*prasaṅga*) would be that the organs of sense are seizable as well [and according to general opinion the sense-organ itself is *atīndriya*, beyond the reach of sense].

[Opponent]: If I should answer: The innate nature of a thing,

---

1) Çridhara's explanation here of the difference in the notions *viçeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa* is not quite clear. Perhaps we must understand it as follows: Ascetics, at least Çivaite ascetics — and here we must remember that Çrīdhara himself was a Çivaite — wore twisted locks of hair. An expression therefore, like „an ascetic with twisted locks of hair" could be compared with „white snow" in as far as it expresses explicitly that which is already contained in the main notion.

2) Cf. here book IV section VII tables A, B & E.

[which nature is] brought about by the totality of its causes, is such, that it alone is seizable, though there is no dissimilarity in respect to causation [between the things and the sense-organs]; but that the sense-organs &c. are not seizable. Further the appearance of present time has reference to the immediately following moment [i. e. the interval in time between the acting of the object upon us and our perception of the object is only one moment; and thus, being so short may be neglected].

[Vijñānavādin]: But again, what do you understand by the seizableness of a thing.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: Its being the cause of knowledge?

[Vijñānavādin]: Again the consequence would be the seizableness of the sense-organ as well. For there is no dissimilarity between this [and the object] in reference to mere causation.

[Opponent]; If I should answer: the self-manifestation of knowledge means the seizableness of the other, [of the thing]?

[Vijñānavādin]: The manifestation of the essential nature of the one, is the seizableness of the other! Truly this is more than clear!

[Opponent]: No, it is clear; for we must not examine any further the innate nature [of things]. Knowledge then possesses as its essential nature the grasping of the object. Therefore, the manifestation of its essential nature is the seizing of the object. And that [particular knowledge] which is born from a thing, is the seizing of this selfsame thing, and not of any thing indefinitely; therefore, no *atiprasañga* (to wide an applicability) takes place.

[Vijñānavādin]: No; because they are one thing. The being born, namely, from an object is the originating from an object-of-knowledge. And this [originating] is one, and it is not a quality of the knowledge and of the thing. So it will not determine the object. Knowledge, now, is not [a quality] of the object, since it is the quality of something else. And the differentiated relation of the one as the seizer towards the other as the thing seizable, is established, because it [i. e. the above-mentioned originating of the knowledge from the object-of-knowledge] determines both, and because it does not determine one of the two members of the relation. Neither does causality with reference to knowledge exist in past or future things, because they are not [now].

[Opponent]: If I should answer; the establishing of the relation between seizable and seizer results from the establishing of the relation between object and experiencer of the object?

[Vijñānavādin]: No, [you are wrong], because there is no difference [between the *viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāva* and the *grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva*].

[Inserted remark by the author]: Since the [opponent] is requested to mention the cause particularising both [*grāhya* and *grāhaka*], the wish of giving this for answer, clearly lies in each of the following answers.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the essential nature of knowledge is the state of seizing a particular object.

[Vijñānavādin]: But when this essential nature of it [i. e. of knowledge] is again without a reason, then particularisation does not ensue.

[Opponent]: But let it be said so [i. e. let us use the term *svabhāva*], for the purport of having a reason [to which we may refer].

[Vijñānavādin]: But why should we talk about such a *svabhāva* (innate nature); I do not see that it is different from *tadutpatti* (causal relation).

[Opponent]: But it is said: that which effects knowledge, gives its own form to this knowledge; this [thing] is the perceivable of that; and nothing else. The form of the object is of necessity to be found again in the knowledge, because otherwise the mere intellection, void of form, would be equally related to all objects; and because, if the distinctions: „this [intellection relates] to a blue [object], that [intellection relates] to a yellow [object]" are not [allowed], the conception of different objects would not exist. For this reason one says that trustworthy knowledge [*pramāṇa*] has the form of the object. And this [form of the object] which is of a particular nature, brings the knowledge into connection with the particular object; but the sense-organs &c. which are [the] common [basis of all experiences] do not possess this rôle. Therefore it is said:

„[The form] moulds it [i. e. the *buddhi*, intellection] after the object, without losing its character as form of the object,

„trustworthy knowledge, therefore, is the possessing the form of the thing to be known, in consequence of the thing's penetration [into consciousness]."

And elsewhere it is said:

„The being conscious of it [of the thing] cannot be a mere state of our consciousness; for [consciousness] remains the same with reference to everything; but similarity of form [1]) penetrating it [i. e. intellection], will cause it to correspond [with the object]."

[The problem of the *ākāra* formulated and examined by the Vijñānavādin]: We answer to this as follows: Is either the object

1) Read *sārūpayat, tad.*

perceived by means of this form-possessing knowledge, or its form, or both?

[Refutation of the last point]: To begin with the third point: not both, because we always become conscious of only one form: „this blue''.

[Discussion of the first point]: The hypothesis that the object is perceived by knowledge, is not allowable, because the knowledge [about a thing] does not arise at the time of the existence of the individual nature of the thing, and because it is not fit that the past should appear in our knowledge as if it were the present. And if you would answer: „the *kṣaṇa*, if helped by subsidiaries of intellection, always appears as the present'', then you show too great a confidence in the maxims of a school, because that [i. e. the thing which has acted on consciousness] cannot be grasped by this [i. e. the present act of consciousness. — What is here the reason, that discriminative knowledge reveals to us one particular object, and not every one? Because there does not exist identity (*tādātmya*) between both [knowledge and object]; and neither is causal relation (*tadutpatti*) the reason for discrimination (*vyavasthā*), [i. e. it does not show the difference between object and sense-organ], as has been said.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the fact of having a certain form is the reason for this fixation.

[Vijñānavādin]: Why then does the one blue-moment [i. e. the momentary state of consciousness, containing the notion of blue] not grasp another blueness which has the same form as well?

[Opponent]: If I should say: the function of grasper (*grāhaka*) is the innate nature of knowledge only, but not of the thing?

[Vijñānavādin]: Even then one intellection „blue'' would bear on all moments of blue, because [these *kṣaṇa*s] do not differ from one another as to this form.

[Opponent]: The function of the grasped only belongs to the thing-moment (*artha-kṣaṇa*), which causes itself [i. e. its correspondent notion in the mind] to arise by means of causality (*tadutpatti*) and similarity of form (*sārūpya*).

[Vijñānavādin]: Then also the perceivableness (*grāhyatva*) of sense-organ and of the *samanantara-pratyaya* [i. e. the immediately precedent contents of consciousness] would come in, as knowledge arises also through them. And indeed this rightly bears a similarity of form [to these two], scil.: [1] the being particularly directed towards the grasping of an object, and [2] the possessing of the character of consciousness (*bodha*).

'[Opponent]: But we mean: The two similarities [which you mention]: that between intellection and sense-organ, namely their being directed particularly towards the grasping of an object, and [2] that between an intellection and the *samanantara-pratyaya*, [1]) namely their character of consciousness, are common to all cognitions. But the similarity in form to the object is special [for one cognition], because the form of blue occurs in the intellection „blue" which itself has arisen from [the objective] blue. And the property which is special, is determinating, and in consequence of this distinction it happens that the cognition grasps the object, and does not grasp the sense-organ and the *samanantara-pratyaya*.

[Vijñānavādin]: Neither does this hold good, because the unwished-for consequence would be that [intellection] would grasp the *samanantara-pratyaya* which has the same object.

[Opponent]: That which causes the form of blueness &c. to arise in the cognition, is the perceivable of this [cognition], but the form of blueness &c. does not originate, in the streamlike cognition, from the *samanantara-pratyaya*; but from the object. For we find the adequateness of this in all cases where it [the „form of blueness" in the mind] arises, according to agreement and contrariety.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: [I believe the *samanantara-pratyaya* to be the cause of the intellection], because consciousness (*bodha*) is found to be adequate, wherever the form of „conscious" arises.

[Opponent]: The seizable is that which projects the form of blue &c. [on the mind]; therefore „this" [the form in the mind] is the indication of „that" [the object], [2]) and not of anything ad libitum. The restricted innate nature of the seizableness is that which determinates it. If so, the determination results from the determinated character of the innate nature. Knowledge, namely, when originating, can be described as the becoming conscious of an object determinated by its effecting complex. And similarly the object is subjected to this becoming conscious (*vedyatva*) by the determinated character of its innate nature of *vedyatva*, but sense-organs are not such.'

[Vijñānavādin]: Then the form (*ākāra*) is no factor. For the act of cutting has not the form of the tree, by which [form] this [act] would get connected with the tree and not with the axe; but the innate nature of the [act of cutting] and the tree are such:

---

[1]) Cf. *Muséon* N.S. II p. 193 n. 122.

[2]) Read: *tasya*

that it [the cutting] is determinated there, and not elsewhere. „This" is the act of being conscious of „that", also this discrimination (*vyavasthā*) has only the appearance as condition; therefore the *ākāra* is not required.

[Discussion of the second point: Vijñānavādin]: But, [perhaps you may suggest]: „we do not become conscious of the object, but only of its form, by means of form-possessing cognition?" Then the existence of the object cannot be proved; neither is there a seizing (*grahaṇa*) of the object, nor an apprehension [of its perception] (*adhyavasāya*). Reflection (*vikalpa*), namely, is quite out of the question; for although reflection really has the comparison [of two aims, of two desires &c.] for its function, it abandons this original function in those cases where sensation takes place, because of its immediate following after this perception; then on receiving the activity of an[other] factor [as an auxiliary], it makes the object manifested. But where sensation does not take place, there reflection is powerless, because the factor is lacking.

[Opponent]: If I should say: The form of the intellection, which ascertains a cause resembling itself, is a proof for the existence of the thing?

[Vijñānavādin]: How then does an exterior object, project a material form [on our mind]? What does this word tend to? Therefore [let us concede:] no material semblance [*ābhāsa*, i. e. *ākāra*, form] of itself is effected by the object in the cognition. And where it is thus obstructed in one respect, [namely with reference to materiality], it is neither possible in several respects. But the [mental] form, not originated from an object, exists now and again by some cause or other [in our mind], it is truly experienced, [although] not existing; similarly another [mental] form will exist and will be truly experienced, [although] not existing. Neither is in your theory of *ākāra*s the distinction between truth and falsity of the cognition-forms easy; this has been pretty well found out. Moreover, the form of consciousness frames then a resembling object as the cause, when it is understood that the cause is of such [1]) a form as belongs to consciousness. But even when an object gets to be known [2]), such a notion [of similarity between our sensation and the exterior object] does not arise, because the ascertainment of causality and similarity would depend on the grasping of both. Thus the proof for the existence of the object does not arise from

1) Read: *tādṛçam eva.*
2) Read: *arthasya saṃvedyatve.*

the [mental] form, and consequently neither does the [proof for the] causality. So then causality cannot be a definition of seizableness (*grāhyatva*). Neither is the [thing's] causality capable of projecting its form [on our mind]. Therefore it is well said: „there is nothing else which can be experienced [by us] than intellection, because seizableness cannot be defined. For the same reason an object, apart from cognition, does not exist.

[Opponent]: And if the solid [object] does not reveal itself, then neither do we become conscious of something else which reveals it, because we always become conscious of only one form [such as „this blue"].

[Vijñānavādin]: But there is such a revealer, and this, if not apparent itself, would not reveal an object which possesses a not-revealing innate nature.

That which has an unapparent manifestation, is itself unapparent;
like an object hidden by a hut &c.;
and the exterior object has a manifestation unapparent to another.

Similarly: that which reveals [something] to another, does not want another exemplar of its class in order to reveal itself;
like a lamp;
and knowledge reveals [things] to another [scil. to human soul].

Therefore only consciousness (*bodha*) which becomes apparent itself, reveals objects; so we do not wander from sound reasoning.

If so, then there would be identity of the thing known and the knower, as between the omniscient and that which is not omniscient, because of the regular occurrence of simultaneous perception. The not regular, [only accidental] occurrence of simultaneous perception is the pervader (*vyāpaka*) of difference (non-identity);
because a regular occurrence of perception at the same time does not take place with reference to blue and yellow;
and the regular occurrence of simultaneous perception is repugnant to the only accidental occurrence of simultaneous perception.

Ergo:. the regular occurence — which is excluded from the only accidental occurrence and consequently from [the existence of] difference, because we meet here with a contradiction to the pervader — rests upon identity. Thus we have here a *pratibandha-siddhi* (an inference by means of „obstruction").

And you may not argue: the word *saha* (in *sahopalambha*) means comradeship as well as simultaneity; and in consequence of the

difference of these two [word-meanings], the fallacy, called *vyāpyatvād viruddha*, creeps in; because we have to accept [in both premises] „illusionary co-existence" as the differencer of the probans. For also in the case of the double moon, [which is] one of [our common] examples, the co-existence is illusionary, and not real, since there is only one moon.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the consciousness-moment of omniscience perceives all living being simultaneously with its own self; still they are non-identical with the omniscience-cognition. So the fallacy, called *anaikāntika*, creeps in.

[Vijñānavādin]: No, because this is not the rule. When the simultaneous perception of two facts takes place in respect to *kṣaṇa*s, then this [simultaneous perception] follows the rule [which I mean], because two *kṣaṇa*s cannot be perceived again apart from each other. But I do not mean a rule for simultaneous perception with reference to [moment-]series. [1]) And there is not a perception at the same time, of the omniscient-series with another conscience-series, since the omniscient may abide at a certain moment only in its own self. And then the omniscient does not become [by that] a non-omniscient, because his capability still exists, just as a cook [remains a cook], although he is not cooking.

That which is cognised by a cognition, does not differ from this cognition;

as the „self" of a cognition [i. e. as the self-cognition which is attached to any cognition], does not differ [from this cognition];

and blue &c. are cognised [by cognitions].

For suppose that there was non-identity, then it [the object] could not be known by the cognition, because identity, which is the reason for the constant relation, would not exist, and causal relation cannot fix such a relation, in-as far as too wide an applicability (*atiprasaṅga*) would creep in, scil. that one thing, not connected with another, would still be cognisable by this. Therefore since we do not become aware of the pervading (*vyāpaka*) relation (reason for the constant rule) in the case of difference, cognisability, excluded from difference (as *vipakṣa*), will be [logically]-pervaded by non-difference. Thus runs the proof by means of „obstruction" for the probans. By this [argumentation] we have also shown the identity of the [cognition-]form „Ego" and cognition. And as for the appearance of the seizable, the seizer and the act of consciousness,

---

[1]) A moment-series in Buddhistic terminology corresponds with the *ātman* in Vaiçeṣika expression.

as separate, [on which you base your theory], this is [simply] an illusion like the appearance of twoness in one moon. Also here the cause is: the *vāsanā* [i. e. an impression in the mind which is given over by one moment to the next moment, like odour from one thing to another] of difference, a *vāsanā* without beginning and with an uninterrupted course. — As has been said [by DHARMAKĪRTI]:

„Multiplicity is [merely] perceived by erroneous cognition, as in the moon which is exempt of duality."

[Opponent]: But granted that the exterior [object] does not exist, what then is the cause of the intellection which [often] arises and possesses the form „blue" &c. As has been said: „[There is] an intellection about the thing, it possesses the form of this; this [intellection] now, having the form for differencer, does it take its origin from the exterior [thing] or from elsewhere? This question deserves examination."

[Vijñānavādin]: [I in my turn ask:] granted that the exterior [thing] exists, what then is the cause of this [cognition]?

[Opponent]: If I should say: the object, such as blue &c.

[Vijñānavādin]: But this is not seen, because the object transcends the senses.

[Opponent]: If I should say: it must be inferred from the manifoldness of the effects.

[Vijñānavādin]: Let us accept then a manifoldness of power in the *samanantara-pratyaya* which is seen [in opposition to the object which is really not seen]. Also the manifoldness of form (*ākāra*) in our consciousness during sleep, is in accordance with this; because here is no question of a capability of objects, located at different places and times, in as far as they do not exist.

[Opponent]: Then the notion of variegatedness (manifoldness) would not exist; because from the oneness of intellection would ensue the oneness of that which is not differentiated from it; and because, if the intellections differed from one another in respect to their forms, each of these intellections would be fixed only by its own form; and because a seizer of their forms, apart from those [intellections], would not exist.

[Vijñānavādin]: We answer to this: in the first place, it cannot be said that the variegated colour does not appear; for this is contradicted by consciousness. But the material (*jaḍa*) is unfit to become manifested. Therefore this [variegated] colour has cognition as its essence. And no multiplicity in the intellection [originates] here from the multiplicity in the forms, because the variegated

colour, which is one, does not possess a multiplicity of „forms". And so as there is one form of blue, which has „blue" for its innate nature, so the one variegatedness has a form which has „variegatedness" for its innate nature. And the intellection, active with reference to this [variegatedness], which is identical with [the intellection] itself, is active or not active with reference to the entire [variegatedness], but is not active [or inactive] with reference to a part of it, because it is without parts. For those parts which seem to be different from each other, are not the variegated colour. So there is not the slightest difficulty.

[Opponent]: The form „material" (*sthūla* = *jaḍa*) may be proved in a similar way.

[Vijñānavādin]: An aggregate which is one and of a material nature, does not exist, [1]) because plurality would be the consequence of its consisting of several parts.

Some say: the form of the intellection, as occurring in one intellection, is one and of a material nature, thus the contradietion between the movement [of the part] and the [simultaneous] rest [of the whole] may be rejected [with reference to transcendental nature] [as being merely] a contradiction in human consciousness. [2])

Others, however, say: the form of the intellection, appearing in consequence of a beginningless *vāsanā*, does not allow any examination; truth (reality) is falsity. Namely:

> that which is *pratyaya* (notion) does not possess an exterior foundation;
>
> > like the notions in sleep and suchlike [conditions of consciousness]. [3])

This *pratyaya* of the waking man, is a pillar &c. Their lack of foundation is seen in sleep &c., for there they are connected with notional nature; the innate nature of the notion of the waking man is also notionality. And if it would abandon its baselesness (*nirālambanatva*), then it would give up its innate nature likewise.

[Opponent]: But suppose that all notions were [objectively] baseless, then the notions [occurring in our argumentations], such as the *dharmin* (or *pakṣa*), the probans, the example &c. would be baseless, and in consequence of the non-existence of the *dharmin*, the probans &c., we could not go in for inference. But on the other hand, when they possess an [objective] basis, then we can make use of these [notions] for this purport.

---

1) Cf. Nyāya-kandalī p. 41 l. 12 &c.

2) ibidem p. 41 l. 24 &c.

3) Cf. here book IV section VII table A, first passage.

[Vijñānavādin]: Not thus. Because these [notions], which have no exterial foundation, are causes for our inferences, simply in as far as they are acts of consciousness. For we see that knowledge arises from not-knowledge, as for instance the understanding of words from the written characters.

[Opponent]: But the lines &c. [which form the written characters and] which make the words known to us, are existing according to their innate nature.

[Vijñānavādin]: Indeed they are; but they are not informative by this characteristic [as being existent], but they are such in consequence of the projection (*adhyāropa* = *upaplava*) of the form „*ka*, [*kha*, *ga*]" &c. and for this reason they are not unfit for the effect [scil. for information].

— Thus the short exposition of the *pūrvapakṣa*.

[Vaiçeṣika]: That which has been said [by you] „duality of seizer and seizable does not exist], because no definition of the seizable can be given"[1]) — this is not sufficient for proving the non-existence of objects. For the exterior object would not be seizable, and neither its non-existence, in as far as non-existence of seizing takes place in consequence of a debarment [from our perception] by innate nature, as in the case of a spirit &c.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: [the difference, made between the existence and non-existence of a thing, is reasonable; for:] non-existence is proved by not-seizing, should [the object, if existent,] have allowed our seizing.

[Vaiçeṣika]: But how, again, is the *yogyatā* (the fitness for being seized) of the thing, ascertained? For its seizing has never taken place. And if it had, then the seizable would no longer be indefinable. Moreover the [act of] seizing is based on the seizer and the seizing intellection is founded in its own self; and merely from this follows the seizableness[2]) of that which is different from [i. e. exterior to] it; and to say: „this not grasping follows from the non-existing of the seizable", is a *sādhyāviçiṣṭa* (= *sādhyasama*)[3]). Moreover I beg you to answer the following question: what seizableness belongs to the form of the intellection? For [1ly] [this form] is not the cause of the intellection; because it is not separated from, [i. e. because in a certain way it is identical with] the intellection. Neither [2ly] does this form foundate an[other] form,

1) Cf. Ny. Kand. 122, 24.
2) Read: *tad anyasya grāhyatā*.
3) Cf. Gaut. Sūtra I, 2, 8.

because we do not experience such a duplicate of forms. Neither [3ly] supposing that [the form is] the essence of the intellection, [do we get a definition of] seizableness, because we do not seize [this form] during the state of deep sleep, although, if being identical with intellection [i. e. with „state of consciousness" in general], it would also go on then, like the series of intellections; [during sleep, namely, the series of intellections goes on, but deprived of form, whilst the intellections of our waking state possess form].

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: the state of apparition in general is the seizableness of the form?

[Vaiçeṣika]: But what is this apparition of the form?

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should answer: the arising of the possibility of different conduct: abandoning, [taking up, and being indifferent], [which conduct is] based on intellection?

[Vaiçeṣika]: But this possibility is just that to which the exterior object gives rise. Namely, when people have a notion harmonising [with the object], then they accept, reject or are indifferent [1]) with reference to this exterior object, but not with reference to anything else: to a mental form (*ākāra*). Thus your proposition, that the seizable cannot be defined, is unproved.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should ask: how is the possibility of the conduct of one thing [namely, of the human person], brought about by the arising of another thing [namely, of the exterior thing]?

[Vaiçeṣika]: Because [the latter thing] shows an innate nature which corresponds to a certain conduct towards that object, in accordance with the complex of causes of its innate nature. Thus your objection is not of much importance (*iti yat kiṃ cit*). — By this we have also refuted [your argumentation which has to do with] cognisability (*vedyatva*). [2]) For also when difference exists [between the cogniser and the cognisable], the cognisability will arise according to the fixed rule which is supplied by the complex of causes of the innate nature of cognition, because [in your argumentation] the exclusion [of the probans] from the *vipakṣa* is uncertain. — Also your thesis that the material [3]) is not capable of manifestation, [cannot be accepted; for it] is either a proof of that which does not want a proof (*siddhasādhana*), namely in the case when you define [the material] as that which does not possess manifestation as its nature; or it is not admissable, namely in the

[1]) Read *upekṣante*.
[2]) Cf. Ny. Kand. 126, 12.
[3]) Cf. Ny. Kand. 125, 16 and 127, 2.

case when you understand [the manifestation] as a contact [between soul and object]. For such a royal edict: „there shall be no manifestation-contact of the material [and the soul]", nowhere exists. [As for the saying]: „The act of knowing stands and falls with the object to be known, as the act of cutting with the object to be cut"[1]); also [here] the exclusion of the constant rule of the simultaneous perception [as the probans] from the *vipakṣa* is doubtful; because a constant rule of the simultaneous grasping of blue and the notion of blue, may be the result of the fact that [cognition] itself and its counterpart [i. e. the object] are both cognisable by [one] intellection.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: since the exterior [thing] does not exist, knowledge is not the cogniser of something else.

[Vaiçeṣika]: When it is proved that the exterior [thing] does not exist, then the exclusion of the probans from the *vipakṣa* is proved; and when this [exclusion] is proved, then this may serve as a probans for the non-existence of the *vipakṣa*, thus there is a m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c e [of propositions].

[Vijñānavādin]: Let it be so, what does it matter?

[Vaiçeṣika]: Also the constancy of the simultaneous perception is not proved, for when we perceive an object as exterior [and express this by the words:] „this is blue", then we do not [always] perceive the [mental] perception [itself] which is different [from the object]; [in other words: when we perceive an object, we do not always reflect on our perception].

[Vijnānavādin]: If I should say: when it is proved that knowledge cognises itself, then the constant rule of simultaneous perception will be proved.

[Vaiçeṣika]: But how do you prove this self-cognition [of intellection]?

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say:[2])

> that which makes apparent [other things], does not need any help for its own manifestation;
>
> like a lamp.

[Vaiçeṣika]: The use of a lamp lies in its warding off the darkness which abides in its place; this work is done by itself [without any help]; for that purport it does not require anything else, for such [an auxiliary] would be useless; but in view of its perception, it requires the eye [and the other factors of perception]; thus the example is unsufficient for [proving] the probandum.

---

1) Cf. Ny. Kand. 125, 24.

2) The same argument has been used Ny. Kand. 125, 21.

[Vijñānavādin]: But I take the notion „intellection" in the sense of „power which manifests", therefore it does not need anything else.

[Vaiçeṣika]: Then the fallacy, called *asādhārano hetuḥ*, creeps in. — As to your argumentation: [1])

that which has an unapparent manifestation, is itself unapparent,

like a hidden object;

here takes place non-apparency, non-manifestation, of the hidden object; but not [2]) in consequence of the non-apparency of the manifestation, but simply of the non-existence of [the manifestation] itself. Thus [we meet here with the fallacy, called *vyāpty-asiddha*.

Also your argument: „because it [scil. the notion of blue &c.] is a notion", [3]) does not hold good; in as far as the example is fallacious. For also the notional states such as sleep, have, although created by imagination, [indirectly] an objective base, and are not confined [in their origination] to the soul, in as far as objects, enjoyed during waking state, appear to us then, owing to their latent impression (*saṃskāra*), otherwise we could not explain the constancy of the arising of those [dream-notions] with reference to objects, seen, heard, experienced.

Moreover, when the exterior thing does not exist, how can we ever get a perception with defined form [and expressed in the words:] „this is blue".

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: this is a form of our consciousness (*vijñāna*).

[Vaiçeṣika]: No, [you are mistaken], because we have a cognition of something existing outside our intellection. For should it be a mere form of our intellection, then the notion would be [expressed by the words:] „I am something blue", but not [by] „this is blue".

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: since the intellections differ one from another, the notion „I" will belong to one, and the notion „this blue" to another.

[Vaiçeṣika]: [No], because the form (*ākāra*) „Ego" is not constituted so as the forms „blue" &c. are. Namely, that which is understood by one, as the Ego, is considered by another as the Tu.

[Vijñānavādin]: The occurring of [the notion] „Ego" to the mind, takes place in the cognition of the self by the self.

---

1) Ny. Kand. 125, 18.

2) Read: *aprakāço na svayam.*

3) Cf. Ny. Kand. 127, 12.

[Vaiçeṣika]: Is then perhaps the cognition about another a cognition about one's own innate characteristic?

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: the notion of difference (non-identity) results form error (*bhrānti*).

[Vaiçeṣika]: The difference, ascertained by perception, is real.

[Vijnānavādin]: No, it is not.

[Vaiçeṣika]: Why?

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should answer: perception is erroneous, as has been said:

> [As to] that portion [i. e. the exterior world] which is located outside the other portion [i. e. outside the soul], the apparition of difference in intellection which is really undivided, forsooth, is a subjective illusion (*upaplava*).

[Vaiçeṣika]: Why this?

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: because we can prove this identity by inference.

[Vaiçeṣika]: Inference receives its own nature, because its topics (*viṣaya*) are not refuted (*abādhita*), whilst perception is erroneous; and on the other hand when inference has received its own nature, then the erroneousness of perception is the logical consequence, thus there is the fault of mutual dependence [of propositions]. But let us grant that difference is a subjective illusion (*viplava*), what gives rise to the notion of an object, located in a fixed place? For there is [in your theory] no [room for a] cause of the restriction: „here this [illusion] shall be projected, and nowhere else."

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: the limitation in this projection ensues from the limitation in the *vāsanās*.

[Vaiçeṣika]: No, [this is not possible], because this [*vāsanā*] can neither be the cause of this limitation in space. But when the existence of the objects is [accepted], then the perception will take place in that spot where the object is situated, and the latent impression [*vāsanā*, here = *saṃskāra*], originated from this [perception] will refer to that [same] spot. But when the exterior objects do not exist, there is no cause which could limit the *vāsanā* to a certain spot. Moreover differentiation in the effect is not possible without differentiation in the cause.

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: the exterior object does not exist. Therefore the manifoldness[1]) of the *vāsanās* [exists and is the cause of the manifoldness of our experience, of the *kāryaviçeṣa*

---

1) Cf. Ny. Kand. 127. 3

which you have just mentioned]; and the origination of this manifoldness [of *vāsanās*] springs from the manifoldness of [other *vāsanās* which are] their causes and so without a beginning.

[Vaiçeṣika]: If the manifoldness of the *vāsanās* is the same as the forms of our intellections, how then do the *vāsanās* differ from one another? And if it is different [from these forms], what objection have you against [the existence of] the objects; [an objection on your side] which puts aside the conception of everybody? And by what factor is the [mental] form projected?

[Vijñānavādin]: By our intellection?

[Vaiçeṣika]: Is this projection (*bahirāropa*) the becoming conscious by means of it [i. e. by our intellection] of the form in our own soul, or is it something else? [1] In the first alternative the result will be that the true notion of this [intellection] and the false notion are the same; because the seizing of the form is true through its being simply a contents of an intellection; and because the conception of exteriority does not correspond with reality. But [2] if [the projection is] something else, then [*a*] there is no existence successively, because the cognition, [which is supposed to be] the cause of this [projection], only exists momentarily [and therefore cannot exist one moment as cognition, and another moment as projection], and neither [*b*] can we conceive simultaneously one thing [as cognition] to be true and [as projection] to be false; and finally [*c*] we cannot conceive, besides succession and simultaneity, a third modus, so that knowledge, subject to this, would grasp the form in one's own soul and project it. Moreover, if an object, such as blue &c. were a form of intellection, then only he who conceives the form, would perceive [the object]; but no one else would see it; yet the one object is perceived by several; because all at the same time are active with reference to it, because one understands: the [object] which is seen by you, is also seen by me. So then this object is not a mere form of intellection. — But when you, in contradiction to [what is taught by] our intellection-form, proclaim: „blue &c. appear to us, as merely false", [1]) then no limitation of origination out of limited causes, nor a practical efficiency is possible; when there is no object, then no causal influence whatever belongs to anything; or every [causal influence] can be attributed] to everything; neither is there a harmony of practical efficiency of everything, nor disharmony, because all differentiation does not exist. As has been said by the Gurus:

1) Ny. Kand, 127, 11.

The taste, the *vīrya* (sensific power) and the digestion of of those who take imaginary pills and those take real pills, would be the same.

[Vijñānavādin]: It I should say: this difference results from a difference in the *vāsanās*.

[Vaiçeṣika]: If this [*vāsanā*] were the cause of the different practical efficiency of [what we call] the exterior things, [what then]? [According to you] „object" and „*vāsanā*" are merely different names [but really identical]; and it [the *vāsanā*] has intellection as nature; and if now the [exterior] object does not exist, then a differentiation of this [*vāsanā*] is without foundation, because mere intellection as a cause (*upādāna*) never varies; and because, if we were to accept both an intellection-form and a difference (variation), different [from that form], then the unwished-for consequence would be that we should have to accept the existence of objects, as has been said. — Neither, on the basis of this alternative, would there be any occasionality of the notion „blue" &c., because the moment-series, [1]) fit for its production, always goes on, and because if it were to stop, then this notion would neither arise at another [previous] time, in as far as there does not exist besides that [notion „blue"] itself, something else on which it could depend [for its origination].

[Vijñānavādin]: If I should say: „the occasionality (*kādācitkatva*) of that effect results from the occasionality of the ripening of the cause.

[Vaiçeṣika]: The ripening of the cause must be effected, [i. e.] its inclination towards the production of the effect. But even this [ripening] cannot be occasional, exclusively dependent as it is on the act of cognition performed by [the moment-series to which] itself [belongs]. Yet the appearance [of the thing] in our perception is occasional; and this [perceptional appearance], ascertaining the object of our notion as exterior object defined in place, time, cause and innate nature, refutes any proof for the non-existence of the object; thus [you are guilty of] the fallacy, called *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* of reasons.

Now we stop; the [paragraph on] number has been completely explained.

---

1) Cf. Nyāya-kandalī p. 126 l. 6.

28. *Relative value of perception and inference.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 158 l. 6.

Some say with reference to this topic: in as far as we become aware of a simultaneous existence of the two disjunctions, taking place in the hand and in the body with reference to a spot in a wall &c., there the accepting of a causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) between these two [disjunctions] is refuted by perception.

[Vaiçeṣika]: This does not hold good, because at the time when the disjunction of the hand takes place, there [would] not be a cause for the origination of the disjunction of the body; and when the cause is lacking, there is no arising of the effect; and the movement of the hand, as has been said, is not the cause. Consequently the notion of their simultaneity is erroneous.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the succession (*kramabhāva*) is arrived at by inference, and the simultaneity is proved by perception. And when perception stands in the way, then no inference will arise, because the condition that its object should not be obstructed, is not fulfilled. How then [do you arrive at] erroneousness of perception in agreement with that [i. e. with inference]?

[Vaiçeṣika]: How then is inference applied in the case of a hundred leaves, although in disaccordance with perception? And if it is upheld:

[Supposed objection]: Inference does not arise through disaccordance with perception in such cases where the refutation (*bādha*) of the object is settled by it [i. e. by perception]; here, however, this [refutation] is doubtful, as it is possible that perception, grasping the simultaneity, arises in consequence of the quick process of the piercing through one hundred leaves. Moreover, the [following] means of trustworthy knowledge, containing a universal concomitance (*vyāptigrāhaka*) is more than strongly evident to every body, namely: a needle which is unobstructed, will pierce through, but not one which is obstructed; therefore by the sufficiency of this [*pramāṇa*] the arising of an inference takes place, although a [contradictory] perception already exists.

[Vaiçeṣika, answering to this objection]: If this were true, then in our case [i. e. in the case of the two disjunctions of hand and body from wall] there exists a trustworthy source of knowledge, containing a universal concomitance, scil.: an action inherent in another abode [for instance in the hand, and not in the body] does not effectuate a disjunction [e. g. in the body]; and in consequence of its strong evidence perception will erroneously (*anyathā*)

arise, and therefore the inference for succession is well-founded. For the same reason [we meet here with] a refutation of perception by that [i. e. by inference]; for this [inference] bears upon an object; but the perception is [really] without an object, as it only arises in consequence of the quickness of the process; and that which possesses an object, has force, because it obtains the accompaniment of the object which abides in the state of being thus [as expressed by the *pramāṇa*], on the other hand that which has no object, lacks force, because it has not got this accompaniment. Thus the refutation of perception by inference, is really a refutation by a previous perception grasping the general concomitance. Similarly in the case of people confused about [the perception of] the quarters of the compass, inference has power; according to the opinion of the former teachers, when saying: „forsooth inference is stronger than perception." On the other hand there is no worthless arising of perception, such as grasps the heat of fire, so then when by this the refutation of a [supposed] object is settled, there is no arising of an inference.

29. *Annulment of an intellection.* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 159 l. 1.

[Opponent]: But why do you accept the relation of sublating (*bādhaka*) and sublated (*bādhya*) between two intellections.

[Vaiçeṣika]: Because they contradict each other with reference to the same object. One intellection teaches us: „this thing — whatsoever — is silver" and the other: „this thing is mother of pearl"; but this being silver and this being mother of pearl cannot exist in the same place; because we always perceive these two in the condition of excluding each other. Thus whereas the contradiction between the objects gives rise to a contradiction between their respective intellections, [we arrive at] the laying down of the relation between *bādhya* and *bādhaka*.

[Opponent]: What is annulment (*bādha*)?

[Vaiçeṣika]: The removal of the object.

[Opponent]: So then, will the object in question (*dharmin*) which has been apparent in the intellection of silver, appear as existent in the same state, after the origination of another intellection, and the silverness is not; — or is it removed?

---

1) Cf. the discussion on *viparyaya* Ny. kandalī p. 180 l. 7.

[Vaiçeṣika]: [It is removed], in as far as this removal means the separation from connection.

[Opponent]: If I should say: but it, [the impression of silver], is still apparent in our intellection?

[Vaiçeṣika]: Truly, it is apparent, but apparency does not allow removal, since it is [so]; neither does an apparent object become unapparent, because it is objective. But silver, although not existent, is shown in a certain place as if existent by an intellection; the separation [from connection] now consists in the propounding of that to which the intellection gave rise as clearly contradictory [to real facts].

[Opponent]: What hindrance is there for the intellection of silver, when the non-existence of silver has been realised? For this [intellection of silver] is not active in causing the permanence of silver, but merely in making it manifest. And this [manifestation] has been brought about by that [intellection], when arising. This is settled. But how does it become refuted (*bādhyate*)?

[Vaiçeṣika]: When we realise the non-existence of the silver, then the real nature of this intellection about the silver, namely its untrustworthiness, is realised; and so there is an obstruction of it.

[Opponent]: But *bādha* is then the removal of results (fruit, *phala*), for when the non-equivalence of an intellection is realised, then it forms no more a part of practical behaviour (*vyavahāra*).

[Vaiçeṣika]: Do not [say] thus. For the removal of the object causes immediately the removal of its *phala*, but intellection does not in every case relate to results, for when it, dependent [as it is] on man's desires, does not produce [results], then it comes to an end in *upekṣā-saṃvitti* (i. e. a state of consciousness, consisting in indifference). But also there, where a wish for result exists, (since the fruit is directly bound to the object, and the object to the knowledge) the removal of the object — and not the removal of the *phala* — will amount to the annulment of an intellection, because [this annulment] follows immediately on the removal of the object.

This has been extensively explained in the Saṃgraha-ṭīkā.

30. *Refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine upholding that buddhi is a separate organ whose states (vṛttis) relate to the objects.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 172 l. 3.

In order to refute the Sāṃkhya doctrine, [PRAÇASTAPĀDA] says:

„*buddhir*" &c., i. e. *buddhi* is that of which the given [termini *upalabdhi*, *pratyaya*, *jñāna*] are synonyms.

As to the exposition, given [by the Sāṃkhyins], we must reject it, because it is not based on experience (*pratītyabhāvāt*). The [stream of states of consciousness] which has origination and annihilation for qualities in accordance with either acceptance or rejection of objects, is one, — the abode of this [stream] is the second, by the causality of which activity or non-activity arise; — these two are experienced; but no third form [such as an intellect-organ besides soul].

And as to [your notion]: „a function of *buddhi*", is this something else than *buddhi*, or is it identical? — It is not something else, because [you] accept the absolute identity (*tādātmya*) between function and that which functions. [1]) And if it be not different, then since [every function] is one with *buddhi* and consequently its functions which have the forms of the objects are mutually one, the notions „three, four &c." would be difficult to obtain, because no consciousness which distinguishes one from the other, would exist about any form and because the *puruṣa* knows the forms only so as they are offered to the *buddhi*.

As has been said [by a previous opponent of the Sāṃkhya doctrine]: „the *puruṣa* experiences the *buddhi*, thus when there is manifoldness of functions, there is manifoldness of *buddhi*, and its oneness is rejected; [in other words: *buddhi* is not one organ, but it is the manifoldness of internal experiences]". — Thus the refutation must be carried out.

31. *Tarka and Prasaṅga.* [2])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 173 l. 22.

But if you do not accept *tarka* (conjecture; reduction to absurdity), then you should neither make use of *prasaṅga*, i. e. [the argumentation] showing something not wished-for by the opponent. For this [*prasaṅga*] really does not differ from *tarka*. And also the Vaiçeṣikas apply *prasaṅga*.

[Opponent]: *Prasaṅga* is not a *hetu* (reason, probans), because it would give rise to such fallacies as *āçrayāsiddha* &c.

[Siddhāntin]: We answer to this: Is *tarka* the insight into the non-existence [i. e. the falsity] of the opponent's opinion (*parapakṣa*),

---

1) Cf. here book IV section VII table C n°. 13 and 14.

2) Cf. Nyāya-kandalī p. 197 l. 16.

or is it the foundating of one's own opinion (*svapakṣa*)? In the first case (A) the argumentation is as follows:

If the intellection [which may be expressed in the words]:

„if the knower [i. e. the soul] were not eternal,
then could neither *saṁsāra* nor liberation exist"

were untrustworthy (*apramāṇa*), then no ascertaining of the non-existence [or falsity] of the opponent's opinion [which defends the transiency of soul] would take place; because the ascertainment of anything by means of an untrustworthy source of knowledge is unfit. And this [*tarka*] would not be applied at all in this case; because no distinction of objects takes place. But on the other hand, if the non-existence of the opponent's opinion (*vipakṣa* = *parapakṣa*) results from it, then [*tarka*] is a *pramāṇa* and must be classified under [the trustworthy means of knowledge such as] perception and the rest. This must be acknowledged by you, even against your wish.

Prasaṅga also is the announcement of a contradiction, that is to say: the exposition of some contradictory argument which is more powerful [than the one adduced by the opponent]. And what is *tarka* else than such a contradictory argumentation and the formula expressing it?

In the second case (B) when *tarka* is considered as a notion which contains the foundation of one's own opinion; [I lay down the question]: What is the cause of its arising? Not the argumentation [directly] proving one's own opinion, for this is [when we talk of a *tarka*] not applied. For only after the subject has been discriminated by means of *tarka*, the proof for one's own-opinion can commence; and if this should be the cause of that, then we clearly get entangled in *anyonāçrayatva* (mutual dependence of propositions).

[Opponent]: If I should say: After the non-existence of the adversary's opinion being proved, the foundating of one's own opinion arises; thus the notion of the non-existence of the *vipakṣa* is its cause?

[Siddhāntin]: Then it would be an argumentation with the non-existence of the opponent's opinion as a probans; because when two opinions are mutually opposed, then the contradiction of the one will necessarily lead to the affirmation of the other. And this indeed takes place, in those cases where it [i. e. the *tarka*] decides about an object „this is just so"; but [as an rule] it only allows one of two qualities, but does not decide. Neither is [*tarka*] doubt, because there is no clinging to both alternatives. So then also in daily life

people will say: „So I surmise", in consequence of their upholding a fitness [of the object]. Where the *vipakṣa* [i. e. the opponent's opinion] is non-existent, there arises the other of the two opinions; but where the *vipakṣa* is existent, there the other opinion will not come forward; thus the *tarka* (reduction to absurdity) showing the positive agreement and the exclusion, demonstrating the non-existence of the *vipakṣa*, is a trustworthy means of knowledge in the matter, previously quoted, and gives us the certainty: „this [knower, the soul] will have non-origination [or eternality] for its property", „this matter is [to use our other expression] 'fit' for the ascertainment of that"; it makes us apperceive the fitness for trustworthiness (*pramāṇayogyatva*) of the object; therefore it [*tarka*] is an inference. So then it fosters inference, because it contains the notion of fitness [with reference to *anumāna*], because it is a cause for using a trustworthy source of knowledge. But otherwise, [scil.] when considered as a foundating [of one's own opinion] it is useless and in itself untrustworthy, because it does not form a part of ascertainment or of perception, in as far as the analysis of an object is done by this refuting argument [*bādhakapramāṇa*] which shows the non-existence of the *vipakṣa*.

32. *Discussion of Viparyaya (illusion).* [1]

Nyāya-kandalī p. 180 l. 7.

[Opponent]: Some say with reference to this topic: wrong intellection (*viparyaya*) does not exist, because its cause is lacking; and again this absence [of the cause] [results] from the fact that the innate nature of the sense-organ lies in producing equivalent knowledge.

[Vaiçeṣika]: If I should say: the sense-organs also produce unequivalent knowledge, in consequence of a disturbance of the organic humours (*doṣa*).

[Opponent]: No, [you are wrong], because the disturbance of the humours only causes the destruction of power (*çakti*). And a sense-organ, conjoined to mother of pearl, and having its power obstructed by the humours, does not grasp the generality: mother of pearl; but neither does it make manifest silver which is not in our vicinity; for the unwished-for consequence would be that the disturbed humours possessed the character of latent impressions. Moreover, if the eye perceives an object, which is not perceptible,

---

1) Cf. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, *The Prābhākara School* p. 28 &c. *Sāḍholāl Lectures* p. 51 &c.

[like the silver which is not in our neighboorhood], then nothing would prevent anybody from perceiving anything. That the intellection: „this is silver", would have the mother of pearl for its objective foundation, is contradictory to consciousness. For that object which becomes apparent in a certain intellection, is the objective foundation of that intellection and in the intellection about silver it is silver which becomes manifest, and not mother of pearl; and in the case of somebody who has never comprehended silver, its erroneous perception instead of mother of pearl does not occur, therefore the act of consciousness has the mother of pearl for its object. [And in the expression: „this is silver"], „silver" is caused by the organic humours, and arises merely from latent impressions awakened by the becoming aware of something that is similar; it is a remembrance of silver in which the component part „that" [*tad* = expression of the past] is frustrated. Therefore these two contents of consciousness [this and silver] have different objects.

[Vaiçeṣika]: To this we answer: if the intellection about silver has not the mother of pearl for its object, but if it is a remembrance of silver, then during that intellection the man desirous of silver, would act with reference to previously existing silver, but not in relation to the mother of pearl, because [it is a general rule that] remembrance makes us act in the place where the perception took place. And if you uphold the idea:

[Supposed opinion of the opponent]: The colour, [inherent] in the mother of pearl and common to silver, is grasped by the sense-organs; but not the special characteristic, scil. the generality 'mother of pearl'. And by the remembrance of silver, [a remembrance] void of the designation 'that' [*tad* = belonging to the past] we only settle silver qua talis, not specified in spot of space. So then in consequence of the similarity between the things comprehended and remembered, between the comprehension and the remembrance, and in consequence of the not-grasping of difference one does not determinate this difference and begins to act in the place of the mother of pearl, thus accepting that mother of pearl and silver possess a common abode in the words: „this is silver",

[Vaiçeṣika]: Neither is this fit, because we do not grasp the identity (*aviveka*). The grasping of the non-difference from silver is the cause of action for the man desirous of silver with reference to the mother of pearl; and not their similarity. On the other hand the grasping of difference [would be] the cause for abstaining from it. And when both [i. e. the grasping of the non-difference and the grasping of the difference] are lacking, then he neither

proceeds nor abstains; so it would be; but he does not necessarily enter into action, because the special nature [of the object] is lacking. And so then there would not be identity of abode, because the not-grasping of the non-difference [= identity] comes in as a cause (reason) for distinctness of abodes. Moreover the refuting notion, [expressed in the words]: 'this is not silver', and which arises at a time after the action, has [on your supposition] no force; [for] neither is the difference of mother of pearl and silver grasped, nor was there identity [previously] ascertained, so that it [now] can be negated.

[Opponent]: If I should say: this negation refers to the language-expression 'silver' with reference to mother of pearl, [an expression] called for by the not-grasping of difference.

[Vaiçeṣika]: No, [you are wrong], because in consequence of the not-grasping of non-difference there is also possible an action towards a thing not having that designation. Moreover the action of the man, desirous of silver, happens in the spot of the mother of pearl. And [the notion, expressed in the words:] 'this is silver', is a notion [of which the objects] possess a common abode; and further the refuting notion aims at the denial of silverness of the thing which still bears this-ness (*idantā*). Therefore I understand it as follows: the sense-organ, conjoined with the mother of pearl, accompanied by the organic humours (*doṣa*) as an auxiliary and assisted by the latent impression of silver, follows the similarity and effectuates [in our mind] the apprehension of silver, which [apprehension] has the mother of pearl for its object. And as to what has been said:

[Quotation of a thesis, previously laid down by the opponent]: [The idea] that the mother of pearl is the objective foundation, is contradictory to experience (*anubhava*).

[Vaiçeṣika]: This too is unfit, because also the piece of mother of pearl appears to us as an abode of a [certain spot of] place which is limited by this-ness (*idantā*), and as characterised by lustre (*cākyacakya*); the meaning of an objective foundation comes to this: that a thing is fit for practical conduct, such as abandoning &c.; and this [practical conduct] is possible in this case. Moreover also [that philosopher] who accepts practical procedure towards the designation (*vyavahāra*) of silver in the case of mother of pearl, in consequence of the non-grasping of difference — he also must accept wrong notion (*viparyaya*), because the practical procedure towards the designation of 'this' (*tad*) for a non-this (*atad*) is a form of wrong notion. And as to that [which you have said]:

[Quotation of a proposition, previously brought forward by the opponent]: disturbances of the organic humours are the cause of the obstruction of power.

[Vaiçeṣika]: Neither does this mean anything, because we see that the humours (*dhātus*), vitiated by a disturbance of organic wind, &c. cause other diseases [than optical illusion]. — And as for [your argument concerning] „the omniscience of anybody about anything'', this is excluded by the limited power of the organic disturbances. — And neither because intellection falls short now and again with reference to an object, will there be nowhere a recovering of breath, because we do not see that the disturbances of humours remain being causes of obstructions (*bādha*) in the case of those who examine with exertion, and because, when the non-existence [of the thing supposed] has been proved and the non-existence [i. e. non-reliability] of the illusion has been settled, we arrive at acquiescence.

[Vaiçeṣika]: And if you do not accept 'wrong notion', what have you to say about the intellection of two moons?

[Opponent]: This appearance of twoness [belongs] to a couple of intellections, originating from particles of eye-rays, which, coexistent with the disturbances of the humours, fall on the moon after separating from each other.

[Vaiçeṣika]: No, [you are wrong], because we do not grasp with our eye [twoness as] a quality of intellection. And if you accept:

[Supposed proposition of the opponent]: A quality of an intellection, grasped as referring to a knowable (*jñeya*), is grasped by the sense-organ which grasps the knowable,

[Vaiçeṣika]: then illusion (*bhrānti*) would be required by you, because there takes place the grasping of the quality of a certain thing [A] in another thing [B].

Now enough of such furious Çrotriya-brahmans as these; let us stop here.

On the basis of the theory of those who deny the existence of illusion, by arguing:

[Opponent]: when the notion of silver arises with reference to mother of pearl, then an objective transcendental (*alaukika*) silver is perceived,

[Vaiçeṣika]: there would be no practical procedure (*pravṛtti*) in the case of such intellection, as we do not become aware of any transcendental [object] which is the cause of an act (*arthakriyā*).

33. *Concrete and vague perception.* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 189 l. 13:

Some declare perception to be only concrete (*savikalpaka* i. e. not vague), because by its character of determinateness (*vyavasāya*) every one is capable of acting, and also because animals, although unable to utter words, are active owing to the distinction [in their perception] of objects.

Against those people [PRAÇASTAPĀDA] says „*svarūpalocanamātram*", i. e. [perception] which only contains the perceiving of the innate nature. This means nearly as follows: „mere perception void of distinction, mere grasping." For when the grasping of the innate nature of the object by means of vague perception (*nirvikalpaka*) is not accepted, then neither can concrete perception exist, for there would be no remembrance of the word which denotates [the innate nature of the object]. Therefore any one who upholds concrete perception, must necessarily accept vague [perception].

And this [concrete perception] does not only grasp the generality, because also difference becomes manifest in it; neither only the individual nature, because also the form (*ākāra*) of the generality becomes an object of consciousness and because recollection takes place at the sight of another individual [object]. But it grasps both: generality and difference. For if, on the other hand, one does not become conscious [of a thing] whilst at the same time distinguishing „this is the generality, and that the difference (peculiarity)", it would not be possible to examine it in comparison with another object; the generality, namely, is distinguished by perceiving the concordance with other individual things; the difference by perceiving the disagreement; this is the distinction.

In the case of vague perception the two [described] qualities: concordance and disagreement with reference to generality and peculiarity, are not grasped, because an examination in comparison with other individual objects does not take place, and since these two qualities are not grasped, no distinctive comprehension (*vivicya grahaṇam*) takes place. [This vague perception] is the grasping of the innate nature, because this [grasping] is not dependent [on other psychical factors]. So then this vague perception does not enter upon the relation of *viçeṣaṇa* and *viçeṣya* between generality, peculiarity and individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*); since this relation is based on the notion of difference (*bheda*), whereas vague perception does

---

1) Cf. here book IV section VII table E.

not contain any conception (*adhyavasāya*) of mutual difference between generality &c. But concrete perception embraces the characterisation (*rūpatā*) [of the object] by generality and peculiarity, for such notions occur, owing to the [activity of the] sense-organs and to the soul which reflects on other things, [similar to the one perceived] and which becomes conscious of the two qualities: „concordance" and „disagreement".

The Saugatas, however, say:

[Buddhist]: The vague perception (*nirvikalpaka*) with reference to the objects is an appearance [before the mind] which affords concordance and disagreement in respect to the individual objects (*svalakṣaṇa*); therefore this is merely perception, and *savikalpaka* is not perception, because this [*savikalpaka*] which owes its birth to latent impressions (*vāsanās*) and does not possess an appearance obeying the object, is illusionary (*bhrānta*) with reference to the object, just like the intellection about hairs [which seem to move before our eyes] &c.... [1])

[Vaiçeṣika]: Why do you say that concrete perception is no trustworthy source of knowledge about an object? For in the intellection „this is a pot", we become conscious of an object (*padārtha*), well defined, characterised by its „shell-neck", and different from all other things.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: distinctness (*vikalpa*) is a mental appearance which is not originated from the object; therefore the conception (*adhyavasāya*) of the object is illusionary. As has been said:

> Distinction, since it does not harmonise with the [immediate] impression made by the object, is an [illusionary] projection.

[Vaiçeṣika]: No, because there is harmony [between this *savikalpaka* and our later impressions], when we are going to act.

[Buddhist]: Why, distinction (*vikalpa*) which originates from the first impression (*anubhava*) and whose own appearance is projected in accordance with the nature of the object, conceals the difference between the individual nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) [of the object] and its own phenomenality, and thus directs man towards the spot of the individual thing; and in this way causes harmony (*saṃvāda*) to arise, in as far as we reach the object by its indirectly being connected with the object, so as the knowledge of the jewel is [connected with the jewel], when the lustre of the jewel shines forth [and is recognised by the expert].

---

[1]) Here is left out the translation of 190, 8—15, containing a gloss on the Bhāṣya.

[Vaiçeṣika]: But when distinction is not in touch with the object, how is it then that it projects its own appearance in accordance with the nature (*ātmatā*) of that [object]? For as long as the bundle of rays of light which are reflected by [the air resting on] the soil of the dessert is not perceived, we do not see the projection of water, localised in that [spot]. Distinction, now, which follows in the steps of perception, makes the object manifest to us; otherwise a man, wishing for the practical efficiency [of an object], could not act according to its distinctive intellection (*vikalpa*). Ergo [*vikalpa*] is a trustworthy means of knowledge with reference to the object, since it is the cause of a harmonising notion. And if you would uphold:

[Supposed objection of the Buddhist]: that *kṣaṇa* which is grasped by the perception, is not conceived (*adhyavasita*) by the distinctive intellection (*vikalpa*); and that *kṣaṇa* which is conceived by the distinctive intellection, is not striven for by the activity;

[Vaiçeṣika]: [then we answer, whilst accepting for the sake of dispute your theory of *kṣaṇas*, as follows]: there is no harmony (or mutual confirmation) with reference to the *kṣaṇa*s, because they possess a momentary existence. But such a *kṣaṇa* as was grasped by perception, such a one is conceived by *vikalpa*; and such a *kṣaṇa* as was conceived by *vikalpa*, such a one is striven for by activity; thus if we abstract from the non-identity, there is a mutual confirmation with reference to an object A, excluded as it is from the non-A.

[Buddhist]: Even then *vikalpa* is an untrustworthy source of knowledge, because we grasp that which has already been grasped (*gṛhītagrāhitvād*), because an object, as described, is grasped merely by perception.

[Vaiçeṣika]: But *vikalpa* owes its origin to a probantial mark (*liñga*) and it is a trustworthy means of knowledge, because it causes us to obtain the individual object which [it is true] was already obtained by another trustworthy means of knowledge.

[Buddhist]: Just as little does this hold good. For neither is there exclusion of a *kṣaṇa* from something else, nor do we grasp by means of perception a common form of it — [scil. a form A, common to *kṣaṇa a1*, *kṣaṇa a2* &c.] which is objectively unreal and merely projected — in regard to its exclusion from something else which may be called its non-existence. The comprehensible (*grāhya*), namely, may be defined by its being a cause [of our first perception]; and that which is objectively unreal, is void of any practical efficiency. But the *kṣaṇa* which is absolutely existent,

is the object of our perception, because it is capable of practical efficiency; and also, as I have already said, it does not exist any more at the time of the distinctive intellection. How then can there be oneness of the object [in the case of the *kṣaṇa*, perceived, conceived and striven for]?

[Vaiçeṣika]: Let us, however, accept that there is one single object of perception and distinctive intellection, an object possessing a form (not to be considered now) and allowing confirmation in the course of activity; in that case also distinctive intellection does not transgress the limits of a trustworthy means of knowledge, because in the circumlimitation of the object it is not dependent on the precedent [intellections], just as [little as] this is the case with streamlike intellection [*dhārāvāhikabuddhi*, i. e. a series of intellections, all referring to one object and arising when our attention remains fixed upon a certain object for a certain time], and because it is able to direct us towards the object, conceived (*adhyavasita*). And whilst its trustworthiness remains, it would be simply perception through the non-existence of the probantial mark &c. [Further it is a trustworthy source of knowledge], because it brings about a concordance and disagreement dependent on object and sense-organ. As for the fact that this [*savikalpaka*], although born from the object, does not arise from the mere approach of the sense-organs [towards the objects], this [must be explained] from the fact that the remembrance of the denotating word, which is the auxiliary of sense-organ and object, is lacking [in the case of *nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam*].

[Buddhist]: If I should say: distinctive intellection, immediately following on remembrance, is born from remembrance and not from sense-organ and object, because these are both concealed (frustrated) by the remembrance.

[Vaiçeṣika]: How, dear sir, the auxiliary of an existent thing frustrates the power of the [thing's] innate nature! But how [can you then explain] the importance of the seed, frustrated as it is by earth and water, for the arising of the sprout?

[Buddhist]: If I should say: what help can sense-organ and object receive from the remembrance of the word, and even in such a way that the latter becomes the auxiliary of the two former?

[Vaiçeṣika]: Just as the distinctive intellection, in its origination follows positively and negatively object and sense-organ, so does it with reference to remembrance; and consequently remembrance is an auxiliary for sense-organ and object in this way that these two, apart, do not produce an effect, but do so by taking remem-

brance as an auxiliary. For on the occasion of our refuting the *kṣaṇabhāṅga* we rejected the theory that auxiliaries do not add any surplus to the innate nature [of a thing].

[Buddhist]: Lut us leave this alone. — Perception is void of fiction (*kalpanā*). Concrete perception (*savikalpaka*), now, is a fictive intellection, and therefore not a trustworthy means of knowledge with reference to an object. And what is this fiction? (A) One [form of it] is the intellectual act consisting in the addition of the word [to the first object-impression]; and (B) the second consisting in the addition of an object[ive fact], is the fiction which grasps [the object] as *viçiṣṭa* (characterised).

This [*kalpanā-jñāna*, fictive intellection] is not allowable, because distinctive intellection (*vikalpa*) may not be admitted.

(A) Does the intellectual act consisting in the addition of the word [to the first object-impression] cause a conjunction between the word and the object (I), or is this [intellectual act] conjoined itself with the word [II]? And if it brings about a conjunction between word and object, does it then give to the object the nature of the word (I*a*), or does it grasp the [object] coloured as it were by the *ākāra* of the word (I*b*), or finally does it denotate [the object] by means of the word (I*c*).

In the first place (I*a*) the intellectual act (or: notion, *pratīti*) does not give to the object the nature of the word, because the object appears also to distinctive intellection in its own innate form which was grasped by *nirvikalpaka*, and because it [still] affords practical efficiency; otherwise it would be impossible for [two men], the expert [whose intellection is distinctive] and the unexperienced, to simultaneously apply their exertions to the same object.

But (I*b*) does [the intellectual act] grasp the object, coloured by the *ākāra* of the word? Neither does this hold good, because we do not become aware of that. When the object is grasped by vague perception, then the word which denotates it and which itself was formerly perceived, is remembered, because one understands its correspondance (*pratiyogitva*) [with the object]; and this [word], brought to consciousness (*rūḍha*) by remembrance and having the [object] for its meaning, delimits the object; but we do not comprehend the object coloured by the *ākāra* of the word, like a crystal coloured blue [by reflecting a flower placed in its vicinity]; because the word is not visible [like the object, but audible], and because only the object [in distinctive intellection] appears under the aspect of thisness as vague intellection does [whereas the remembered word shows to us the aspect of that-ness]. And when a denotation is remem-

bered, then the word [used for it] does not destroy the innate nature [of the thing], so that this, in spite of its conjunction with the sense-organ, does not obtain perceptibility. As has been said:

> „The denotation, when remembered, does not annihilate the perceptibility; for it stands on the „shore" [on the side] of the person using the denotation [and not on the side of the object], and is not capable of hiding the form [of the object]."

And neither (II) can we be satisfied with the opinion, that the intellectual act (*pratīti*), combined with the word, points out the object. For the soul is a conscious being; it possesses, namely, the power of arranging [the impressions given]; and [this soul] remembering the denotating word, experienced at the time of *saṃketa* [i. e. at the time when a certain word was chosen for a certain thing], points out the object by means of it, scil. [in the formula]: „this is a pot" — [the soul does all this], but not the intellectual act, because this lacks the power of arranging [the psychical impressions]. Thus [in concluding] we may state in the first place that the intellectual act does not cause any conjunction of the word [with the object]. But secondly [II] this [act] itself is not conjoined with the word, because it is not possible that an intellection and its unseparable form, — momentary and without general properties and consequently without any possible *saṃketa* as they both are — could be connected with a word; and also because a word which denotates an [external] object, does not denotate an intellection which itself refers to an object and is distinguished from this. And if you think:

[Opinion, attributed by the Buddhist to his opponent]: The distinctive intellection has for its object the thing, combined with the word [I*c*]; and the thing, after being thus combined, is denotated by the word.

[Buddhist]: [Then we answer]: for whichever thing the *saṃketa* (conventional choice) of the word [was made], [merely] for that thing the *saṃketa* of the word [is available]; [namely] for that which is non-momentary and general and is not of an individual character. The thought, truly, has the individual thing for its object; and the form which has the thought for its contents, is general and non-momentary. And the [supposed] externality of the thought-form (*bodhākāra*) is nothing else than the thought-form and is not common [to two sides: to object and thought]; neither is generality objective, because it does not admit of examination (*vicāra*). Thus whilst the forms belonging [to our ideas] have been projected under the aspect of externality by our distinctive intel-

lections in the different cases, and[1]) whilst we conceive the mutual differences by which [one thing] is excluded from the other, the *saṃketa* of the word [takes place] with reference to this projected oneness This result has been obtained inevitably by the aid of trustworthy means of knowledge. Thus distinctive intellection (*vikalpa*), in as far as proceeding with reference to something that is false and connected with words, gives rise to the fancy (*vikalpayati*) of a non-existent object. This now is *kalpanājñāna* (fictive intellection). As has been said:

> That form which appears in it [scil. in fiction, *kalpanā*], as exterior, as one, as excluded from another, — it is without truth, since it does not make part of [i. e. since it does not allow] examination.

[Vaiçeṣika]: To this we answer: If [you understand by] the term *kalpanā* (fictive intellection) the fact that we grasp [an object] characterised by generality, whilst [at the same time] objective generality does not exist, then *kalpanā* is really a reference to a non-existent thing, but it is not the grasping of an object, combined with a word. In this case if we could be taught [the objective existence of] generality by means of a *pramāṇa*, then distinctive intellection, which has this [generality] for its object — whilst it also grasps [the object] combined with the word — would be merely perception, because it is born from sense-organ and object.

> That which gives an impression of immediateness (*aparokṣāvabhāsi*), is perception,
> like indistinctive (vague) perception,
> and also distinctive intellection gives the impression of immediateness.

Here the *parokṣatva* (the non-immediateness, the character of being secondary) of intellections is pervaded (*vyāpta*) by the not being born from the sense-organs and objects as in inference, but the being born from the sense-organs and objects, as contradictory to the not being from sense-organs and objects, is perceived in vague intellection, because it is of a suchlike essence. Thus there is an experience about a fact contradictory to the pervader (*vyāpaka*) in negative instances (*vipakṣa*).

[Buddhist]: If I should say:

> That which is based on remembrance, is non-perception;
> like the intellection in inference;
> and distinctive intellection is based on remembrance,

---

1) Read: °*bhedādhy*-. Cf. Ny.-kand. p. 193 l. 1 & 2.

Thus there also exists an inference in behalf of your opponent's view (*pratipakṣānumāna*).

[Vaiçeṣika]: If it is somewhere ascertained that [as I have said in my inference, *aparokṣatva* proves] *pratyakṣatva*, then there is no denial of this with reference to distinctive intellection, because [your] denial was preceded by [my] affirmation. And this [*pratyakṣatva*] is seen [somewhere, scil.] in vague perception.

[Buddhist]: How is it seen?

[Vaiçeṣika]: If I should say: by the inference stating that sense-organs and objects are of such an essence.

[Buddhist]: Then, whilst trustworthiness is accepted for the inference, [mentioning] the having such an essence and [which is supposed] to prove the *pratyakṣatva* (perceptional character), then also the inference for the denial of *pratyakṣatva* receives force, [an inference] which resides in that which is contradictory to [your thesis]; and this is refuted by it, so as [there is contradiction in the expression]: a soundless sound.

Thus the distinctive intellection is not an intellectual act which is defined by a conjoining [of object or intellectual act itself] with word. And whilst thus fictive intellection (*kalpanā*) is defined by conjoining with an object, yet it does not grasp [the object] as characterised [1]) [*B*], since the *viçeṣaṇa* (characteriser), the *viçeṣya* (the thing to be characterised) and their relation — a relation [namely] as that between *vyavacchedaka* (the circumlimiting) and *vyavacchedya* (the circumlimited) — are not objective. [2]) Intellection grasps the object and [this takes place] owing to the contact between object and sense-organ; the [intellection] arises such as the object is; but it is not active after an examination with reference to the object.

[Vaiçeṣika]: The intellection [concerning an object] as characterised, is [that which we call] examination; [it may be formulated]: „this is the characteriser (*viçeṣaṇa*), this the thing to be characterised (*viçeṣya*), this the relation between both of them." And in daily life, when we talk of „the man with the stick" and do not talk of „the stick with the man", this is what happens: first we examine them separately, then we combine [these two ideas] into one, and grasp it: „the man with the stick".

[Buddhist]: If I should say: If the state of the thing as characterised be objective, then the characterised intellection (*viçiṣṭajñāna*)

---

1) Cf. Ny.-kandalī p. 191 l. 24 and here p. 447.

2) Read: *avāstavatvāt*.

would arise at first. But if this be not the case, then the [object's] state as characterised is not in accordance with the innate nature, but it is formed by „*upādhis*". [1]) This characterised intellection is fictive intellection.

[Vaiçeṣika]: The following is difficult for you to refute. The soul, namely, after having grasped the particularities &c. one by one, arranges them and thus understands the characterised state [of the object] with the aid of the sense-organs, but the intellection, which lacks consciousness, does not do this, because it has no power of putting [facts] together and is no longer active after once having stopped. The object is characterised (*viçiṣṭa*) on account of its relation towards the characteriser. And at first it is not grasped by the sense-organ as such, because the grasping of the particularities &c. which should be the auxiliary, is lacking; but when once these particularities &c. are grasped, then [the characterised nature of the object] is grasped. Thus characterised intellection is merely born from the object and the sense-organs. And it is difficult to admit that perception does not exist in consequence of a fault, to wit, on account of its being characterised intellection. — Thus we may stop.

34. *Pratyakṣa (karmapratyakṣa).* [2])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 194 l. 13.

[Pūrvapakṣin]: We do not admit that there is perception of action (movement); for nothing save conjunction and separation is perceived in a moving object. The notion: „this is moving" has reference to (is based on) an action which is inferred from conjunction and separation.

[Siddhāntin]: This is without value. If action is imperceptible and is to be inferred from conjunction and separation, then action is inferred in reference to both seats [of inherence] in as far as separation and conjunction are located in both. When, however, a monkey goes from the root to the bough and from the bough to the root, the notion: „this goes" does not arise in the tree as well, though it is a substrate of continual conjunctions and separations. And if the theory is put forward:

„The inference of activity in the tree is not made, because it is impossible for the conjunctions of the monkey with [different

---

1) Cf. the use of this term in the Sāṃkhya system.

2) Gaṅgānātha Jhā, *The Prābhākara School* p. 91.

spots of] (physical) space &c. to arise from a movement which inheres in the tree",

then [I answer: we have to admit that] a second action exists in the monkey, which action causes the conjunctions with other spots; but the acceptance of movement in the tree does not succeed; because of the general rule: in the thing in which the effect inheres, in that thing the cause inheres. If we should allow an exception to this rule in one case, where have we to stop in others?

[Pūrvapakṣin]: If I should answer: the admittance of the two movements [in the monkey] is not allowable, because through the inferred action, inhering in the monkey, there arise the separation and conjunction of the monkey both in regard to the tree and to different spots?

[Siddhāntin]: This is not so. For where a probans (*liṅga*) is observed to be impeded, there it obliges us to accept the [existence of the] impediment; [in other words: the absurd consequence of the stationary tree moving refutes your theory]. For the whole drift of inference comes to this; no violation of this could ever occur by things going otherwise, just as [little as in the case of] *arthāpatti*. Nor is the [probans, used by you] — so as man is — a conscious principle which could act according to a motive [and circumstances]. [In other words: human will is free, but reasoning follows strict canons]. When you adduce conjunctions and disjunctions with one spot of (physical) space as reasons for inferring movement, then [I answer]: it is not possible to adduce [such reasons], since the separations and conjunctions of things abiding in the supersensuous (physical) space are not perceptible. If the movement is to be inferred from a series of separations and conjunctions with one spot of the earth, then the movement of a bird flying in the air would surpass human notion. If one would adduce as reasons for the movement the series of conjunctions and disjunctions with the multitude of lightbeams expanded in (physical) space, then no foundation would exist for the sensation of movement which sometimes in darkness is suddenly and involuntarily experienced by some one through the influence of wind [i. e. wind as one of the humours of the body], whilst his limbs tremble and he himself makes the statement: „my hand is moving, my eyebrow contracts", a sensation which arises in the sense-organ of skin, subject to [the action of] the internal organ and the unseen [quality of soul]. And how could you explain the notion of „movement" with reference to a flash of lightning, abiding only for one moment, at night, amidst the darkness of great clouds?

35. *Polemics against an opponent who denies a special perception of yogins.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 197 l. 9.

[Siddhāntin]: With reference to that which has been said:

[Quotation of the opponent's view]: The yogins do not behold
objects which surpass the limits of our senses,
because they are living beings,
as we and others;

[Siddhāntin]: this inference is *siddhasādhana* (an unnecessary trial for proving something which is already known), if it is upheld with regard to ordinary men (*puruṣamātra*). — An extraordinary man is denied by one of the two parties (*parasyāsiddhaḥ*). [1]) — And if [such a special species of man] were known, then your inference would be refuted (*viruddha*) by a *pramāṇa* which embraces the *dharmin* (the object of which the quality is to be proven). [Thus your inference is at all events a fallacy, either a *siddhasādhana*, or a *parasyāsiddhaḥ*, or a *viruddhaḥ*].

[Opponent]: To this we answer: this [argumentation of yours] proceeds by *prasaṅga* [2]) [i. e. by supposition, specially a supposition leading to absurd consequences]. Now a proof by means of *prasaṅga* does not tend the proving of one's own view, but only at the reaching some result, not desired by the antagonist. This result (*parasyāniṣṭam*) can be obtained by means of qualities which necessarily ensue from the [opponent's] admission (*abhyupagama*). But in this process of investigation we must not reflect on our own view. For one [of two disputants] may not debate in this way: „These qualities &c. of yours are unproven (*asiddha*), but I neither enter [positively] upon those which I myself accept (*svasiddha*)."

[Defendent]: To this I answer: is a *prasaṅgānumāna* an inference (*anumāna*) or something else? If it is something else [than the forms of inference which are known], its inclusion in [the general form of] *pramāṇa* should be described or any other definition should be given. But if it is a mere *anumāna*, then it proceeds on the basis of one's own opinion, since every *parārthānumāna* aims at effecting a conviction (*niçcaya*) in others, as it exists in ourselves. Otherwise such a [fallacious] inference as:

The lotus, grown in the sky, is fragrant,
because it is a lotus,
as the lotus, grown in the pleasure-pond;

1) Cf. here book IV section IV table F sub *b* n°. I, 2.

2) Cf. Ny. Kandalī p. 173 l. 22 here p. 436.

would be trustworthy, if it were *siddhāçraya* [1]) by consent of our antagonist; [but our own logical conscience prohibits its *siddhāçrayatva*].

[Let us now return to the inference, originally upheld by you: „*yogino 'tīndriyārthadraṣṭāro na bhavanti*" &c.]: [your probantia], such as the possession of life, possess an uncertain pervasion [*sandigdhavyāptayaḥ*). [2]) What objection can be raised, if an extraordinary man, whose existence is the object of our investigation, were to possess life &c. as well as omniscience? For no contradiction is seen between these two qualities, in as far as omniscience is no object of any other means of knowledge [than of itself (?) or than of the inference, given formerly by me, cf. Ny. kandalī 196, 18]. The [necessary] concomitance of *prāṇitva* and non-omniscience is, however, uncertain. For we cannot settle the dilemna: is non-omniscience dependent on *prāṇitva* &c. of people like us, or is it effectuated by the non-existence of merit, born from *yoga*, [a merit] which is acknowledged to be the cause of omniscience. Therefore the *prāṇitva* &c. [given by you as a probans], since its pervasion is uncertain, is not fit for an inference.

[Remark]: „Merit, born from *yoga*, is a cause of knowledge which surpasses the sense-organs", this is uncertain? Why, because of its absence [in ourselves]....

36. *Prakaraṇasama* & *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*. [3])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 202 l. 14.

[The two fallacies, termed] *prakaraṇasama* and *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* are included in the *anaikāntika* (or more-sided fallacy). For the *prakaraṇasama* takes place in a *sādhyadharmin* [i. e. an object, a quality of which remains to be proved], whilst the *vipakṣa* is uncertain [i. e. whilst the probans, may or may not occur in counter-examples], [4]) and the *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* in a *sādhyadharmin*, whilst the *vipakṣa* is ascertained [i. e. although the quality, considered to be the probans, occurs in the counter-examples].

The following is [the definition, given by Nyāya Sūtra I, 4, 47, of the] *prakaraṇasama*:

„That [reason] which is employed with the view of determining

---

1) Cf. here book IV section IV table F sub *b* n°. I, 4.

2) ibidem sub *b* n°. II, 1.

3) Cf. here book II p. 311 letter *f* and p. 314 letter *f*.

4) Cf. book IV section IV table F sub *b* II.

[the state of the case], [but] from which a question arises concerning the *prakaraṇa*, is a *prakaraṇasama*."

[We may comment upon this as follows]:

prakriyate = *prastūyate* ('is made a topic of dispute'). So then:

prakaraṇa = *pakṣa-pratipakṣau* (i. e. topic = views of defendent and opponent).

tayoç cintā = *vicāraḥ* (question).

That [reason] now which gives rise to this question, [although employed with the view of determining [the state of the case], is not fit for ascertaining one or the other of the two views, in consequence of the equality of these two views — [and this uncertainty remains] as long as the topic is thus equally balanced.

For instance:

[I] Sound is eternal,
because no transient quality is perceived in it.

[II] Sound is transient,
because no eternal quality is perceived in it.

Thus since there is doubt about the eternality or transiency of sound, in consequence of the non-perception of its eternal or transient quality, an open question on this point will exist; for if we could grasp one or the other of the two qualities, the truth would be settled and there would be no room left for any question. Here the non-perception of a transient quality, brought forward in order to ascertain the eternality [of sound] — not overcoming the opponent's view which is based on the non-perception of an eternal quality — is not sufficient for determination, because the [other view is an] obstacle. And this [reason, quoted by the defendent], residing in a *dharmin* with a possible *pratipakṣa*, is a form of *anaikāntika*, in accordance with [the definition of this last fallacy]: „the [matter] is not decidedly placed on one side or the other."

Similarly the *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* is a form of *anaikāntika*, for the [alleged reason]: 'the being a product" resides in the *vipakṣa*, whilst fire [i. e. the *dharmin*] is proved to be warm by perception. [1])

---

1) The inference, here referred to, runs thus:

agnir anuṣṇaḥ,
kṛtakatvāt.

In this inference the thesis is already fallacious (cf. here book IV section IV table F sub *a* 1). Leaving this out of sight, we may consider the argumentation to be based on:

I *yat kṛtakaṃ, tad anuṣṇam*
II *yad uṣṇaṃ, tan na kṛtakam*.

[Opponent]: Your argumentation does not hold good. For when a probans is a factor leading to knowledge (*gamaka*) on this condition: „that whilst penetrating the *pakṣa*, it exists in the *sapakṣa* and is excluded from the *vipakṣa*", then still the admission of a contrary view (*pratipakṣa*) with reference to the *sādhyadharmin* [i. e. the object the quality of which remains to be proved] is allowed; and similarly the probandum could be proved by a *prakaraṇasama* [i. e. the defendent's argumentation against which an opponent brings in a reasoning of equal force], for in itself it is sufficient. But the [probandum] cannot be proved thus, for the doubt, suggested by the opponent's view, comes in. Consequently *gamakatva* [i. e. the sufficiency of the probans for leading to convincing knowledge] does not merely depend on the threefold character [of the probans: 1) its *pakṣavyāpakatva*, 2) its *sapakṣe bhāvaḥ*, 3) its *vipakṣād vyāvṛttiḥ*]. But the circumstance that there is no contradictory view must be posited as a fourth condition, because the probantial nature [of the probans] exists, when there is no *pratipakṣa*, and it does not exist, when there is.

Similar restrictions are to be made about the *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*. If the probantiality only should depend on the threefold character [of the probans], how would there be undecisiveness [in this argumentation]:

Lack of heat exists in fire,
because of its being a product.

But although fire is a product, still the lack of heat does not take place in it, for the ascertainment of heat originates from perception. Thus the arriving [at trustworthy knowledge] takes place, when there is no contradiction by perception, but when this occurs, then it does not. Thus the *abādhitaviṣayatva* [i. e. the circumstance that the object is not refuted by perception] must again be accepted as a condition. Therefore it is said in other words:

> A synonym of *pakṣa* [or *dharmin*] is *sādhya* [i. e. probandum]; and a *sādhya* is to be defined as that which allows proof, but an object of which a *pratipakṣa* can be conceived, does not allow proof, in as far as a matter does not allow twofold aspect [scil. a negative and a positive aspect; — in other words: since the principle of the tertium exclusum has force].

[Defendent]: But here [we touch upon] a quality of an *apakṣa*

The latter hypothetical proposition, however, is not true; or as ÇRĪDHARA says: 'the being a product resides in the *vipakṣa*'.

[i. e. a thing different from that whose quality remains to be proved]; and so, that which allows contradiction by perception &c. is not a *pakṣa*, because it is not possible to prove in one form [*rūpa*, e. g. in a form, arrived at by inference] that which has already been settled in another form [scil. a form, ascertained by perception].

So then these [two fallacies]: *prakaraṇasama* and *kālātyayapādiṣṭa* are excluded by the total formula [of our text]: *yad anumeyena sambaddham*" [Praç. Bh. p. 200 l. 19], because they both rest on a fallacy of the *anumeya*. [1])

37. *The exclusively positive probans (anvayi liṅgam).* [2])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 203 l. 15.

But is not this [definition of *liṅga*, given by PRAÇASTAPĀDA] wrong, in as far as it does not include all [legitimate forms of probantia]? The probans, namely, can be threefold: exclusively positive, exclusively negative, and positive-negative.

An [example of the] positive probans is the following:

Difference is expressible,
because it is knowable,
like generality.

For everything besides the *pakṣa* of this [positive probans] is *sapakṣa*, divided into existent and non-existent things; for, taking knowledge in general of any knower in general, there is nothing but which is expressible and knowable. And that which is unexpressible and unknowable for the [ordinary] man, is the non-existent, like the horn of a horse; and this [non-existent] would neither be *sapakṣa* nor *vipakṣa*, because it is without innate nature. But that which is existent, is without exception *sapakṣa*, therefore the part of the definition: *tadabhāve ca nāsty eva* (Praç. Bhāṣya p. 200 l. 20) is not applicable here, because *vyatireka* (exclusion) does not take place.

[Opponent]: If I should say, this [exclusively positive] probans is 'not leading to convincing knowledge' (*agamaka*)?

[Defendent]: No, [you are wrong], because no deviation from the positive agreement takes place. The positive agreement [which can be expressed in the words]: 'the existence of the one results from the existence of the other', is here a cause [of trustworthy knowledge]; and the notion of its deviation [in any case] is refuted

1) According to Nyāya-kandalī p. 200 l. 23, *anumeya* = *dharmin*. Thus *anumeyābhāsa* = *dharmyābhāsa* = *pakṣābhāsa*. Cf. VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA, Med. School p. 90 § 52.

2) Cf. here book II p. 323 &c. § 5.

as unadvisable [1]) [by our logical conscience]. First: there is positive agreement between *prameyatva* (knowableness) and *abhidheyatva* (expressibleness), because we experience *abhidheyatva* in all cases of *prameyatva*. And neither does a deviation occur, nor does [anybody] feel a doubt, for any object which a man brings into the region of his intellection, making it subject to his distinctions, and about which he wants to inform somebody else, falls under the region of *prameyatva* and *abhidheyatva*, and all things are in this respect equal to each other; for when there is no *vipakṣa* [2]), non-deviation is a factor [required for right inference]; ergo not by the formula *vipakṣābhāvād* does the *prameyatva* prove the *abhidheyatva*.

38. *The exclusively negative probans (vyatireki liṅgam).* [3])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 204 l. 1.

An [example of the] exclusively negative probans is the following:

The living body possesses a soul,
because it possesses breath &c.

For everything besides the *pakṣa* of this [negative probans] is a *vipakṣa*. And still it is a correct probans, because the reserved [i. e. negative] relation holds good without exception.

In pots &c. we realise the universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) of absence of soul with absence of breath &c.; but in the living body it is perceived that absence of breath comes to an end; and through this [4]) insight [we arrive at] the inference concerning the extermination of the absence of soul — an absence which is pervaded by the insight [about the absence of breath &c.].

And if you reason as follows:

[Supposed argumentation of the opponent]: when an object is itself not perceived, then its exclusion [from anything] can neither be perceived, because a negation (*pratiṣedha*) must bear upon a positive fact (*sidhi*). Soul, now, is nowhere perceived, how then could we become aware of its exclusion from pots &c.?

[Defendent]: this is not fit. The exclusion [i. e. non-occurrence] of soul from [resp.: in] pots &c. is certain for the adversary (*para*) who upholds the absence of soul to be a common property of all things; and as for my self (*svasya*), after I have proved the causal relation (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*) of the soul in my living body with reference to its effects, such as intellections &c., I infer from the

1) Read: *apavāditā*?
2) Read: *vipakṣe 'saty*.
3) Cf. here book II p. 323 &c. § 5.
4) [illegible] in double construction with [illegible] & *anumānam*.

absence of intellections &c. in pots &c. the non-existence [in these pots] of a relation with a particular soul, [a relation] which would be capable of producing the [mental states, indicated before], just as, when there is an absence of smoke somewhere, we may infer the absence of fire which is capable of its production. And if so, then soul is proved in [all] living bodies, because the notion of a relation is not possible without the notion about that which bears the relation.

[Opponent]: But then the argumentation by means of a negative [probans] is useless, because we fall into a procedure of applying a means to an action the result of which has been obtained.

[Defendent]: It is not thus; because soul, being proved as far as I am concerned, but not yet for another, remains still to be proved [for the sake of that adversary]. And there is no reason for this limitation: „a positive necessary concomitance is informative, but a negative necessary concomitance has no force." So then also the [*vyatireki liṅgam*] may serve as a probans. Ergo the formula *prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite* (Praç. Bhāṣya p. 200 l. 19) is too narrow.

39. *Conclusion to the passages on anvayavi & vyatireki liṅgam.*

With reference to these difficulties some say: the exclusively positive and exclusively negative [probans] are included, because they are taught in [other writings of] the same school.

But others say: the definition [given by PRAÇASTAPĀDA) is to be explained as *vyasta-samasta* [i. e. first the parts of the definition must be taken separately as definitions, and finally the complete formula must be taken as such]. „*Anumeyena sambaddhaṃ, prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite*", this is the definition of the *anvayavi* [*liṅgam*]. „*Anumeyena sambaddhaṃ, tadviparīte* [= *tadabhāve*, in Praçastapāda's text] *ca nāsty eva*", this is the definition of the *vyatireki* [*liṅgam*]. The total formula is a definition of the *anvayava-vyatireki* [*liṅgam*]. The being a means for proving the probans, is a common characteristic for these three [probantia]; so as the common characteristic of trustworthy means of knowledge is their circumlimitation [of the objects] as they are.

40. *Avinābhāva.* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 206 l. 17:

Well then, what is this non-deviation (*avyabhicāra*), called necessary concomitance (*avinābhāva*)? What is it caused by?

---

1) Cf. here book IV section VII table E and *Muséon* N.S. V p. 141

The [Buddhists] answer: by identity and by causality. An accidental act can just as well take place as not take place: there is no cause for any limitation. Even when perception [of the *sādhya*] takes place in homogeneous instances, and non-perception in heterogeneous instances, no non-deviation can be known, because we cannot banish the doubt whether [the *sādhya*] may still reside in [some of the] heterogeneous instances.

But when we can settle the causal relation (*tadutpatti*), then doubt is dispelled, as it is not possible to take hold of the nature of the effect without its cause. This determination of causality[1] between effect and cause proceeds by means of five perceptions or non-perceptions of our sense-organ: (1) the non-perception of the effect before the arising [of the cause]; after (2) the perception of the cause (3) the perception [of the effect]; and, later on, this perceived [effect] — after (4) the non-perception of the cause — (5) is itself subject to non-perception; thus there are two non-perceptions [n°. 1 & 5] and one perception [n°. 3] of the effect; and there is one perception [n°. 2] and one non-perception [n°. 4] of the cause. Thus by means of these five perceptions and non-perceptions it is settled: 'only when there is fire, existence of smoke; when there is no fire, non-existence'. For this is the essence of effect; that it is, when a certain other thing is; and that it is not, when this is lacking. Also by the notion of identity this necessary concomitance is proved. Existence does not go astray from its own innate nature, otherwise the unwished-for consequence would be that there is no such innate nature. The ascertainment of identity (*tādātmya*) takes place by this circumstance that a refuting argument (*bādhaka*) in heterogenous instances (*vipakṣa*) acts as trustworthy means of knowledge. But when this refuting argument does not come forward, then nobody, even on seeing [two facts] together for the hundredth time, would be capable of preventing this doubt: perhaps somewhere [the *sādhya*] will occur in a *vipakṣa*. Therefore it is said:

> A rule for necessary concomitance either results from the relation between effect and cause, or from innate nature as a determining factor; and not from non-perception [in the *vipakṣa*] [and not] from perception [in the *sapakṣa*].

That is to say: a strict rule for necessary concomitance follows from *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* as a *niyāmaka*, or from *svabhāva* as a *niyāmaka*,

1) Cf. SIGWART, *Logik* II (3. Aufl.) p. 484 and notes.

but not from perception [of the *sādhya*] in the *sapakṣa* and non-perception in the *vipakṣa*.

[Vaiçeṣika]: To this we answer: [Must we] either say: wherever there is identity and causality, there is necessary concomitance; or, wherever there is necessary concomitance, there is identity and causality?

To begin with the first alternative, this does not hold good. For [if necessary concomitance takes place], whilst there is causality, then the quality of smoke, such as earthness &c. is still lacking in fire; and whilst there is identity, then the tree-ness [as a generality] does not fall together with the species [*çiṃçapātva*].

But [must we then say]: wherever there is necessary concomitance, there is identity and causality? Then in the case of the existence of necessary concomitance these two will function as *gamaka*s (factors leading to conviction). If so, let the necessary concomitance be the *gamaka*, for what do we want identity and causality? For neither does an effect lead us to the insight: '[this is] an effect', nor innate nature to the insight: '[this is] innate nature'. Why then should *avyabhicāra* be the cause of our being led to the insight: 'this has *avyabhicāra*'. Neither are identity and causality [causes of this insight], for there would be *vyabhicāra* [i. e. deviation from a rule].

Neither does [your argumentation] obtain fitness in the following way: "smoke is effectuated by fire, but not its [i. e. smoke's] qualities 'earthness' &c."; because a substance cannot be split up [in this manner]. Neither can this be accepted: „the *çiṃçapā* has the tree as self, but the tree has not the *çiṃçapā* as self, because [the generality 'tree'] is common to the *dhava*, *khadira* &c."; for there is no difference between these two [propositions, both expounding the same identity]. And when the treeness, common to the *dhava* &c. is not the *çiṃçapātva*, then there is no oneness of these two, because difference characterises the difference in innate nature. But if identity is accepted, then just as treeness is common to all trees, so would be *çiṃçapātva*. Further, when there is identity, [between treeness and *çiṃçapātva*], and consequently non-existence of *gamya* (notion to be arrived at) and *gamaka* (notion leading to the ascertainment of the *gamya*), no diathesis [between these two] can be accepted, as this [diathesis] must rest on difference. If, on the grasping of *çiṃçapātva*, tree-ness is not grasped, how [could we talk of] identity? And if this [tree-ness] is grasped, why [should we take refuge in] inference? But it is said: (1) the object in question (*dharmin*) as described, (2) the *çiṃçapātva* and (3) the tree-ness,

these three are one, and when the object in question is grasped, then also *çiṃçapātva* and tree-ness are grasped. As has been said:

> So then, when a form of existence is seen, its complete qualities are seen. What other portion then would be unseen and [must therefore] be realised by means of [other] sources of knowledge?

[Buddhist]: As to the fact that in this way a distinctive intellection (*vikalpa*) of a *çiṃçapā* originates, and not such an intellection of a tree; this ensues from a shortcoming [of ours, scil.:] the non-existence of the remembrance of the word 'tree'. The distinctive intellection of a *çiṃçapā* — which owes its birth to the awakening of the latent impression of the word *çiṃçapā* and which amounts to exclusion of [everything which is] not-*çiṃçapā* — does not lead to the exclusion of not-tree, because the unwished-for consequence would be that all distinctive intellections were synonymous with each other. The relation of *gamaka* (intellection leading to insight) and *gamya* (intellection to be arrived at) exists only between two exclusions (*vyāvṛttis*) and not between two positive agreements of the object[ive world], because there does not exist a positive agreement in this.[1]) The exclusion of the not-tree and the exclusion of the not-*çiṃçapā* are mutually different, because there is a difference between the [two] excludenda[2]) [scil. the *çiṃçapā* and the tree].

[Vaiçeṣika]: O wonderful cleverness on the part of scholars, in so arranging the precedent and the consequent. Identity is the germ of inference; and yet there is a mutual difference between the two exclusions, functioning as probandum and probans. What does this hocus-pocus mean?

[Buddhist]: If I should say: There is identity between tree and *çiṃçapā*; and although difference [must be admitted] between the exclusion of not-tree and the exclusion of not-*çiṃçapā* — which exclusions appear as identical — yet there is identity as far as *adhyavasāya* (final conclusion) is concerned.

[Vaiçeṣika]: When the identity [between tree and *çiṃçapā*] is proved, then the exclusion of the not-tree can be finally ascertained — with reference to the topic in question — by means of the exclusion of the not-*çiṃçāpa*; and when the exclusion of the not-tree is finally ascertained here, then the settling of the identity, as far as the final conclusion is concerned, takes place. Thus the fault of mutual dependence [of propositions, comes in].

---

1) According to the Buddhistic *apoha*-theory.

2) *vyāvastya* cf. Ny.-kand. 76, 14.

[Buddhist]: At the moment of the grasping of the universal concomitance, there exists identity between the two exclusions, which have been proved to have one nature.

[Vaiçeṣika]: The identity of these two [exclusions] thus ascertained, is a matter of fancy (*kālpanika*). And when inference could take place by transmitting [the matter] to fancy, then no fallacious reason whatever could exist, for also identity would be possible between *prameyatva* (the being object of trustworthy knowledge) and *anityatva* (transiency), being finally accepted as having one nature in as far as the final ascertainment is concerned.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: there is non-existence of identity of *prameyatva* with transiency, because exclusion from the *vipakṣa* does not exist.

[Vaiçeṣika]: That is true. There is no real identity, but there is an identity projected [over them] by fancy (*kalpanā*). And you have wished this as a condition for the arising of inference. Thus the non-existence of the exclusion from the *vipakṣa* is equal to something non-existent [i. e. is nonsense]. Moreover:

If [1]) somebody believes that the notion about identity or causality ensues from the notion of the non-existence of the probans in the *vipakṣa*, then the notion about the non-existence of this [identity or causality] is a non-perception [2]) of something which allows perception, and — since non-perception is included in inference — proceeds from the notion about identity or from the notion about causality together with [i. e. just as well as] the non-existence of the probans in the *vipakṣa* [a non-existence] which must also be proved by him [i. e. by this somebody to whom I refer]; and again the ascertainment of identity or causality in this [last-mentioned notion] [3]) ensues from the notion of the non-existence of inherence in the *vipakṣa*; and the notion of this non-existence is dependent on another non-perception, because this is accepted: „whatever may be the negation, it always bears upon a non-perception". Thus, since endless regress comes in, we cannot prove exclusion (*vyatireka*) and therefore neither can innate nature nor effect be [what we call] the probans.

Moreover although there is neither identity nor causality, yet we notice the relation of *gamya* and *gamaka* between the rising of the asterism *Kṛttikāḥ* and the setting of the asterism *Rohiṇī*.

---

1) *yasya* = *yadi kasya cit.*

2) Read: *dṛçyānupalabdhir.*

3) Omitted in this translation: *swasādhyena.*

Thus it is a statement, unsufficiently thought out, to say: restriction either ensues from causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) or from innate nature.

For the relation of one thing with another thing by means of innate nature is definite, because it is exempt from conditions (*upādhi*). A relation, brought about by conditions, namely, ceases on account of the cessation of these [conditions], but a relation by innate nature (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*) does not. If the relation of smoke towards fire was effectuated by conditions, then these would have been perceived, as is the instruction [which is being given], [as a condition] for the being together of pupil and teacher. For there is not the slightest reason for our not perceiving these conditions, when fire and smoke are perceived several times, and neither are the conditions of a perceived [object] necessarily imperceptible. For when these [conditions] were dependent on the innate nature [of the object], then the necessary concomitance would be proved, in as far as a relation, brought about by this [innate nature], would last as long as the object [exists]. But if they were adventitious, then their causes would also be perceived. And to say: „the conditions and their causes transgress the senses without exception", this is too complicated a supposition (*gurvī kalpanā*). That fact, [e. g.] smoke, for which there are no conditions [required], would be sometimes perceived [in its] independent [nature], so as fire (or heat) whose relation towards smoke is effectuated by [wet] fuel as a condition, is met with as smokeless, when dry fuel has the predominance (*ādhipatya*). But never in this way is fireless smoke found by any other act of consciousness [i. e. by any other perception]. So then:

when we have conceived the non-existence [of *upādhi*s], because we never perceived such *upādhi*s which [according to their nature] would have possessed the property of [being open to our] perception;

whilst we have settled the non-probantial character (*ahetutva*) of the perceived different states of the fuel according to[1]) place and time, on reason of the irregular concomitance in reiterated perception;[2])

then there is no fault in the perception of the non-existence of *upādhi*s by referring to all particular cases of place and time.

So then after having settled, that the coexistence of the generality 'smoke' with the generality 'fire' is merely bound on the innat

1) Read: *deçakāla.*
2) Omitted: *upalabdhānām anupalambhād.*

nature [of things] — by the last perception, of which every counter-view is rejected, and which is supported by a latent impression, originated from the seeing of simultanous existence — one realises the strict rule: „this is strictly bound to that".

Although at the first perception the coexistence is grasped, yet we do not grasp the strict rule. For the strict rule does not follow from the mere coexistence, but from a coexistence void of conditions. And the voidness of conditions is the final conclusion of the application of reiterated perception. Thus it [i. e. the strict rule] is settled by a concrete perception which has got force by the reiterated grasping of coexistence. By this we have also refuted:

[Quoted opinion of an opponent]: „How is the grasping of a strict rule possible with reference to individuals belonging to past and future, for the perception by means of the sense-organs refers to something which is [now] existent?

[Defendent]: For we do not teach the grasping of universal concomitance (which abides in special forms) in respect to generality with disregard to the special forms, but in this grasping of the universal concomitance, the notion is without doubt everywhere, because it has everywhere one form.

[Opponent]: Why then have not the individual forms entered into the universal concomitance?

[Defendent]: But who says that they have not? But only under the aspect of generality and not of difference have they done so. Therefore we think of fire qua talis through our notion of smoke; it [i. e. fire] has regard to that[1]) [notion of smoke], and has no reference to difference [i. e. is not considered in its own differentiated forms].

[Opponent]: If I should say: But when (although the strict rule is ascertained everywhere by generality) doubt has originated owing to factors which lack trustworthiness, then also from your standpoint (when individual fires and smokes have been seen by means of perception, and their causal relation grasped) nobody can prevent the not happening there of inference in consequence of a doubt which was 'put between' by [lapse of] time and [difference of] place.

But we say: the relation of effect and cause is ascertained by reiterated perception, because the doubt as to whether [the connection which seems to be of a causal character] is due to its *upādhis*, is not solved by one single perception. And the reiterated perception

---

1) Read: *tām*.

refers to the generality, because there is no reiterated perception of momentary individuals. Therefore the relation of effect and cause — which refers to generalities and exists between that which is excluded from the non-fire and that which is excluded from the non-smoke [1]) — is ascertained for all cases after it has been ascertained for one case, for there is oneness in the generality.

[Defendent]: Why does not [the notion of] *niyama* (strict rule) please you — [a notion] which is similarly settled for all cases by us? Moreover, from your standpoint, two generalities which transgress the reach of the sense-organs, do not allow the relation of effect and cause, because they are not objective (*avastutvāt*). But the individuals are of such a nature; and everything is grasped by perception in [the form of] individuals. And you may not argue as follows:

[Argumentation attributed to the opponent]: There is a holding together in the mind of past and future individuals.

[Defendent]: for if the mind were independent with reference to an exterior object, the unwished-for consequence would be that there would be no blind or deaf person, [for his mind would form shapes, forms and sounds, although the exterior objects do not act on it]. Causal relation and *adhyavasāya* (ascertainment) exist for perceived individuals, and origination of inference does not take place with reference to unperceived individuals, because it is otherwise than this. Neither can the relation of probans and probandum be accepted for individuals, for they are totally apart from each other.

41. *Verbal authority a form of inference.* [2])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 214 l. 6.

[Opponent]: In an inference we conceive a *dharmin* (an object in question) determined by the quality to be proved; but what is this *dharmin* in an inference concerning a matter by means of word? No object, certainly, because this is then [at the time of the mere mentioning of the word] not perceived.

[Defendent]: If I should say: the word is the object in question?

[Opponent]: What is its probandum?

[Defendent]: If I should say: its reference to an object?

[Opponent]: [You are wrong, because] differently from mountain

---

1) According to the *apohavāda*.

2) The passage is a polemics against the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas who uphold *çabda* to be an independent source of knowledge. Cf. GAṄGANĀTHA JHĀ, *the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā School* p. 52 &c.

&c. with reference to fire &c., no relation of word with object — either a conjunction, or an inherence &c. — is perceived, which would allow that this [word] can be proved as determined by the object. For the relation of these two is merely that of the *pratipādya* (nominandum) and the *pratipādaka* (nominans); and this [relation], dating from the time after the cognition of the object, is not possible before the showing of the object. Neither does there — as is the case with fire and smoke — exist a regular necessary coexistence (*avinābhāva*) of word and object, because of their [possible mutual] deviation in space and time. And [the occurrence of] this deviation is proved by

a) the fact that the word Yudhiṣṭhira is used in the Kali-period, although Yudhiṣṭhira does not live anymore;

b) the fact that the word Laṅkā is heard in Jambudvīpa, although [this island] Laṅkā is not present. Consequently word is not a form of inference, because the whole set of conditions, necessary for inference, is not present; for [the word] is not strictly combined with [lit., deviates from] the object, according to varieties of place. Nowhere does smoke deviate from fire [i. e. wherever there is smoke, there must be fire]; but on the other hand word deviates from its object. Namely:

> [The word] *caura* has for the inhabitants of the Dekhan the meaning of „lover"; but for the people of Āryāvarti it means „thief".

And if word were a form of inference, then the ascertainment of its trustworthiness would depend on the notion of the threefold qualities (*trairūpya*) [which are required in the probans], and not on the notion of its being spoken by a competent person. But since its trustworthiness is settled by this notion, it differs from inference, for it is dissimilar in this respect.

[Defendent]: We answer to this: When the forefinger is raised, the inference of the number „ten" is made with reference to objects, distant from us in space and time. Here now it is not number which is the object in question (*dharmin*), because it is not taken as such. Neither is the position of the forefinger the *dharmin*, because there would exist no other relation of this [position of the forefinger] with the number „ten", which is expressed by it [1], and because it would not be fit that this expressing [of this number] should be determined by it [i. e. by this position]. And neither do these two occur in the same place, nor at the same time. How then

1) Read: *pratipādyamānayā*.

does the inference take place? — In consequence of the perception of the custom, prevalent among merchants, when engaged in buying and selling, to raise the forefinger, as we have said; and which is intended to suggest to us the idea of the number „ten". How is this? — This [gesticulation] is the cause of the notion of the number „ten" by means of the understanding of the intention to inform us about that. If so, then[1]) it is with word as follows: first by the uttered word 'cow', [the hearer] becomes aware of the speaker's wish to express an object to which belong [the respective speechsounds] *ka*, *ku*, &c. — for he also perceives in the stream of his own consciousness (*svasantāna*) the fact that the wish for indicating a cow precedes the uttering of the word 'cow', and from this wish to express a certain object, [the hearer] infers the object. The formal inference may here be given thus:

> This man — the *dharmin* [in our inference] — possesses the wish to express an object to which belong [the respective speechsounds] *ka*, *ku* &c.;
>
> because he is the agent of the utterance of the word 'cow';
>
> so as I [am on certain occasions].

[Opponent]: If I should say: the ascertainment of the object does not follow from this wish for indication, because we perceive this wish for indication also in incompetent persons, although the object does not exist.

[Defendent]: [You ask me]: How does the [untrustworthy] proof for the [object] by means of word take place here? [I answer]: by error (*bhrānti*), or by the intention to deceive, [or] by the use of a word, void of sense.

[Opponent]: If I should say then: the notion of an object arises from a word, uttered by a trustworthy person?

[Defendent]: We might just as well say: the understanding of the object follows [as a result] from the intention (*abhiprāya*) of the competent person. — And as to the (occasional) deviation of word from object in particular places, although its probantial nature still exists — a deviation which does not occur in the case of smoke [and fire] — here the following argumentation has force:

Smoke is a probans for fire by a relation, founded on the nature of things (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*); but word, which like gesticulation, functions through convention (*saṅketa*), formed by the wish of man, is a probans with the aid of the understanding of the

---

1) Note the construction of *evam* with genitive.

speaker's wish in relation to that object for which man has made the convention. And further for the same reason, just as gesticulation is fit for the ascertainment of objects, when used by competent men, so undeviating relation [1] will occur between thing and word, provided that this latter is uttered by a competent person — [in this way there is analogy with the regular concomitance of fire and] smoke characterised by such qualities as continuance, rising upwards &c.

[Opponent]: Why have you not laid down the fact that the denotation of object by word takes place through the original meaning (*mukhyā vṛttiḥ*) of the word?

[Defendent]: Because there is not a [real] relation [between word and thing; — i. e. this relation is only a matter of convention], and if anything, quite unrelated, could be a factor, leading to insight (*gamaka*), then there would be too wide an applicability (*atiprasañga*).

[Opponent]: If I should say: there is a natural (*svābhāvika*) relation [between word and object]?

[Defendent]: No, because one word is used for several objects in accordance with variety of place.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the denotative power of the word relates to that thing for which it is used by the Āryas, but in other cases the probantial nature of the word, when used, agrees with convention?

[Defendent]: No, because the word *caura* is [active in] the same [way], either effectuating the notion 'thief' or the notion 'lover'. And there is no reason for any distinction, so that it would have denotativeness (*vācakatva*) with reference to thief, and probantiality with reference to lover. — For:

> also in the case of the Āryas the notion of the object, arising in consequence of the word *caura*, supposes a probans;
>
> > because the obtainment of this [notion] is born from the word *caura*;
> >
> > > just as the obtainment [of the respective notion] is born from the word *caura*, when used by an inhabitant of the Dekhan and agreed upon by both parties [speaker and hearer].

---

1) Read: *sambhavaḥ*.

42. *Is there a svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ between word and object?* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī, p. 215, l. 19:

[Vaiçeṣika]: And there is no proof for the existence of a natural relation. By your school it is said:

[Opinion held by opponents]: [This] relation consists in the natural power of the word as a denotator — a power which [also] resides in the denotandum — because thus is a foot placed on either side. According to the saying:

The power, forsooth, is the relation.

[Vaiçeṣika]: If the power of word were to stay in the denotandum according to the nature of things (*svabhāva*), then the inexperienced man [i. e. he who does not know the language] would understand the object through the word, like the experienced man, because [in both cases] there would be a word, an object, and their relation.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the relation, when known, is the cause of the notion of the thing; and not [the relation], merely by the fact of its existing. As has been said:

> [This] relation, because it is a factor leading to knowledge (*jñāpaka*), stands in need of an intellection about itself, therefore this [relation], although existent, is not manifest, when not grasped.

[Vaiçeṣika]: Of what kind is the intellection about this relation?

[Opponent]: If I should say: this [intellection] is of the following kind: this object is the denotandum of that word.

[Vaiçeṣika]: And from where does it arise?

[Opponent]: From the usage of old people [which is perceived by children when growing up].

[Vaiçeṣika]: Let the intellection about the objective fundament of denotation and denotandum — [an intellection], brought about by grown up people, when dealing mutually, [in the soul] of a boy in their presence, and which is called convention (*saṅketa*) and proficiency in language (*vyutpatti*) — be the cause of the notion of the thing, through the intermediance of latent impression! Why do we want another kind of relation?

For the innate fitness of the word is its wordness; and the adventitious fitness is its *saṅketa*; and this order is peculiar; and from these two forms of fitness ensues the origination of the notion of a certain thing. And it is unnecessary to surmise another kind of relation.

[1]) Cf. Vaiç. Sūtra VII, 2, 14—20 & GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, *The Prābhākara School*, p. 220 & 2.

43. *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya of word specially and of knowledge in general.* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 217 l. 23.

[Opponent]: Here some people say: The trustworthiness of word does not depend on its being spoken by a competent person, because all sources of knowledge are trustworthy by themselves.

[Vaiçeṣika]: The following question may be put to these people: What do you understand by trustworthiness of knowledge, either (*A*) the non-deviation from the object, or (*B*) the circumlimitation [of the object] just as it is.

To begin with (*A*), it is not the non-deviation from [i. e. regular concomitance with] the object; because, although fire is regularly connected with smoke, yet trustworthiness of knowledge can be lacking [for instance, in the case] of somebody, inattentive, in whose mind the intellection about fire does not arise, owing to any cause whatever; and [secondly] because the knowledge [given by the eye] is trustworthy, since it [in general] produces knowledge equivalent to the object, although in special cases the eye may err with reference to blue, yellow &c.

And (*B*) if trustworthiness of knowledge means the circumlimitation [of objects] just as they are, [then we may ask]: (*a*) is this knowledge known by itself; (*b*) or is it born from itself? (*c*) or is it merely occupied with itself?

If (*Ba*) this self-trustworthiness [were brought about] by knowledge, then there would arise by itself the intellection: „I am circumlimitating [2]) the things as they are"; consequently with reference to a means of knowledge would there never be the doubt: is this [which I now conceive] like the object or not like the object?; neither would there be practical behaviour on account of erroneous knowledge. But in consequence of the absence of action with reference to one's own self, intellection, not grasping the self, does neither grasp the self's circumlimitation [of objects] just as they are; so then something else is required in order to circumlimitate this, because there is no knowledge about a thing to be proven (*prameya*) without a proof (*pramāṇa*) and because trustworthiness, when itself in the condition of being proved, becomes a *prameya*. Thus trustworthiness ensues from an exterior [fact].

---

1) The self-sufficiency of the knowledge-sources and specially of the (sacred) verbal authority is an important dogma of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, cf. GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, *The Prābhākara School* p. 22 § 4.

2) Read: *paricchedako'ham*.

[Opponent]: If I should say: when the trustworthiness [of a knowledge-source] is known by means of something else, then the trustworthiness of this latter must again be proved by something else, and so on; and consequently the fault of endless regress would come in.

[Vaiçeṣika]: There is no endless regress here, because the wish for knowledge does not exist for every source of knowledge. For a proof circumlimitates an object by the mere fact of its arising; and [this task does] not [belong to] its understood trustworthiness. Now it can sometimes happen, that, after an object is circumlimitated by a proof, there arises by some cause or other a doubt: „is this a trustworthy or an untrustworthy source of knowledge?" and that man abstains from activity through this uncertainty about this object of his knowledge (*viṣaya*); [then afterwards it may happen] that man's wish to get more knowledge with reference to this trustworthiness by means of another instrument arises, in order that he may proceed to activity; for as long as the trustworthiness is not settled, the doubt will not be sublated. But where, either by the skill [afforded] by perpetual application or by the grasping of all particularities without exception, the proof, with all its stains of doubt wiped off, comes forward, there by the mere arising of the [proof] the object is ascertained and the person who realises the proof (*pramātar*), feels no more any further [intellectual] desire, since he does not stand in any need of it; consequently there is no further research for other proofs. And he who would try to raise a doubt here, would fail in this attempt, since [this doubt] is refuted by the ascertainment of that object. As has been said by MAṆḌANA in his Brahmasiddhi:

„When [the object] is known, the doubt [lit. the not breathing freely] is removed by knowledge."

[Opponent]: If [you maintain that] the wish to understand the trustworthiness of knowledge is felt on behalf of activity, then [I raise the following objection]: when a man who had not settled this trustworthiness was active [for a certain object], impelled by his doubt concerning that object, then after that he has become satisfied by the reaching of that object, [he will] no more [feel] this wish to understand the trustworthiness. How then does fitness for activity prove that a trustworthy means of knowledge possesses [i. e. bears upon] a real object? For his activity does not take place with reference to this [reached object], in order to examine the trustworthiness of the knowledge, so as the husbandman

proceeds in order to examine the seed. For his wish only bears on that [object, and not on the knowledge-source],

[Defendent]: When a man was first in doubt about an object, in consequence of his doubt on the trustworthiness of his knowledge, and has been active in order to grasp the object, then he will, by obtaining his aim through the reaching of the object, arrive at the ascertainment of the trustworthiness of his knowledge, although not striven for, whilst the object proves to be fit [for activity]. The fitness for activity, namely, never goes astray (*vyabhicarati*) from the trustworthiness of the knowledge-source. Thus the trustworthiness of knowledge is neither known by itself (*Ba*), nor is it born from itself (*Bb*).

If an intellection, after having first risen, produces (*janayati*) in the own self (*sva*) [*Bb*] a condition of circumlimitating [the objects] as they are, then we could understand the *svataḥ-pramāṇatā* of this [intellection]. But on seeing that the origination of this [circumlimitation, *pariccheda*] — having for its innate nature, the realising of things as they are — is due to a cause, we also become aware of the fact that its trustworthiness depends on something else.

But if you think:

[Opinion, attributed to the opponent]: We do not define *svataḥ-pramāṇatva* thus: „a proof itself produces its own trustworthiness"; but we understand *svataḥprāmāṇya* in the following sense: „a proof does not require, for the effectuating of its trustworthiness, anything else besides the bundle of the causes which produced [the proof itself]." (*Bc*)

[Defendent]: Then does neither this hold good. For when the complete bundle of conditions which produce the intellection, and nothing more or less, is the cause for its trustworthiness, how does erroneous knowledge then originate?

[Opponent]: If I should say: the innate nature of these causes is, to produce an intellection equivalent to the objects. But when it is disturbed by faults (*doṣas*), then they produce an intellection which is not as the things are. But when the faults, causes of the disturbance of the innate nature, are lacking, then this innate nature, scil. the production of an equivalent intellection, appears.

[Defendent]: Is then the origination of equivalence (*yathārthatā*) with reference to a verbal information based on the intellection of the speaker, merely due to this intellection? If so, then every verbal information would be trustworthy. But if the origination of equivalence with reference to word is due to an intellection,

concerning a trustworthy means of knowledge, then this trustworthiness is not merely due to the innate nature of the cause, but to its qualities. The intellection about the object is the cause of the word; its [good] quality, of the equivalence; its faults, of the non-equivalence [of the word]. So then, whilst the equivalence [of the word] is the cause for its trustworthiness as a proof, its trustworthiness is effectuated by the [good] quality of the cause, and not by the mere innate nature [of the cause]. And if the trustworthiness of word as a proof depends on its [good] quality, then [1]) it will be the same case with the other kinds of intellections:

The intellections in question, as proofs, possess trustworthiness in consequence of the [good] quality of their causes;

because they are intellections about a trustworthy means of knowledge;

so as an intellection (about a trustworthy source of knowledge) which is dependent on the verbal information [heard].

[Opponent]: If I should say: the activity (*vyāpāra*) of the [good] quality of the cause bears — also with regard to word — on the non-existence of the fault, but not on the origination of the trustworthiness of the intellection.

[Defendent]: No, [2]) for let us admit that no origination of non-equivalence (which is an effect of faults) takes place, in consequence of the fact that faults are frustrated by good qualities; whence, however, should arise the origination of the equivalence? For the non-existence of the effect takes place when the cause is lacking, but not the existence of the [state of things] opposed to [this effect].

[Opponent]: If I should say: [the origination of the equivalence] is due merely to the innate nature of the intellection?

[Defendent]: No, [you are wrong], because there are no differences [in this innate nature qua' talis]. For the connection with objects forms the differentiation in the intellections. And if this [connection with the objects] is no factor in the origination of this equivalence, (owing to the fact that this [equivalence] only depends on the sublating of faults), then in consequence of the identity in the innate nature, word will not be fixed with reference to the different objects, because there is no proof for such a differentiation.

But if an intellection referring to a certain object produces a

---

1) Notice the construction of *asti tathā* cum genetivo.

2) Read: *doṣa-pratibandhād doṣa-kāryasya* &c.

verbal information about that object, then the equivalence of the intellection [in comparison with the object] is the cause of the equivalence of the word, and the fact that [the word] possesses the form of a mental state (*bodha*) [is] not [such a cause]. So then we have proved that its trustworthiness as a knowledge-source is only due to the good quality [of its cause, i. e. of the effectuating intellection].

But even let us admit that the activity of the good quality bears on the non-existence of the faults, even then *parataḥprāmāṇya* (the extraneousness of the factor on which the trustworthiness depends) is not forsaken; because we can settle by means of agreement and contrariety the fitness of the non-existence of faults, [a non-existence] which is different from the innate nature of the cause in every case of the origination of this [*prāmāṇya*]. [1])

[Opponent]: If I should say: the non-existence of the wrong notion follows from the non-existence of faults, but trustworthiness of cognition is merely dependent on the innate nature of the sense-organs &c.

[Defendent]: Why do you not accept: the origination of trustworthiness of cognition is obstructed by faults, but the wrong notion is dependent on the innate nature of the sense-organs &c.?

[Opponent]: If I should say: such an admission is not possible, because the wrong notion follows [in its apparition] the agreement and contrariety of the faults.

[Defendent]: [We could] just as well [say]: the admission of that [hypothesis of yours] is not possible, because we see that trustworthiness follows [in its apparition] the agreement and contrariety of the non-existence of the faults. For that which does not take in account the prior or posterior non-existence of faults, is not a trustworthy means of knowledge. Thus also the activity of *pramāṇa* which has to do with the production of effects such as positive behaviour &c., is directed outwardly, [2]) and is not exclusively limited to itself, because [intellection] in as far as dependent on expedients, obstacles &c. produces effects such as positive behaviour.

---

[1]) The explanation of *tad* = *prāmāṇya* is suggested by the preceding „*parataḥprāmāṇya*".

[2]) See *Bc*, Ny.-Kandalī p. 218 l. 2.

44. *Upamāna (indication by means of comparison) a form of anumāna.* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 220 l. 21:

When a competent person — e. g. a man who has travelled through woods and knows the *gavaya* — is asked by a citizen who has no knowledge about this animal: „what does the *gavaya* look like?" and when he informs him by means of the similarity of a *gavaya* with a cow, [then we have to do with a form of] inference. The words: „the *gavaya* is such as the cow is", are the *āpta-vacana* (words of the competent person = *çabda*). And this *āpta-vacana* is also an inference, because the notion [that the case is] thus, follows from the trustworthiness of the [knowledge, given by the] speaker. Therefore *upamāna* is no separate [source of knowledge] apart from inference.

[Here we must make the following distinction]:

(*A*). The inference is of the kind as we have described, in the case of those Pūrvamīmāṃsakas who term the words of the wood-traveller the *upamāna*. (*B*). The pupils of Çabara-svāmin, however, declare *upamāna* to be the intellection about the similarity with a [previously] perceived particular cow — [an intellection], which arises after the seeing of a *gavaya* in the wood and together with the remembering of the cow and which can be expressed in the words: 'my cow is similar to this [animal]'. [If we now accept this definition], then *upamāna* is [a form of] remembrance. For similarity, like generality, obtains individuality every time in one object; and it does not like conjunction, adhere to two objects. For the notion: „this is similar to a cow", arises with reference to an individual *gavaya* in a wood, even although an individual cow is not seen. As has been said by the Mīmāṃsaka-teachers, [Çlokavārttika p. 444 n°. 35, cf. Gaṅgānātha Jhā's transl. p. 227]:

> „Like generality, similarity obtains reality in one abode; because it is experienced, even where the *pratiyogin* [i. e. the object on which the relation bears] is not seen."

Discussion of the notion *upamāna*, according to the Çabara-svāmin-definition.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 221 l. 8.

And whilst similarity every time obtains its full reality in one

---

1) Cf. *Prābhākara School* p. 68 and 69. The Çabara-svāmin-definition, also accepted by Prābhākara, is given there § 1. The „other definition" in § 3.

Read in the text of Praç. Bhāṣya p. 220 l. 16 *aprasiddhagavayasya.*

object, so, although this notion, bearing upon cow and [expressed in the words]: „this is similar to a *gavaya*", did not exist previously in consequence of the not grasping of a *gavaya*, yet the notion of similarity consists rightly in the mere conjunction [of the sense-organ] with its [one] abode. In the same way, although in consequence of the not having grasped of the (other) *pratiyogin* the notion: „this is long or short in comparison to that [= a previously not perceived object]" does not arise, yet the grasping of extension qua talis takes place on our merely approaching its abode. How otherwise could anybody, when arrived at another spot, after having seen a *pratiyogin*, decide: „this is long or short in comparison to that [= an absent object]." If similarity which formerly was not seen in the cow by the mere meeting with the sense-organ, neither were now [i. e. in the wood, where no cow in present] seen in the *gavaya*, then the fixed relation of these two [*pratiyogins*], [to be expressed in the words]: „the remembrance takes place with reference to the cow, after the perceiving of the *gavaya*" would not exist; because there would be no difference [in this respect].

[Opponent]: The determination of the remembrance is effected by the perception of so many generalities: hoofs, hairy tail &c. as were perceived in the cow.

[Defendent]: [You are right, but then it follows that]: the generalities inherent in several parts form the similarity, in consequence of their inherence in both [abodes]. And when these [generalities] are grasped in one special case in consequence of the grasping of the abode, then the similarity is grasped. Therefore the notion of similarity, based on the individual cow which is not present and [arising] when a *gavaya* is perceived, is a remembrance which originates from the latent impression, awakened by the seeing of something similar, and it is not a separate source of knowledge. And we may also notice that remembrance may have for an object something which is grasped by vague perception (*nirvikalpaka*); because somebody unexperienced (*avyutpanna*) recognises — on perceiving a second individual object — a generality which was vague (*avikalpita*) at first in his perception of one [i. e. the first] specimen.

Discussion of the notion *upamāna* according to the other Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-definition.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 221 l. 21.

[Let us now consider the definition, given by the other Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas. They explain *upamāna* as follows]: When a man has

heard the *atideçavākya* [i. e. a sentence wherein occurs a statement transferring the form of one object to another, such as *yathā gaus, tathā gavayaḥ*], then on seeing a *gavaya* and noticing its similarity to a cow, [he will take] the word *gavaya* as a name for that animal]. This notion, now, of the relation between the name and the object bearing the name, is the *upamāna*.

In this theory [the formula]: *yathā gaur gavayas tathā*, belongs to [the source of knowledge, termed] word [*vākya* or *çabda*]; and the intellection of ordinary people, originated by it and [to be expressed in the words]: „that which is called '*gavaya*', is something similar to a cow", is merely *āgama* [i. e. tradition or word].

As to the intellection: „that which is similar to a cow, must be called *gavaya*" this is [a form of] inference, because this word is used for that. [Or to express it more formally]:

> If a certain word is consistently used for a certain object by people who are well versed in it, then it is the name for this thing;
>
> > the word *gavaya*, now, is consistently used by the wood-inhabitant for [an animal] like a cow;
> >
> > > ergo this animal [which I now see] is to be termed a *gavaya*.

[Here we have to do with] a knowledge by means of a generality, or: inference.

The egression on *upamāna*, concluded.

Nyāya-kandalī p. 222 l. 3.

With reference to this perceptible *gavaya* the fruit (*phala*) of the perception is: (1) the knowledge of the similarity, and (2) the intellection about an individual, different [from anything else] in the three worlds.

And as to the application (*anusandhāna*) of the relation 'name and thing bearing name' as bearing upon this [particular case], this again is [a form of] remembrance;

> because it is originated from a latent impression, which itself was produced by an intellection [containing the statement]: that something similar to a cow, must be called by the word *gavaya* — [an intellection] which starts from a generality, manifested by the grasping of similarity and previously originated;
>
> > like the application of the *vācyatva* by means of a certain word to another specimen of the same kind as

object — [a *vācyatva*] effected by a latent impression which is born from an intellection about a convention (*saṃketa*), relating to [lit.: having as object] a generality originated in [previous] particular cases.

45. *Arthāpatti.* [1]

Nyāya-kandalī p. 222 l. 9.

„An object (matter), either seen or heard of, is not possible in another way", here the supposition of something else [than that which is originally grasped] is an *arthāpatti.* [2] It is useful to mention separately the perceiving of [words] heard. *Arthāpatti* [in general, is brought about] by [the supposing of an] other [state of things] which puts matters right. This rightly arranging matters is carried out in two ways in the *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* and the *çrutārthāpatti.*

When a state of things, otherwise being impossible, suggests another state of things, then [we have to do with] a *dṛṣṭārthāpatti.* For instance:

„Caitra lives, but he is not in his house". Here the non-existence of Caitra is ascertained by means of the [source of knowledge, termed]: *abhāva*; but from the verbal information: „he lives", his staying there is ascertained, in as far as we experience that a living man stays in his house. But it is not possible that one [thing] simultaneously is and is not in one place; because the existence of these two [conditions] together is contradictory. Therefore this ascertained non-existence and this heard-of information: „he lives" do not agree, unless he is out-of-doors. So then one will surmise such [a fact] by the existence of which an other [fact], [first] being impossible, becomes possible. If he is not out-of-doors, then there is contradiction [of his non-existence in the house] with [the fact] that lives, and a contradiction cannot exist. But when Caitra's being out-of-doors is accepted, then this [difficulty] is solved: „Caitra lives and he is not in the house, because he is out-of-doors."

---

1) Cf. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, *The Prābhākara School* p. 244 &c., where we find in § 2 a reference to the „çrutārthāpatti".

2) I should like to propose the following hypothesis on the original meaning of the term *arthāpatti*. It was a notion due to the exigencies of exegesis. Where a literal explanation of the text was not possible, one „had to go back" (*āpadyate*) to the „meaning", or „intention" of the speaker (*artha*). *Arthāpatti* thus signified as much as „reading between the lines". Later on, *arthāpatti* got a wider meaning; only the *çrutārthāpatti* was a remnant of the old use of the term.

For if there is a contradiction between two means of knowledge, one of which leaves room [for further suppositions], whilst the other is not of this kind — it is likely that there exists another object of the *sāvakāçam*[*pramāṇam*], on account of the unfitness of the *niravakāçam*[*pramāṇam*]. That now which puts right the contradiction between these two [*pramāṇa*s] is the *arthāpatti*. The intellection which arises [in a man's mind] after his having seen an object which stands in a certain relation [to other objects] and is limited in place &c., and in consequence of his remembering the relation — this intellection, now, containing another object which stands in a certain relation, is a [form of] inference. The difference between these two [means of knowledge, i. e. between inference in general, and *arthāpatti* specially] ensues from a difference of the manner in which intellections arise. As has been said:

> In inference we can distinguish one form in which [the inference] owes its birth to agreement. But the other form, [termed] *arthāpatti*, proceeds from exclusion (*vyatireka*). [1])

Similarly the auditive *arthāpatti* suggests [to us] an other word, where a certain word is illogical [at first impression]. For instance: after [having heard] the information: „This fat man does not eat in the day-time", we surmise as a complement to this information: „[but] he eats at night".

46. *Discussion of dṛṣṭārthāpatti in detail.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 223 l. 6.

[Opponent]: When the non-existence [of Caitra's] in the house suggests the idea of his being out-of-doors, only because of the unfitness [of a contradiction], then it could just as well suggest any other fact, because a determining cause is lacking.

[Defendent]: If I should say: the non-existence in the house suggests another fact in order to effect its own fitness; and this fitness is not [brought about], when another fact [than this being out-of-doors] is supposed.

[Opponent]: By whom is it upheld that its fitness arises on account of his being out-of-doors? We, on our side, affirm that,

---

1) Yet *arthāpatti* is clearly distinguished from *vyatireki anumānam*. This latter term has reference to the inductive part of the Indian syllogism, it means such general propositions, for which we can only finds instances, if we read them in their negative form. An *arthāpatti* has reference to the deductive process and contains i. a. the following argumentation: when we know 1. „if *A* is not, then is *B* not"; 2. „*B* is"; then we must conclude: „*A* is".

even when there is existence out-of-doors, still the non-existence in the house remains unfit.

[Defendent]: This is noticed:

A non-omnipresent object is in one place, and is not somewhere else;

so as the sun is perceived in one place between east and west and nowhere else, — as is ascertained with the aid of perception;

so then the non-existence of a living man in his house is fit, when his existence out-of-doors takes place, but not otherwise.

But then the comprehension of this fitness is only based on the comprehension of agreement. And so *arthāpatti* would be the same as inference, since it owes its birth to agreement. As to the fact that it arises when there is a contradiction, this is merely a specification. And in this way we obtain the formal syllogism (*prayoga*):

Devadatta is out-of-doors;

because he is not perceived in the house, whilst at the same time he is connected with life;

as it is [often the case with] me.

47. *Discussion of çrutārthāpatti in detail.*

Nyāya-kandalī p. 223 l. 17.

After one has heard the information: „the fat [man] does not eat in the day-time", the supposition of his eating at night is an inference by means of [a fact, itself] inferred. Because the fatness [of the man] is inferred from the [speaker's] word which functions as a probans; and [from this fatness] we infer its cause: the eating at night.

That is to say: The not informing us about its matter is the unfitness of a source of knowledge. The information: „he does not eat in the day-time" informs us about its own object; and so there is no question of its unfitness. But the fatness, as an effect of eating, is not fit, whilst there is not-eating in the day-time; for the cause is then lacking; and as a consequence of the unfitness [of this supposed fatness], the information (*vākya*, word) is also unfit, for the objects are not coherent.

And if so, then the unfitness of the word is identical with the unfitness of the objects, and the fitness of the one is the fitness of the other. But the fitness and the unfitness [of the word] is not of an independent nature (*na svarūpeṇa*). The state of things,

characterised by the fatness of him who does not eat in the day-time, in as far as it is a result of eating, becomes fit by a state of things which consists in the eating at night; but [does not become so] by the word „eating". Because the unfitness belongs to the object, therefore the object, as cause also for the fitness of its respective word, must be sought for; and not the word, because this would not lead to fitness. And one object is understood as made fit by [another] object, because fatness, excluded from [i. e. not met together with] eating during day-time, is necessarily the effect of eating at night; ergo the [proof called] *arthāpatti* does not refer to the words.

[Opponent]: [1]) But I do not mean: „the object is brought to fitness by [another] object; and thus by its fitness the fitness of the respective word arises; but [my idea is]: the object of our language-expression is made fit by [another] object of language-expression; because there is no coexistence between a [real object] comprehended by another source of knowledge and it [i. e. the object of language-expression]. For when the verb-form „he cooks" is uttered, then [2]) there is no fitness without an object of the action; but one is satisfied [in this logical desire] by the perception of the pulse which is being cooked; for the *ākāṃkṣā* (the desire for completion of a sentence), [expressed in this case by the words]: „what does he cook?", is satisfied [lit. 'complies'], when this [pulse] is present. And also when the object of the action is adduced by verbal information [in forms such as]: „he cooks greens, he cooks pulse" &c., this notion is settled without doubt. Similarly such an unfitness of the objects (contents) of word exists in [the sentence]: „this fat man does not eat in the day-time." Therefore in this case too satisfaction will arise with the aid of an object (or: contents) of language-expression; and thus in the first place through *arthāpatti* we must search for a word which expresses the eating at night; for otherwise there is no agreement of eating at night with the object of the word „during day-time".

[Defendent]: But if *arthāpatti* is restricted to the boundary of words, then the eating at night, as an objective fact, does not become the object (contents, *viṣaya*) of *arthāpatti*, because this [fact] falls outside [3]) the verbal information.

Neither is this [which you mention] simply word, because there is no immediate proximity (*pratyāsatti*) between the word „during

[1]) Read: *na matam.*

[2]) Read: *vinopapattiḥ.*

[3]) Read: *apagamāt.*

day-time" or its object with the word „night"; neither is this effected by means of these two [words]. For word is brought into proximity [towards another] with the aid of the proximity between objects.

[Opponent]: But unlike inference, *arthāpatti* does not require [1]) *pratyāsatti*; because it only proceeds from (grammatical) unfitness. Therefore it has been said:

> „But this (*A*) which is required by [one] object (*B*) is not a second object; for it (*A*) is excluded from this [nature] by the fact that it must be grasped by concrete intellection [i. e. by an intellection in which the notion of the object is accompanied by its name].

„One understands fitness (*sāmārthya* = *upapatti*), after having conceived other words: [2])

> „Therefore this [*arthāpatti*] refers decidedly in the first place to words, and hence word will inform us about contents of words, as it relates to that."

[Defendent]: To this we answer: the separate words (*padāni*) are used to inform us about the contents of the sentence (*vākya*). These [words] are separately unable to teach us the contents of the sentence — which requires the meeting together of the word-meanings — because their function has not yet reached its aim [in their separate use]; so then they want other word-meanings [each of which apart] effectuates [the notion of] one object [in our mind]. But when the contents of the sentence is taught by them, [used in continuation], then they do not want another word more, because their function has reached its aim.

[Opponent]: If I should say: the object, as taught [by these combined words], is [logically] not fit?

[Defendent]: It is fit, [3]) for the levelling of a contradiction in the object is not the function of word (*çabda*); but this only aims at information; and this is carried out by it, even when the word „at night" is not near. For we learn the not eating of the fat man from the verbal information about his not eating in the day-time. This knowledge, [up to so far] is undoubted and unmistaken, otherwise there would be no occasion at all for the procedure of *arthāpatti*.

For only the unfitness of the not eating during day-time, as proved by trustworthy means of knowledge, in the case of a fat

---

1) Read: *apekṣyate*.

2) Read: *çabdāntarāṇi buddhvā*.

3) Read: *sopapādi*.

man [whose existence is] ascertained, is not allowed. For if these [two facts] were uncertain or settled as being wrong ideas, why should we posit another state of things? And for what would *upapatti* be wanted? But [1]) the mutual contradiction exists between the two states of things. Therefore the notion of these two [states] is a non-notion. Conclusively the verbal information is put straight by the comprehension of the object, but does not require another word; for there is no other way to regulate matters. Thus then the object, declared by means of the [word], is [logically] unfit without another object; and, when in pursuit of a [right] notion, it is searching for its own fitness.

48. *Non-existence.* [2])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 225 l. 16.

Some assert a sixth source of trustworthy intellection, called *abhāva*, [i. e. proof for] non-existence, because the five other means — perception &c. [3]) — which grasp [forms of] existence, are unfit with respect to the notion of the non-existence of a knowable (*prameya*).

Praçastapāda refutes this [in the words]: „*abhāvo 'py anumānam eva* i. e. [proof for] non-existence is merely [a form of] inference". And in order to answer the question: „how?" he adds *yathotpannam* &c. i. e. „just as the originated effect is a probans for the existence of the cause, so is the not originated effect the probans for the non-existence of the cause."

Even for him who accepts *abhāva* as a [separate] means of knowledge, does not the knowledge of the non-existence of the knowable arise merely through the non-existence of an intellection; for the unwished-for consequence would be that the comprehension of non-existence would exist with reference to an object, beyond our perception by its innate nature. But when the causes for the intellection are present, then the not arising of intellection in regard to an object capable of being known, is a cause for the comprehension of non-existence. But there is no difference — in itself — of the non-perception of a perceptible [lit. fit] object from the non-perception of an imperceptible object. Therefore this [non-perception], unlike our sense-organs, is not a factor of instruction through its own power. But the non-perception of the perceptible object

---

1) Read: *Kiṃ ca.*

2) „Non-existence" is accepted as an independent source of knowledge by Kumārila, but rejected as such by Prabhākara. — *The Prābhākara School* p. 71.

3) Perception, inference, *çabda*, *upamāna* & *arthāpatti.*

does not deviate from [i. e. is constantly accompanied by] the non-existence of the knowable; the non-perception of the imperceptible (or unfit) object, does not show such a regularity, in as far as [non-perception] sometimes takes place although the object exists. By such an important difference the non-perception of the fit object is informative, and the other [i. e. the non-perception of the unfit object is] not so.

If so, non-existence will simply be a probans (*liṅga*); for it depends on the grasping of a necessary concomitance; but if it were independent of this, then we could with difficulty avoid the unwished-for consequence that this non-existence [of intellection] would [always] without distinction teach us the [objective] non-existence.

[Opponent]: But the intellection about non-existence also takes place with reference to the perceived [spot of the] floor in consequence of the connection with the sense-organs; why should we not accept, in this [intellection, expressed in the words; „this spot of the] floor is without a pot", a perception of the non-existence just as well as a perception of the floor?

[Defendent]: If I should answer: the connection of the sense-organs takes place with regard to the positive part [i. e. the floor and not the non-existence], because of its fitness (perceptibility)?

[Opponent]; This is not right, as not being made convictive. For fitness (*yogyatā*) must be deduced from the effect, and just as in existence the effect is seen to comply with the agreement and contrariety of the sense-organ, thus too in non-existence. And like existence, so is non-existence fit for the grasping through the sense-organs, and also here from the seeing of the effect a certain connection of the sense-organs must be posited.

[Defendent]: But our idea [is otherwise]. No form of non-existence is conceived unless as supported by a certain abode [*adhikaraṇa*, object to which it refers, place where the non-existence is located]; for we see that practical behaviour and inactivity take place with reference to defined spots &c. The activity of the sense-organs now deals with the perception of that [object] which is conceived as the *adhikaraṇa* of the [non-existence, in question]. Somebody, namely, who has seen e. g. a temple, so as it is, and who, having gone to another place, is asked by somebody else: „Is Devadatta in that temple or is he not?" will — after having learnt the other man's wish for information — realise in himself this non-existence [to be formulated in the words]: „is not"; and will [consequently] answer [with these words]: „[Devadatta] is not [in the temple]."

And one should not say:

[Supposed contradiction by an opponent]: The non-existence of Devadatta was formerly grasped, at the moment of the grasping of the temple by vague perception; and at the present moment it becomes remembered.

[Defendent]: The grasping by vague perception, in consequence of a connection with the sense-organs, is possible for pots &c., because things like these do not depend in their innate nature on something else. But the innate nature of non-existence, having negation as innate character, is dependent on that whose negation it is. Therefore — [scil.] since there is no other innate nature of non-existence than that of its being the negation of the [positive entity in question] — no determining of it is possible without the determining of the innate nature of its *pratiyogin* (correlative object). This, namely, is the difference between existence and non-existence: that the grasping of the one takes place in a positive form, the grasping of the other in the form of a negation of something else. As has been said by the author of the Nyāya-vārttika:

> There is a difference, because the cause of perception and non-perception, is [respectively] independent [and] dependent.
>
> The existent is independent, being the [objective] foundation of the trustworthy means of knowledge.
>
> The non-existent is dependent, through the intermediance of the negation of something else.

But if the grasping of the non-existent were also independent, then it would no more differ from existence. So then there is no grasping of non-existence by means of vague perception. And as to your dilemma:

[Opponent]: Was there formerly a notion of the temple as connected with [the presence of] Devadatta, or as free from this? If [the temple] was grasped as connected, there will be no remembrance of the temple simply as such; but if [the temple] was grasped as free [from that presence of Devadatta's], the non-existence, then grasped, will afterwards be remembered. This [argumentation] is valid.

[Defendent]: This does not hold good, for we grasp the temple in its innate nature, even if the existence or non-existence is not grasped. Therefore there was previously no grasping of non-existence, and as a consequence of this non-existence [of this grasping] there is now no remembrance. And neither does here appear a new kind of *pramāṇa*.

[Opponent]: From this [*we* conclude that] there is a source of trustworthy knowledge which differs[1] from the five [generally] accepted sources: perception &c., [and which aims] at the grasping of non-existence with reference to [an objeet whose] *pratiyogin* is not in our neighboorhood, but is an object of remembrance. And when we have proved in one case, that [objective] non-existence must be determined by [the means of knowledge, called] non-existence, then this will also be admissible in other cases. So then we have proved that non-existence is a new kind of *pramāṇa*.

[Defendent]: To this we answer: (*A*) Must we say that the person who had gone to another spot and was questioned by somebody else, possesses a presential (*idāntīna*) non-perception of Devadatta in the temple and thus states a presential non-existence [to be expressed in the words]: „is not now"; or (*B*) that he by means of a praeterital (*prāktana*) non-perception states a praeterital non-existence [which may be paraphrased as]: „he was not at the time of the grasping of the temple?"

(*A*). A presential non-perception — [that is to say] a non-perception of something which allows [perception] — cannot be upheld; for the non-existence of Devadatta [in the temple] at this moment is dubious, because of separation in place, since it is possible for him to have gone up there.

(*B*). But a praeterital non-perception [which would be] capable[2] of determining a praeterital non-existence is not of force for the present moment, because it has entered into another stage [i. e. from a presential non-perception it has become a praeterital non-perception].

And a [now] not-existing notion[3] cannot function as a cause, and neither is a notion, object of remembrance, active, because it was not known of before. Neither can non-perception be proved by another means of knowledge, because it has itself the form of non-existence; and if, [on the other hand], it should depend on another non-perception, then there would be an endless regress. Therefore this non-perception [upheld by you as a separate source of knowledge and] which is supposed to circumlimitate the objects as the sense-organs do, is never grasped. This is the right view (*rāddhānta*). If so, how could there ever be a remembrance of it; for it itself is never experienced.

---

1) Read: *vyāvṛtty eva.*
2) Read: °*yogyā tu.*
3) [illegible]

[Opponent]: But my idea [is as follows]: The non-perception of Devadatta in the temple is brought to an end by the perception of Devadatta, but this [last-mentioned] perception does not arise in him who has gone to another spot. Therefore only his non-perception exists.

And if [you bring forward the objection]: „this non-perception has reached another stage [1]); and whilst there is a transition of stage [in the non-perception], there is no transition [of stage] in the objective world", then [I answer]: let it be here so [as you admit]. But there where formerly no non-existence of the object was grasped [i.e. made conscious], because the remembrance of the *pratiyogin* was lacking, there afterwards, after the grasping of the object, will arise an intellection about praeterital non-existence, [to be expressed in the words]: „here it was not [up to] now". What objection [2]) can there be against this?

[Defendent]: [There is such an objection]; for the non-perception of a certain object comes to an end by its perception. And a non-perception, [to be expressed in the words: „the non-existence] was before", and not being known of before, cannot be the cause of a notion; because the unwished-for consequence would be that also somebody who has lost his sense-organs, would grasp objects (*viṣaya*).

[Opponent]: If I should say: the presential non-perception of a certain object (= *tasya*) is brought to an end by a presential perception; but the praeterital non-perception still remains and by this [praeterital non-perception], capable of circumlimitating the praeterital non-existence, this praeterital non-existence is circumlimitated.

[Defendent]: O scholarship, o cleverness! — Non-perception is a non-existence previous to perception, and this [non-existence], limited by the origination of the object, and being one, is not split by a differentiation of past and present. And as for [your defense]: „in such a case the presential non-perception is destroyed, but the praeterital [non-perception] is not destroyed", who else then, except somebody gifted with an intellect sharp as the point of Kuça grass, can realise this over-subtle distinction. So then, we [in our simplicity] do not understand [your thesis]: the [objective] non-existence is circumlimitated by a [notional] non-existence". How then [you may ask] does it happen, that somebody, after having grasped only

1) Cf. p. 227 l. 10.
2) Read: *pratīkāraḥ*.

[an object's] innate nature and having gone to another place, obtains the notion of non-existence, whilst the *pratiyogin* is remembered? By inference. For [when two objects possess such a nature that] if one (*A*) is remembered, the other (*B*) is capable of being remembered, and when this latter object (*B*) is not remembered, although the wish for its remembrance exists, then [we conclude]: „this object (*B*) did not exist at the time of the grasping of the other (*A*)".

Unlike a pot which possesses an existence formerly ascertained, and which is remembered after that only its place is remembered, is Devadatta, although a fit object for remembrance, not remembered, even if the temple is remembered and the wish for remembrance exists. Hence we draw from this non-existence of remembrance the inference: „Devadatta was not [in the temple] at the time of the grasping of the temple".

[Opponent]: If I should say: sometimes it is found that two objects are simultaneously perceived, but that [afterwards] by a lack of clearness in the latent impressions we remember one thing, and do not remember the other; e. g. when we remember one *pada* of a memorised *çloka*, but do not remember another *pada*. How then could we infer in this case the non-existence [of the forgotten or lacking *pada*] from its non-remembrance, accompanied by the remembrance of the other? [Such an inference would be impossible], because of the manysidedness (*anaikāntikatva*) of the probans.

[Defendent]: [You could just as well ask]: sometimes by some cause or other, one of two things, placed together, is perceived, and the other is not; how then is the non-existence of the not perceived pot proved by the perception of the floor? But my intention is:

When one of two objects, both connected with one intellection, is perceived, then the non-perception of the other is a proof for its non-existence. But not every non-perception [is of that kind]. Namely by the same intellection by which the floor is grasped, the pot connected with that floor, is grasped. The same bundle of conditions necessary for the grasping of the floor is necessary for the [grasping of the] pot. If the pot were on the floor, then it would be known, whenever the floor is known, for [both intellections] depend on the same bundle of conditions. But it is not known, therefore it neither exists, because its non-perception is not possible in any other way.

And if so, then also:

when one of two objects both connected with one intellection

of ours, is remembered, then the non-remembrance of the other is a proof for its non-existence. [Namely] the same bundle of conditions necessary for the grasping of the temple, is also necessary for the [grasping of] Devadatta, conjoined to it. And that bundle of conditions necessary for the grasping — which is [at the same time] the bundle necessary for the remembrance of the temple — is also the bundle of conditions necessary for the remembrance of Devadatta, because [both remembrances] are connected with the one [original] intellection about those [two objects]. If Devadatta had been [in the temple] at the time when the temple was grasped, then he [1]) would also be remembered; because the [two] bundles of conditions are equal for these [two objects]. But he is not remembered; therefore Devadatta was not [there]; since the not remembering him is not possible in any other way.

Thus [the two cases] are similar.

But the *padas* of a *çloka* are recited successively in accordance with the utterance, and are not connected with one intellection. That *pada*, now, of those [belonging to one *çloka*] of which a stronger latent impression is born, is remembered, and not the other. So there is no unfitness.

Similarly the intellection about anterior non-existence of an object which is now perceived — an intellection [to be expressed in the words]: „this was not here before" — is an inference from the non-existence of the remembrance of its existence, whilst, [namely, at the same time] we remember the previous existence (*astitva*) of its *pratiyogin* [i. e. the positive state of things of which it is the negation].

As for those who accept the non-existence of remembrance as the source of knowledge, called „non-existence", they are refuted by ÇABARASVĀMIN's *Bhāṣya* in the words: „non-existence is a non-existence of a source of knowledge" [i. e. takes place when no other source of knowledge is present] and by the Vārttika [2]) in the words: „when the five trustworthy means of knowledge do not arise with reference to a particular object &c." Thus enough.

49. *Non-existence as a separate category.*

But to those who say thus: „the consideration of it [i. e. non-existence] as a trustworthy means of knowledge is not fit, because

---

1) Read: *asmariṣyate.*
2) Çlokavārttika p. 473 çl. 1.

a 'knowable', possessing the form of non-existence, does not exist" this question may be asked:

What is the objective foundation for the contents of consciousness, [to be expressed in the words]: „there is not". If it is answered: „nothing", then a helping hand is offered to the Mahāyānikas who maintain that intellection lacks any objective foundation. But if it is answered: the earth is the objective foundation [of the non-existence e. g. of the pot], then also a surface of earth, covered with thorns, would give rise to the notion: „there are no thorns", and the activity which has the form of going and coming and which supposes [this lack of thorns] would — no doubt — with difficulty be kept off.

[Opponent]: If I should say: The contents of consciousness, [expressed in the words]: „there is not" has for its object the earth as such [without any surplus]; and this *kaivalya* (state of being void of additions) is checked by the presence of thorns; for this reason both the notion [of non-existence of thorns] and activity are absent.

[Defendent]: Is this *kaivalya* (perfect isolation) of earth its innate nature or a separate quality? In the first place, the innate nature is not disturbed by our being conscious of thorns &c.; and so then the not stopping of notion and activity would arise in this case too as a difficulty; but if on the other hand we accept [*kaivalya* as] a separate quality, we arrive at an entity besides [the existent thing, similarly as we uphold non-existence to be a category next to existence].

But if you think:

[Opinion, attributed to the opponent]: Existence allows a double state either it is single or accompanied (*sadvitīya*). [Of these two forms] the single existence is the innate nature; and this is likewise indicated by [the word]: *kevala* (merely, pure). The perception, now, of the [ground] as such, whilst we wish to perceive a pot which is the perceptible correlative object (*pratiyogin*) — [of the *ghaṭābhāva*] — leads to the [rather incorrect] language-expression „the non-existence" 1) of the pot" &c.

[Defendent]: To this we answer: Whilst you [try to] separate the [notion] „ground" from [the notion] „non-existence of pot", which object do you accept [to be indicated] by the word „single", [an object] which is the objective foundation of the negative proposition: „there is not". For without a differentiation in the objects

1) Read: [illegible]

neither can a differentiated intellection arise, nor is a differentiation of language-expression possible.

[Opponent]: If I should say: The innate oneness of existence is this singleness (*ekākitva*)?

[Defendent]: What is this oneness? The being devoid of a correlation (*pratiyogin*) or the number „one"? The number „one", in as far as it remains the same time with its abode, also undergoes the accompanied state of the existent thing. But if the innate oneness is the condition of being void of the correlation (*pratiyogin*), then another 'knowable', [namely: „non-existence"] is proved.

[Opponent]: But even in the case of him who accepts non-existence [as a separate category], is the comprehending of the ground the cause of the notion of non-existence; for if the ground were not conceived, the notion of non-existence with reference to a spot [of that ground] would not be fit.

[Defendent]: In the first place the notion: „there are no thorns"; does not arise, when we perceive the ground, covered with thorns &c. But whilst the comprehension of the ground, characterised by non-existence, is the cause of the notion „non-existence" with reference to non-existence [in general], so with reference to non-existence of a certain object the comprehension of the ground, characterised by the non-existence of this object [functions as a cause]. Thus the comprehension of non-existence arises from a perception which concerns the ground and is characterised by the non-existence of a certain object; consequently [this non-existence] would be understood as being itself the cause of itself [i. e. as being independent of another object].

[Opponent]: Then you just as well [as I] would have to accept the [ground's] condition of being single, a condition different from „non-existence" and excluding the connection with the *pratiyogin* [*pratiyogin* = the opposite of the „non-existence" in question]. And this condition, the notion of which is the same as the notion of non-existence, gives rise to our language-expression „there is not".

[Defendent]: Neither is this fit. For the notion „non-existence" is the cause of the exclusively grasping of the innate nature of an existent thing. And when we grasp [the object as] accompanied, then there is no occasion for the arising of this notion. Just as in the case of the comprehension of the ground, so does the contract between the sense-organ and the non-existence form the complete set of conditions, necessary (*sāmagrī*) for the grasping of the non-existence. But even where the comprehension of the ground takes

place, the notion of non-existence does not arise; for eye, light &c. are not the cause of the perception [of non-existence], but where something does not exist, there is this [non-existence of it] perceived. So then non-existence [as an objective category] is proved.

50. *Discussion of the anvitābhidhānavāda and the abhihitānvayavāda.* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 231. l. 24.

[Introduction]: After we have found in our own selves the general rule: „he who uses certain words together, has the intention of informing us about the coherence of the meanings of these words", [we arrive] at the inference which settles the meaning of a [heard] sentence from the [separate] words by means of the insight in the speaker's wish of teaching us the coherence of the meanings of such and such words, since he uses a collection of words. This inference bases itself on the heard words]; but the understanding of it is not based on the objects, corresponding to the words (*padārthas*). For there is no separate knowledge-source to be accepted for the word-meanings, as [some] Mīmāṃsakās have taught. [2]) Neither does any power (*çakti*) for informing us about the sentence-meaning, appear in the „word-objects" (*padārthas*) which successively are denotated by the separate words [used] on behalf of communicating to us the sentence-meaning. For a knowledge-source [e. g. the words heard] has only the task of making us understand its *prameya* (i. e. its own contents), but is not the vehicle for a power of the *prameya*. Therefore if the word-objects were teaching us the sentence-fact, they would do this either by a probantial mark, or by an *anyathānananupatti* (reductio ad absurdum); in both cases the sentence-meaning would be something independent of the words (*açābda*).

[Problem]: Do the words, one by one, inform us about their meanings as a probantial mark for the sentence-meaning, or do they, [as first] related (*anvita*) to each other, express their own meaning?

[Exposition of the *anvitābhidhānavāda*]: [3]) Some answer this question as follows: The information of the signification by means of words is based on *vyutpatti* (language-knowledge). And this *vyutpatti* refers — with reference to expressions, used by old people

1) Cf. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, *The Prābhākara School* p. 62.
2) Cf. Speyer, *Syntax* § 113 R. — Read: *padārthānāṃ pramāṇāntaram.*
3) [illegible] is derived from *anvitābhihita*. Cf. Speyer, *Syntax* § 209. 2

[and heard by the growing up youth] like: „bring the cow, bind the cow" &c. — to the factors connected with the action or to the action connected with the factors, but not to the object in abstracto (*svarūpamātra*). Thus the word-objects, only as far as connected with each other, are indicated by the words.

[Opponent]: We answer to this: If in an expression such as „the cow, bring it hither", the word „cow" already denotates the object of the word „bring", in as far as these two word-objects are connected with eachother, then the word „bring" would be superfluous, since its object has been mentioned before.

[Anvitābhidhānavādin]: If I should say: whilst the objective [fact of] bringing is denotated by the word „bring", so the word „cow" denotates its own object as related to this objective „bringing"; therefore this word „bring" is not superfluous.

[Opponent]: Then it would be proved that the single word „bring", indicating its own object, is denotative without first being connected (*ananvitābhidhānin*); and as this word has an object [represented as] not connected, so will the case be with any other word. — So I have brought my handful of water to [the Manes of] your *anvitābhidhānavāda*.

When the word „bring" denotates its own object as connected with the object which is denotated by a precedent word, then so long as the precedent word does not denotate its object, so long does neither the subsequent word denotate its object as connected with the object of the precedent word, and so long as the subsequent word does not denotate its object, so long does neither the precedent word denotate its object as connected with the object of the subsequent word; thus [we meet here with the fault, called] m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c e.

And if you maintain:

[Opinion, attributed to the defendent]: First the words merely remind us of the word-meanings [or word-objects]; next each of them denotates its own object as connected with the object which was brought to memory by the others. Thus there is no mutual dependence.

[Opponent]: This does not hold good. For we always observe — with reference to the words — their concomitance with a connected (*anvita*) word-object; but they are not capable of bringing to our memory an isolated word-object in abstracto which is unconnected; for remembrance will proceed in accordance with the first direct impression. In the language-expressions, now, of old people a strict rule will be perceived, by means of agreement and

contrariety, between the word „cow" and an object possessed of a hump &c.; but not [between this word and] factors of an action; for we see the word „cow" used with deviations [i. e. sometimes used and sometimes not used] in the separate cases of these factors of an action. Therefore this word „cow", when heard, will in consequence of constant application, bring to our memory simply an object which possesses a hump &c. and whose concomitance [with the word „cow"] does not admit an exception; but it will not bring to our memory the factors necessary for an action.

[Anvitābhidhānavādin]: In this case the same mistake [which you reproach in the *anvitābhidhānavāda*] would be common to your *ananvitābhidhānavāda*, namely: „when a fixed rule of concomitance is perceived between a certain object and word, then that word would only be the denotator of that object and of nothing else."

[Opponent]: But neither is it well understood: that remembrance only proceeds in accordance with a strict rule of concomitance so as inference does. For [remembrance], which is simply based on latent impressions, arises also by the seeing merely of an [object], correlative [with the original object]. For instance by the sight of smoke we remember just as well the fire [which logically „pervades" smoke] as the kitchen [which is only accidentally concomitant with smoke]. Therefore if the word „cow" brings before our memory the objective cow, in consequence of the notion of concomitance, so it would remind us of [different] objects (*padārthas*) which are correlative with the objective cow. But exclusively reminding us of the objective cow as its contents, it is based on *vācakatva* (denotative power) [and not on mere remembrance], because only on this supposition there is a strict rule possible.

Moreover, so as you uphold the *anvitābhidhānavāda* for the words in a sentence, so you accept this *anvitābhidhānavāda* for the root and the formatives (affixes and suffixes) within the word. But if each of these elements denotates its own object as connected with the object of the other, how does there exist besides these any word-object which is brought to memory by the [total] word?

Now this discussion which has fallen upon the opinions of the Nagnāṭikas,[1]) may end.

[1]) Cf. Çlokavārttika, transl. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, p. 511 çl. 154 & footnote, and p. 427 çl. 107—108 (materiality and tangibility of sounds, upheld by the Jainas).

51. *Proof for the trustworthiness of inference.* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 255 l. 5:

[Vaiçeṣika]: But to those who do not accept inference as a trustworthy means of knowledge and merely accept perception as such, the following question may be put:

[Do you take as such] only one act on behalf of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) i. e. one perception, so as it is conceived in its individual existence, or all perceptions? Certainly not only one *pramāṇa*, because there cannot be untrustworthiness in another such *pramāṇa* which possesses the same totality of conditions. But every *pramāṇa*, i. e. [on your standpoint] every perception, past as well as future, [a perception arising in yourself and] also a perception arising in somebody else, is such. How is this ascertained?

[Opponent]: If I should say: because [all perceptions] are of the same kind (*sajātīya*) as the individual perception which is experienced?

[Vaiçeṣika]: [By this answer] you have accepted the trustworthiness of *svabhāvānumāna* (inference based on identity). Thus the proving force of inference is to be called *vikalpa* (determinate perception). [2]) — Who is to be informed [by you] about perception as a trustworthy means of knowledge? Not, you yourself, because you are the person who informs. If another then? Is it a well-informed person, who is to be informed, or a dissentient person? Not somebody well-informed; because information, given to somebody well-informed, is superfluous. And if [the person to be informed, is] somebody, dissentient, then this opposition of his, is not known [by you] with the aid of perception.

[Opponent]: If I should say: with the aid of the probans, afforded by words?

[Vaiçeṣika]: [By this answer] you accept the trustworthiness of *kāryāmumāna* [i. e. inference based on the relation of effect to cause]. By what means would you prove [your original proposition]: „inference is not a *pramāṇa*" [3]) [and implicitly how would you prove the notion „non-existence"], for perception has for object a positive entity (*vidhi*) and is not capable of negating anything else.

[Opponent]: If I should say: [this result] is reached by non-perception (*anupalabdhi*).

---

[1]) The argumentation is based on Buddhistic suppositions and therefore copied from a Buddhistic writing. Cf. here book IV section VII table E.

[2]) *vikalpavācyam.* Cf. Speyer *Syntax* § 214.

[3]) Add *na* in Sanskrit text.

[Vaiçeṣika]: So [you would have accepted] the existence of *anupalabdhiliñgakam anumānam* (inference, based on non-perception as a probans). And this has been said by the Buddhists:

> „The inclusion [of inference] in the trustworthy means of knowledge follows from (1) the fact that [one *pramāṇa*] belongs to the same class as other *pramāṇa*s, (2) the fact that the opinion [to be refuted] is found in somebody else's [mind], (3) the fact that something can be denied."

The meaning of this gloss (*vārttika*) is: (1) from the establishing of the generality of the *pramāṇa* and its non-existence (?), (2) from the acceptance of [the existence of] somebody else's thought, (3) from the denial of something, follows: the existence of inference, which is another *pramāṇa* than perception and which has for probans either innate nature, or effect, or non-perception.

52. *Sphoṭa.* [1]

Nyāya-kandalī p. 268 l. 24.

But here it must be noticed: when knowledge is being acquired by repetition [of the clauses in which it is expressed], — is then the sense of these [clauses] given by the clauses themselves or by *sphoṭa*? Why is there a doubt here? Because there is difference of opinion [about this point]. Some say: *sphoṭa* imparts the meaning to us, but others teach that the clause is the informer. Therefore, we may agree about the legitimacy of the doubt: whether, first, *sphoṭa* informs us about the meaning.

[Defendent of the *sphoṭa*-theory]: If the word is nothing else besides the speechsounds and if the clause is nothing else besides the words, then there would not exist any notion of the meaning. To wit: the speechsounds, taken one by one, do not awake in us any thought which has the meaning as its contents, for [if the single letter did so] the other speechsounds would be useless: and an aggregate of these does neither exist, because the preceding sounds have already ceased to exist at the moment of the perception of the final sound.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: such an aggregate does exist, because of the eternity of sounds?

[Defendent]: Even then the apprehension of them would not follow; for if that which is not apprehended, still causes apprehension,

---

[1] See here book IV section IX table C. For a modern European treatment of the difficulties which gave rise to the *sphoṭa*-theory, see W. WUNDT *Völkerpsychologie*, Ier Band: *Die Sprache*, Ier Theil, 5tes Capitel 1. Psychophysische Bedingungen der Wortbildung, 2. Psychologie der Wortvorstellungen.

then the unwished-for consequence would be that objects are always apprehended. For there is no difference [in this respect] between objects not apprehended after having first been so, and objects, not apprehended at all.

[Opponent]: If I should answer: the speechsounds, first perceived and then deposited in the memory, are causes of the apprehension?

[Defendent]: If remembrance follows the [original] order, then there is no co-existence of sounds in this case either, for at the time, when the third sound is seized [by recollection], the remembrance of the first sound is destroyed. On the other hand, a simultaneous arising of the remembrances cannot be thought of, as the simultaneity of intellections is excluded [1] [according to the generally accepted doctrine]. But if you would take refuge in [the following argumentation]:

[Supposed argumentation of the opponent]: First takes place the intellection of the first speechsound, after that is formed the impression [deposited in the memory], then arises the intellection of the third(?) sound, the last memory-impression [i. e. the impression of the last-mentioned or third sound-intellection] is determined by the first memory-impression, so in this way at last a memory-impression which has all the speechsounds as its contents, effects one single remembrance in one moment.

[Defendent]: [If we should accept this view], order would be done away with. Order, namely, means relation between preceding and following; this may be based either on (mathematical) space or on time. Neither form [of order] takes place in the [objective, physical] sounds; because they are omnipresent and eternal. Let the order of the sounds then be based on the order of the intellections! — even then the order of these [speechsounds], which would abide in one remembrance-intellection, would come to nought; thus the potency of manifestation would belong to [sounds] which lack order. In consequence of this, there would be no understanding of the difference in meaning which we notice in words as: *sara*, *rasa*, *vana*, *nava*, *dīna*, *nadī* &c.; since the speechsounds do not differ from one another, and the order does not form part of the intellection. — Yet in fact this difference of meaning exists; and this difference which does not lie in the speechsounds themselves, proves the existence of another special cause; so then the theory of *sphoṭa* is proved.

[Opponent]: *Sphoṭa*, as long as it is not manifest, does not teach

---

[1] See here book I p. 92 n°. 4.

us the meaning, otherwise the unwished-for consequence would be that we should always perceive meanings [of words]. But its manifestation cannot take place through the speechsounds! For these arising one after the other, are not fit for that, for similar reasons [as you have brought forward against me]; therefore the understanding by *sphoṭa* is likewise inconceivable.

[Defendent]: In respect to this [some people] say: the noises in the air, which differ according to the exertion [of utterance], in as far as they respectively form the essence of the speechsounds, reveal first the *sphoṭa* in an *asphuṭa*, indistinct manner, and finally by receiving the accompaniment of the *saṃskāras*, [impressions] which the objects have formerly left [in our soul], those [noises or sounds] make the *sphoṭa* apparent. Thus at the end, the right meaning, clear, and one, and without parts, is experienced, in the same way as handwriting in which the differences of all speechsounds have disappeared. For if only the speechsounds were the word, then this could not be perceived in one act of intellect, and so this intellection, as having no basis, comes to an end; nor does then the statement hold: „from the word we learn the meaning''; therefore there is something different from the sounds, [an entity] from which the meaning bursts forth.

[Opponent]: If things are thus conceived, we answer: When [compound] words are pronounced as *guṇaratnābhāraṇaḥ*, *kāyasthakulatilakaḥ*, *pāṇḍudāsaḥ*, then only the sounds which follow in order are perceived, but there is no manifestation of any matter beyond these sounds. For, if this manifestation is first apprehended in the form of sounds, and finally appears in its true form, then the falsity of the former cognition is obtained, just as [the falsity of] the intellection concerning silver [gets apparent] on the realising [the existence of] the mother of pearl. But we do not make this observation: „these are indeed no speechsounds, but this is *sphoṭa*''. On the contrary, this intellection, which also refers to one object, does not give rise to a second [representation of the] object, but just like the notion of the wood,[1]) [the unity of the word] has only for basis the collection of the speechsounds, and people use the expression: „we learn the thing from the word'', in as far as they admit the collection of the speechsounds. And [the word-meaning, if] not learnt by the aid of perception [and recollection], cannot be arrived at through any other means of knowledge, for such an expedient is lacking.

[1]) Cf. here book I p. 58 & Çlokavārttika transl. p. 329 &c.

[Defendent]: If I should answer: [the wordmeaning] cannot arise in another way [i. e. unless we accept *sphoṭa*], therefore [this *sphoṭa*] is the expedient.

[Opponent]: Is then this *sphoṭa* accepted by you as the cause of the becoming aware of the wordmeaning, whilst it itself is unperceived, or whilst it is perceived? If it should be so whilst unperceived, then the unwished-for consequence would be that we should always have intellections of wordmeanings. On the other hand a perception of the *sphoṭa* neither takes place, as I have said formerly. The understanding of the meaning [follows], is dependent on, the intrinsic nature of the speechsounds only. Therefore, which expedient could be accepted with more right, with reference to the communication of meanings, than the pursuit of the originating of these [sounds]? — But moreover the supposition of [a *sphoṭa*] which is not perceived, is not allowable, just as little as [the supposition of] a sky-flower. And you cannot say:

[Supposed answer of the defendent]: If the speechsounds should reveal the wordmeaning, then the unwished-for consequence would be that the wordmeaning would arise, even when the order [of the sounds] were different, when there were different agents (i. e. speakers, each of whom uttered separate sounds], or when there were intervals [between the sounds].

[Opponent]: [You cannot say so], for the speechsounds, having transverted order, or proceeding from different speakers, or separated from each other in place or time, are not the cause of a thought concerning the meaning [in the hearer's soul]. For the efficiency of things must be deduced from their effects; just as their effects are, so must their efficiencies be considered. As has been said by the Honourable [KUMĀRILA]:

> (Çlokavārttika, sūtra V, section 12 çl. 69, edition p. 527, cf. GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ's transl. p. 272): „Speechsounds are denotative of a meaning, only when occurring in proper number, of proper quality, and in reference to such a meaning for the information of which they are known to be fit."

Order of speechsounds exists, since they are omnipresent and eternal. Therefore, the meanings differ in words as *nadī*, *dīna*, because the order [of the sounds] differs.

[Defendent]: If I should answer: no order exists in the speechsounds. How then can this order of theirs be an auxiliary?

[Opponent]: No; [you are wrong; such an auxiliary exists], since the relation of *ante* & *post*, [which relation is] effected by place

and time, is to be acknowledged between these [speechsounds] which enjoy origination and are [qualities of physical space] which do not cover the whole [of their substratum]. And as to your saying: „These [speechsounds], arising successively, are not fit [for producing one wordmeaning in the hearer's soul]", neither can this be considered to be other people's opinion. For though the speechsounds are not lasting, yet the impressions [in the soul], relating to them and occurring in order, when united, effect the thought of the wordsense. Or to express myself otherwise, the last speechsound, either supported by impressions or by the remembrance of the former speechsounds, affords the meaning; and that many impressions, after becoming united, effect a remembrance, this has been shown in our treatment of twoness. 1) And if you mean:

[Supposed answer of the defendent]: The understanding of the meaning, owing to an impression, which has a speechsound for contents, cannot be admitted; for impressions are only capable of producing a remembrance of that which first as object caused the birth of its perception, and [cannot originate] another effect. So as MAṆḌANA has said in his *Proof of Sphoṭa*:

> „The impressions, undoubtedly, make the effect ripen only in reference to those objects, colours, appearances, by which they have been themselves produced."

[Opponent]: This neither is correct. For the impressions which have the speechsounds for contents, by being deposited one after the other by the perceptions with a tendency towards the understanding of the wordmeaning, are thus deposited as possessing a power different from the impressions which are [merely] causes of remembrance, since we may infer their being so from their effects. Or otherwise, let the impressions (*saṃskāras*) have the [full] character of impressions (*bhāvanās*) [i. e. unchanged repetitions of former perceptions], even then a power of teaching us the wordmeaning belongs to them, because they are of such a nature. For he who assumes *sphoṭa*, is also obliged to assume for the *sphoṭa* the power to make wordmeanings apparent. And hence a needless multiplication of suppositions. When, however, only the fitness of the *saṃskāra* (a notion common to both parties) is accepted, then there is simplicity [of suppositions]; therefore only this [theory, given by me] should be assumed. As has been said by the Nyāyavādin [Kumārila]:

(Çlokavārttika sūtra V, section 12 çloka 102, edition p. 536,

Gaṅgānātha Jhā's translation p. 207): „Though it is an acknowledged fact that *saṃskāra* is the cause of remembrance, yet that does not preclude its applicability to other purposes."

53. *The eternity of generality.* [1])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 315 l. 5:

Because generality differs from the substances &c., therefore it is eternal. If generality did not differ from substance &c., then it would perish at the moment when substance &c. perish, and its origination would take place at the time of their origination; but since there is difference, this rule is not met with.

[Opponent]: To this some say: the intellection which persists in different objects, foundates generality; and this [intellection] does not bring before us two objects, to wit generality and difference which are individually independent of each other, like a stick and a man, and neither [does it show to us] the relation of characteriser and thing to be characterised, since the notion „this has a cow-nature" (*gotvin*, *gotvavant*) does not arise. But this notion, [to be formulated]: „this is a cow", grasps identity (*tādātmya*), because it reflects on the essence of one [thing], for when the two, [the individual cow and the generality „cow"] are abstracted from each other, then there is no other innate nature [left]. For agreement — as in the case of *gotva* — is the innate nature (*svarūpa*) of every generality; and deviation (difference) — as in the case of the individual cow — is the innate nature (*svabhāva*) of all other individuals; but the innate nature of *gotva* is differentiated from all other generalities; and the differentiation from other individuals is the innate nature of the individual cow; but one of them [either the cow or the *gotva*] cannot be defined without their mutual identity. And it is not right to say; „the one is the innate nature of this [identity], and the other is that which bears the relation", for no relation is possible for a thing which has no innate nature [i. e. your distribution of *svabhāva* and *sambandha* to two separate entities cannot be upheld]; therefore the mutual identity of genus (*jāti*) and individual is the truth. And we have proved the theory which accepts both difference and non-difference [of individual and generality]. For we conceive [the notion] „the *bāhuleya* is a cow"

[1]) The eternality of *jāti*, also accepted by the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā; *The Prābhākara School* p. 100.

just as well as „the *çāvaleya* is a cow". And the objection (*bādha*): „merely the *çāvaleya* is a cow and the *bāhuleya* is not", does not hold good; but all people agree about this: „the one is a cow, and the other is a cow". And whilst here the identity of *gotva* — which is also identical with the *çāvaleya* — with the *bāhuleya* is sure on the ground of the notion, yet the difference [of the *gotva*] from the *çāvaleya* is also certain. This, namely, is the difference between individual and generality: that the generality also possesses identity with the second individual. And this is just the essence of generality that it possesses identity with both.

[Defendent]: If I should say: difference and non-difference of one [and the same thing] is self-contradictory?

[Opponent]: No, it is not, and it does not become you who know the means [of right argumentation] to give this answer. That is contradictory where the intellection falls short, but with reference to that which is always known by a trustworthy means of knowledge to be the same, the mere allusion to a contradiction, by way of answer, is contradictory.

[Defendent]: If I should say: such a thing [scil. that difference and non-difference apply to one and the same object] is seen nowhere else?

[Opponent]: But perception, no less than inference, follows the seen [object], therefore this [that you mention] is put aside by *anavasthā* [by the failure of an endless regress]. But this [that I uphold] owes its origin to its own capability; and when a certain object shows a certain [quality] in a certain way, then it does so in that way. But it does not admit of refutation by [the mentioning] that is not experienced elsewhere; for the unwished-for consequence would be that every [form of] existence could be refuted. So then generality, which [in some objects] arises and perishes in accordance with the arising and perishing of these individuals, and which [in other objects] remains since these individuals remain, is eternal and non-eternal, but not merely eternal.

[Defendent]: Whilst this is arrived at, we answer: does the notion of genus and individual grasp one form (*ākāra*) which has no difference for both, [1]) or does it grasp two forms which differ from each other? On the first alternative there would be only one object; and no oneness of two objects, for we have to do with identity (*abheda*) when something is known by an intellection which contains a form without differences (*avilakṣākāra*). On the second

[1]) Leave out: „*uta tayor abhedam gṛhṇāti*".

alternative a contradiction arises; for the becoming conscious of different forms means a becoming conscious of difference (*bheda*), and when this takes place, there is no room for an identity [of two objects]; how then do you lay down a non-difference of two different [things], and how, consequently, could a notion of identity be applied here? In no way, according to our opinion. [Thus], if one form (*ākāra*) is realised, the notion relates to only one object, and not to two; but if two forms are realised, the arising of this notion [of identity] is not possible. The fact that the contents of consciousness, [to be expressed in the words]: „this is a cow" is indivisible, follows from the force of inherence. When there is conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of two things, then connection (*saṃsarga*) shows itself; but this is the importance of inherence that the two [things] possessing relation, are perceived closely united like the piece of iron and the heat [which pervades it]; yet the genus is not the innate nature of the individual; although therefore there exists difference between them, yet the innate nature of the individual cannot be torn apart from the genus, so as the Badara-shrub, belonging to a hedge, [can be torn out of this]. However, perception [of one of them] is possible, whilst the other is omitted, for it is possible for somebody to comprehend the individual, although the comprehension of the generality *gotva* is far, [1]) and for somebody to comprehend the *gotva* in a second species, although the first specimen is absent; thus generality is essentially separated from the individual, according to the authority of the logicians (*tārkikas*).

54. *The denial of generality by the Buddhist.* [2])

Nyāya-kandalī p. 317 l. 24:

[Buddhist]: To this the Buddhists say: No generality exists, because we do not perceive one form in the perceived differences, so as a string on which the pearls are fastened.

[Vaiçeṣika]: This is not fit, for the notion of the form (*ākāra*) of generality arises, after we have perceived several individuals such as cows &c., a generality which is distinct from such individuals as horses &c. If there were not one point of concordance in *çāvaleyas* &c., which are mutually distinct, then the individual cows would be observed to be as dissimilar to each other, as individual cows, horses &c. are, or [on the other hand] so as the

1) Read: *gotva-grahaṇe.*

2) Cf. here book IV section VII table E.

individual cows are perceived as similar, so also individual cows and horses would show themselves [as similar]; for there would be no difference in the two cases. But exclusively the individual cows, which are perceived as similar (*sarūpa*), foundate a single form (*rūpa*) which is common to their own set and distinct from horses &c.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: the oneness in the individual cows ensues from the fact that [these cows] give rise to one form of *arthakriyā* (practical efficiency) and are consequences of the same cause?

[Vaiçeṣika]: If no generality exists, then there cannot arise oneness of the causes of the individuals nor of the effects which are mutually distinct, just as little as [oneness] of the individuals themselves. Moreover if oneness should depend on the origination from one cause, then no oneness would exist in individuals which originate from different causes, and yet difference of causes is seen of [effects] which have identical natures; so, for instance, fire owes its origination to the rubbing of wood or to the burning-glass hit by the sunbeams. And if [you maintain that] oneness results from oneness of effect, then [I uphold that] oneness is met with [as effect, i. a. as a quality] of heterogeneous things; so, for instance, the act of drawing, giving milk &c. is seen in the individual buffaloes, just as well as in the individual cows; and that cow which is not milked or which is not used for drawing, would not be a cow. — Moreover, if there were no generality, which object could bear the relation of the word to it? In the first place [*A*] it could not be the object in its individual appearance (*svalakṣaṇa*), because that which is momentary and in every respect discrete, cannot be the object of word-convention. Neither (*B*) could distinct apperception (*vikalpa*) be the word-meaning, because this [too would] be momentary and not-general (*asādhāraṇa*). Is then (*C*) the form of the distinct apperception (*vikalpākāra*) the word-meaning? [We may make here two distinctions]: Either the form of the distinctive apperception is different from the apperception itself (*Ca*) or it is not different from it (*Cb*). If it differs from it, is it then common to every distinctive apperception [1]) or does it vary with every distinctive apperception? If it is common, then this [form of distinctive apperception] does not differ from [that which we call] generality; if perhaps [you raise the objection that] it is a quality of intellection for you and a quality of the object for us, then [I

1) Read: *sarvavikalpa°*.

concede that] there is some difference, because [my generality] is perceived as objective. — If the form of distinctive apperception, [accepted as] different [from this apperception], varies with every apperception, or when it is not different from [i. e. identical with] the intellection (*Cb*), in both cases a relation towards the words is not fit, because word-convention is not possible [for such varying *vikalpākāras*] just as little as for the intellections.

[Buddhists]: If I should say: Distinctive apperception projects continually its own form under the aspect of externality, owing to a series of causality and thus builds up the imaginations (*vikalpayati*) [which the naive man calls the objective world]. On this the relation of the word bears.

[Vaiçeṣika]: The form of the distinctive apperception which is projected under the aspect of externality, is admitted as originated, when the distinctive apperception itself originates, and as perishing when this apperception perishes, and thus appears to vary according to the distinctive apperception. But word-convention cannot arise towards something subject to difference, as has been said (p. 318 l. 13 & 14).

And if you say:

[Argumentation, attributed to the Buddhist]: When one distinctive apperception [1]) of a cow has projected, under the aspect of externality, a certain resemblance of itself, then again another distinctive apperception of a cow will project a similar [resemblance]. — And the distinctive apperceptions, which separately merely comprehend their own forms (*ākāras*), are not capable of comprehending the difference of these forms which are projected over one another, because this [comprehending of difference] would depend on the comprehension of the two [*ākāras*]. And in consequence of this not comprehending, one of the *ākāras* (after having projected a oneness of the *ākāras* which themselves were projected by their respective apperceptions) is called the object. Therefore generality — (1) which has the character of non-existence, in as far as ultimate difference from other *vikalpākāras*, projected [by *vikalpas*], does not exist, and (2) which is called, the half of the fifth *ākāra* that is to be completed with [2]) its four auxiliaries, projected by the specific individual, the intellection and their *ākāras*, and (3) which possesses a projected externality, and (4) which can be denotated by word — is the object which bears the relation of the word

1) Read: *govikalpo*.
2) Read: *sahakāribhiḥ* or *sahāyaiḥ*.

[to it]. — The definite apperception of it [i. e. of generality] is [at the same time] the definite apperception of the specific individual, because it [i. e. the apperception] projects [its object] as having for essence the [generality]. And it [i. e. generality] has for innate nature the exclusion from [anything] else; and is common to existence as well as non-existence, since [both expressions] are used „the cow is" „it is not". If it had [merely] for innate nature existence, then the use [of the language-expression]: „the cow is" would be impossible, for it would be a tautology (*punaruktatva*); neither [would] [the expression]: „[the cow] is not", be fit, because it would be contradictory. Similarly if the [generality] had [merely] for innate nature non-existence, then the expression „is not" would be a tautology, and the expression „it is" would be contradictory. As has been said:

> „One should not say: „the pot is", because the pot is merely being; neither should it be said: „it is not", because existence and non-existence are contradictory to each other."

For the same reason [i. e. because generality is based on the not grasping of difference], the oneness of individuals comes forward. For this [generality, as described by us] is the [common] object of all distinct apperceptions, because it is one; the oneness of the distinct apperceptions (*vikalpānām ekatvam*) results from the oneness of these [generalities] and there is also oneness of the vague intellections (*nirvikalpānām ekatvam*) which are the cause of the distinct apperceptions and exist in accordance with their respective material bodies; and we understand the oneness of the individuals (*vyaktīnām ekatvam*) which are the causes of these *nirvikalpa*s, from the oneness of the *nirvikalpaka*s. As has been said:

> The thought does not possess difference, because it is the cause of the reflection on „one"; also there is identity (*abhinnatā*) in the individuals, because they are the cause of the one thought.

[Vaiçeṣika]: This is not fit, because the [notion of] *vikalpa* is not admissible [here]. As to what the Buddhists say: „the generality is a oneness which is projected in consequence of the not grasping of the *vikalpākāra*s", [I ask]: Is this projection of non-difference (identity) the not grasping of difference of the *ākāra*s, or is it the grasping of their non-difference? Now, the first alternative does not hold good, for the unwished-for consequence would be that also difference would be projected. For not only is the difference of *vikalpākāra*s not grasped, but neither is their non-difference grasped, and whilst there would be occasion for the

projection of difference owing to the not grasping of non-difference, — in the same way as the projection of non-difference takes place owing to the not grasping of difference — the language-expression of *abheda* (non-difference) in its usual sense could never be applied. Neither is right the second alternative: „the projection of identity is the grasping of the non-difference''. Because this does not take place. For one [reflective soul] which perceives several objects, states their difference and identity, but in your theory which denies the *ātman* (the one soul) there is not such a one person who perceives the several objects, because the distinct apperceptions are each exclusively bound to their own *ākāra*s. But even supposing there is such a single person who perceives several objects, then neither will the grasping of identity in the different *ākāra*s take place without one occasional cause; or even, if taking place, this grasping of identity will proceed with reference to the *ākāra*s: cow, horse, buffalo &c. [without distinction], because there is no differentiation.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: the exclusion of the non-cow, which is not the individual cow, is this one occasional cause?

[Vaiçeṣika]: What then are these non-cows, by the exclusion of which the oneness is projected over the cow-*ākāras*.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: those [objects] which are not cows, they are the non-cows?

[Vaiçeṣika]: What then are the cows?

[Buddhist]: If I should say: [those things] which are not non-cows?

[Vaiçeṣika]: After that the innate nature of the cows is defined, the innate nature of the non-cows is defined by excluding them [from the cows]; and after the innate nature of the non-cows is defined, [you give] the definition of the innate nature of cows by excluding them [from the non-cows]. Thus since the one cannot be understood when the other is not excluded, both will not be understood. As the Honourable [Teacher KUMĀRILA has said]: (Çlokavārttika p. 587 çl. 83 & 85, cf. transl. p. 311):

> „It is an established [entity], the cow, which is negatived by the *apoha*, and this [*apoha*] is only the negation of the cow. Here the cow, which is negatived by the particle *na* [by which also the praefix *a-*, *an* is understood, according to Pāṇini VI, 3, 73 & 74], must be explained... And in the absence of [an idea of] the cow, as an established [entity], there can be no [idea of] non-cow, and as such how [could you explain] the idea of the cow to be based upon the idea of the non-cow?''

[Vaiçeṣika]: But if you think:

[Oppinion attributed to the Buddhist]: The word-meaning, which has no projected externality [1]) [i. e. which remains an internal fact] contains the *apoha* of everything else.

[Vaiçeṣika]: Then we say: what then is this *apoha*? Is the *apoha*, [expressed in the formula]: „non-cow" an existence [*A*] or a non-existence [*B*]? If it is an existence, is it then the innate nature of the individual cow [*Aa*] or has it the individual non-cow for self [*Ab*]? If [*Aa*] it is the individual cow, then this [*apoha*] would not be common [to all cows], and word is not used with reference to an object which is not of a general nature, as has been said. And [*Ab*] if it is the individual non-cow, the same fault arises and moreover there is this shortcoming that the object „cow" of the word „cow" [so as now defined] is not right [i. e. is just the opposite to that which we mean].

And if [*B*] *apoha* is defined as having non-existence for innate nature, because it aims at excluding something else, then it would never be comprehended as a notion, because the thing to be comprehended can be defined as that which produces an intellection, and because non-existence can be defined as the absence of every practical efficiency. And neither is there a comprehension of word-convention with reference to an object which is not grasped by perception, and neither will word be applied to a non-existence; nor, suppose it to be understood, would an act of the hearer take place towards the object, because existence and non-existence are different from each other and without connection.

[Buddhist]: If I should say: when non-existence is understood to be the specific individual, then there will be practical efficiency towards this individual without discrimination.

[Vaiçeṣika]: That which you contend, namely, „the observing of those who observe arises, after their having confounded the [thing so as] seen and [the thing so as] imagined by *vikalpa*, from these objects, over which *atat* (properties which they have not got) is projected by illusion", is mistaken. Because it does not hold good that one projects non-existence as if it were objective [literally: in the form of „that"] over a thing which is perceived. And neither would then an observing of the hearer arise towards this object, because word would then bear on an object with imposed qualities (*atadviṣaya*) and because there would be no other trustworthy means of knowledge. However, we see man proceed towards

1) Read: *anāropitabāhyatvaḥ*.

an object on account of word; and thus the word-meaning does not bear on a non-existence. And [according to you] there is no other occasional cause [which could explain the trustworthiness of language], because everything objective is excluded from anything else, and momentary without precedent. And that which is taken hold of as being without any precedent, cannot be known with the aid of word. And neither could that which is not perceived by perception, be an object of avoiding or accepting, because [only] 1) that which is well known, is fit for that. However, there is both activity, based on verbal information, and human conduct, aiming at reaching and avoiding that which is good and bad, [a conduct] which complies with the wants of the living being, and is based on perception. And this conduct also ascertains [the existence of] one generality in the different individual objects, for the practical man acts in view of a certain object which he had not seen before, provided he has ascertained its usefulness for practical efficiency, because it belongs to a certain class of objects, the notion of which is obtained by word.

> „The intellection of accordant form (*ākāra*) in the different [objects] is the condition of the genus. And if this intellection is absent, then neither the practical man will exert himself."

---

1) Read: *bharet. pari°.*

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE BOOK

TRANSLATIONS FROM THE NYĀYA-KANDALĪ.

BOOK IV.

MATERIAL FOR REFERENCE.

SECTION 1.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL LISTS.

In the first place the following notes are arranged thematically, in the second place chronologically. I thought it useless to give completeness to the lists by copying out information, found in current manuals, and have limited myself to those books of which I have made use during my preparatory study.

I have not repeated in these lists the titles of the books on European philosophy, quoted in the text; that I have limited myself there to German authors, is not due to prejudice, but to the former direction of my studies.

A. General works and translations.

1. H. T. COLEBROOKE, On the Philosophy of the Hindus, Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society 1824.
2. FITZEDWARD HALL, A contribution towards an index to the bibliography of Indian philosophical systems, Calcutta 1859.
3. E. B. COWELL & E. A. GOUGH, The Sarva-darçana-saṃgraha, translated by... 1st edition 1882, 2nd. ed. London 1894.
4. F. MAX MÜLLER, The six systems of Indian philosophy, London 1899.
5. P. DEUSSEN, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Religionen, Erster Band, Leipzig 1894—1908.
6. P. OLTRAMARE, L'histoire des idées théosophiques, tome I, Paris 1906 (explains the Vedānta and Sāṃkhya).
7. G. THIBAUT & GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, Indian Thought, a quarterly, devoted to Sanskrit Literature, Allahabad 1907 &c.

   Separate reprints i. a.:

   GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā 1911.

   „ „ The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama, with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārttika of Uddyotakara (in course of publication).

GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, Sādholāl Lectures on Nyāya (in course of publication).

8. H. JACOBI, The dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brāhmans, Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. XXXI, 1, (1911).
9. H. JACOBI, Zur Frühgeschichte der Indischen Philosophie, Sitzungsberichte der Kgl. preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 1911.

B. Studies and translations, concerning the *Nyāya & Vaiçeṣika*.

1. BARTHÉLEMY SAINT-HILAIRE, Mémoire sur la philosophie Sanskrite, le Nyāya, 1839.
2. E. RÖER, 'Viçvanātha Pañcānana, Division of the Categories of the Nyāya Philosophy', edited and translated by. . ., Bibliotheca Indica 1850.
3. J. R. BALLANTYNE, The aphorisms of the Nyāya Philosophy by Gautama, Sanskrit and English, Allahabad 1850.
4. E. B. COWELL, 'Udayana Ācārya, Nyāya-kusumāñjali', translated and edited by. . . Calcutta 1864 (1884).
5. A. E. GOUGH, The Vaiçeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda, translated by. . . Benares-London 1873.
6. E. WINDISCH, Ueber das Nyāya-bhāṣya, Leipzig 1888.
7. BHIMACHARYA JHALAKIKAR, Nyāyakoça or dictionary of the technical terms of the Nyāya philosophy, second edition, Bombay 1893. (The name of the author and of the next following, given in Anglocised spelling).
8. M. RAJARAM BODAS, A historical survey of Indian logic, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay Branch, vol. XIX p. 306—347 (1897).
9. Y. V. ATHALYE, The Tarka-saṃgraha of Annambhaṭṭa, with. . . critical and explanatory notes. . . with a preface and introduction by M. RAJARAM BODAS, Bombay 1897 (The preface is a reprint of the historical survey, noted above).
10. W. HANDT, Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiçeṣika-Philosophie, Tübinger Doktor-dissertation, Rostock 1900.
11. H. JACOBI, Die Indische Logik, Nachr. der K. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, phil.-hist. Klasse 1901 Heft 4.
12. TH. DE STCHERBATSKOÏ, Rapports entre la théorie bouddhique de la connaissance et l'enseignement des autres écoles philosophiques de l'Inde [i. e. principally the Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika Schools] *Muséon* Nouvelle Série vol. V 1904.

13. E. HULTZSCH, Annambhaṭṭa's Tarka-saṃgraha, ein Kompendium der Dialektik & Atomistik mit des Verfassers eignem Kommentar, genannt Dīpikā, Abhandlungen der Kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Klasse Neue Folge IX n°. 5 (1907).
14. NANDA LAL SINHA, The Vaiçeşika Sūtras of Kaṇāda with the commentary of ÇAṂKARA MIÇRA, translated by... (in the series: The sacred books of the Hindus), Allahabad 1910 & 11.
15. JAGADĪSHA CHANDRA CHATTERJI, The Hindu Realism being an introduction to the metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiçeşika system of philosophy, Allahabad 1912. (Name of author in Anglocised spelling; I scarcely ever quote this book which differs in aim and method widely from my exposition).
16. LUIGI SUALI, Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia Indiana, Pavia 1913 [gives an exposition of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiçeşika, with an introduction about the history of Nyāya and Vaiçeşika]. Note. Published during the printing of this book:
17. F. W. THOMAS, Indian ideas of action and their interest for modern thinking, Lecture before the Aristotelean Society, 1918.

C. Studies &c. concerning the other Brahmanic systems.

Upanişads and Brāhmaṇas.

1. P. REGNAUD, Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire de la philosophie de l'Inde, Paris 1876.
2. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS, The theory of soul in the Upanişads, Journal Royal Asiatic Society 1889 p. 71—87.
3. (See list A n°. 5).

Pūrva-mīmāṃsā.

4. J. R. BALLANTYNE, The aphorisms of the Mīmāṃsā Philosophy by JAIMINI with extracts from the commentaries, in Sanskrit and English, Allahabad 1851.
5. G. THIBAUT, The Artha-saṃgraha by Laugākşi-Bhāskara, edited and translated by..., Benares 1882.
6. GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, Kumārila's Çloka-vārttika, translated by... Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta 1907.
7. (See list A n°. 7).

Vedānta.

8. P. DEUSSEN, Das System des Vedānta, Leipzig 1883.
9. P. DEUSSEN, Die Sūtra's des Vedānta aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt, Leipzig 1887.

10. G. THIBAUT, The Vedānta-sūtras with the commentaries by ÇAṂKARA ĀCĀRYA and RĀMĀNUJA, Sacred books of the East, vol. 34, 38 & 48, Oxford 1890 & 96.
11. M. N. DVIVEDIN, The Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's Kārikās and the Bhāṣya of Çaṃkara, translated into English by... Bombay 1894.
12. (See list A n°. 6).
13. M. WALLESER, Der ältere Vedānta, Heidelberg 1911.

Sāṃkhya & Yoga.

14. R. GARBE, Die Theorie der Indischen Rationalisten von den Erkenntnissmitteln, Berichte der kön. sächs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften phil.-histor. Klasse 1888 S. 1—30.
15. R. GARBE, Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie, 2te Auflage, Leipzig 1917.
16. A. BÜRK, Die Theorie der Schlussfolgerung nach der Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī des Vācaspatimiçra, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XV S. 251—263.
17. J. DAVIES, Hindu Philosophy, the Sāṃkhya Kārikā of Īçvara Kṛṣṇa, an exposition of the system of Kapila, with an appendix on the Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika systems, 2nd edition, London 1894.
18. (See list A n°. 6).
Note. The following book is of importance for the study of Indian philosophy in general, but unfortunately came too late into the possession of the author:
19. J. HAUGHTON WOODS, The Yoga-system of Patañjali, Harvard Oriental Series vol. XVII, Cambridge Mass. 1914.

D. Publications on Buddhism in general.

1. W. WASSILJEW, Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur, erster Theil, St. Petersburg 1860.
2. H. KERN, Manual of Indian Buddhism, Strassburg 1896.
3. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques, Muséon (nouvelle série) II & III [translation of the portion in the Sarva-darçana-saṃgraha, dealing with Buddhism] 1901—'2.
4. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Dogmatique bouddhique, Journal asiatique 1902.
5. D. T. SIZUKI, Outlines of Māhāyāna Buddhism, London 1907.
6. P. OLTRAMARE, La formule bouddhique des douze causes, Genève 1909.
7. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Bouddhisme, Opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique, Paris 1909.

8. M. WALLESER, Die Mittlere Lehre (Mādhyamika Çāstra) des NĀGĀRJUNA nach der tibetischen Version übertragen, Heidelberg 1911.
9. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Théorie des douze causes, Gand 1913.

E. Buddhistic Logic.

1. SADAJIRO SUGIURA, Hindu Logic, as preserved in China and Japan, Philadelphia 1900.
2. (See table B n°. 12).
3. SATĪÇ CANDRA VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA, History of the Mediaeval School of Logic, Calcutta 1909.

F. Editions used.

Original Vaiçeṣika system:

1. *The Vaiçeṣika Darçana* with the commentaries of Çaṃkara Miçra & Jayanārāyaṇa Tarka Pañcānana, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta 1861.
2. *The Bhāṣya* of Praçastapāda together with the Nyāya-kandalī of Çrīdhara, edited by V. DVIVEDIN, Benares 1895.
3. *The Bhāradvājavṛttibhāṣya* by Gaṅgādhara Kaviratna-kavirāja Berhampore, Çak. 1790 (India Office Library I. B. L. 13).
4. *The Kiraṇāvalī* (the aphorisms of the Vaiçeṣika philosophy of Kaṇāda with the commentary of Praçastapāda and the gloss ,Kiraṇāvalī, of Udayanācārya) edited by VINDHYEÇVARA PRASĀDA DUBE, Benares 1885.

Original Nyāya system:

5. *Nyāya Sūtra Vṛtti*, the logical aphorisms of Gotama with a commentary by Viçvanātha Bhaṭṭācārya, printed at the Education Press, Calcutta 1828.
6. *The Nyāyasūtras* with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya..., edited by GAṄGĀDHARA ÇĀSTRĪ TAILAṄGA, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, vol. IX, Benares 1896.

Syncretic Nyāya-Vaiçeṣika system:

(The names of the editors, given in Anglocised spelling):

7. *Kārikāvali*, with the commentary *Siddhānta-muktāvali*, by Viçvanātha-pañcānama, edited by TUKÂRÂM JAVAJÎ, Bombay 1903. (cf. list B n°. 2).
8. *The Tarkabhāṣā* of Keçavamiçra, with the commentary of Govardhana, edited with an introduction and notes by SHIVRAM MAHADEO PARANJPE, 2nd edition, Poona 1909.

9. *Saptapadārthī* by Çivāditya, with the commentary *Padārtha-candrikā* by Çeṣānanta, edited with introduction and notes by V. S. Ghāte, Bombay 1909.
10. (See here list B n°. 9).

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā:

11. *The Mīmāṃsā-çloka-vārttika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, with the commentary called *Nyāya-ratnākara* by Pārtha Sārathi Miçra, edited by Rāma Çāstrī Tailanga, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series, Benares 1898 &c.
12. *The Tantravārttika* by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, edited by Dhundhirāja Panta Dharmādhikārī, Benares Sanskrit Series, Benares 1882.
13. (See list C n°. 5).
Further Indian works of philosophy are referred to, according to the edition of the Bibliotheca Indica; see:
14. E. Sieg, Verzeichnis der Bibliotheca Indica und verwandter Indischer Series nach Werken und Nummern, Leipzig 1908.

Section 2.

DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENT OF THE VAIÇEṢIKA SŪTRA, AND REFERENCES TO THE PRESENT PUBLICATION.

Adhyāya I, 1.

Adhyāya I, 2.

Adhyāya II, 1.

Adhyāya II, 2.

Adhyāya III, 1.

Adhyāya III, 2.

Adhyāya IV, 1.

Adhyāya IV, 2.

Adhyāya V, 1.

Adhyāya V, 2.

Adhyāya VI, 1.

VI, 1, 13—16 *d. Tyāga* (of oneself or another), with reference to these three classes . . . p. 29 & p. 347

Adhyāya VI, 2.

VI, 2, 1— 9 Factors, necessary for the reaching of merit and demerit (behaviour, emotions, self-restraint, purity of food). . . . . ,, 348

10—16 The concatenation of the psychical states: *a.* desire originates from pleasure and other factors; *b.* application to *dharma* and *adharma* originates from desire and aversion; *c.* birth and death; *d. mokṣa* . . . ,, 265

Adhyāya VII, 1.

VII, 1, 1— 7 The discussion of the first group of qualities resumed. Their eternality and transiency, according to the nature of their substratum . . . . ,, 160

8—21 The second group of qualities taken up again (cf. IV, 1, 11). . . . . ,, 215

1°. *parimāṇa* . . . . ,, 215

22—25 Egression on the infinitely great (physical) space and soul, on the infinitely small *manas*; on (mathematical) space and time p. 157 & ,, 261

Adhyāya VII, 2.

VII, 2, 1 &c. The discussion of the second group of qualities continued . . . . p. 129 & ,, 199

1— 8 2°. *ekatva* 3°. *pṛthaktva*. . . . . ,, 129

9 4°. *saṃyoga*. . . . . ,, 226

10—13 5°. *vibhāga* . . . . ,, 226

14—20 Egression on *çabda*. An objective relation (*saṃyoga* or *samavāya*) does not exist between *artha* and *çabda* . . . . p. 29 & ,, 308

21—25 6°. *paratva* and *aparatva*. . . . . ,, 214

26—28 Egression on *samavāya*; definition; difference from *dravyatva* &c.; its *tattva* . . . . ,, 121

Adhyāya VIII, 1.

Adhyāya VIII, 2.

Adhyāya IX, 1.

Adhyāya IX, 2.

Adhyāya X, 1.

Adhyāya X, 2.

SECTION 3.

GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE PRAÇASTAPĀDA-BHĀṢYA.

The *Bhāṣya* is divided by the Indian editor into six *grantha*s (books) according to the number of categories. The introduction, the general enumeration of categories and the discussion of substance are considered by him to form the first book. It is, however, more logical to distinguish here two *grantha*s. Each of the books, further, is divided into *prakaraṇa*s (chapters), and a *prakaraṇa* into paragraphs. I mean by a paragraph such a part of the text which is not interrupted by any comments.

BOOK I. The six Categories.

BOOK II. Substance.

Chapter 1. The properties, common to all or some of the nine substances.

1—15) p. 20–26. Similar treatment, as in the precedent chapter.

Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the nine substances..

1) p. 27. Topic mentioned.

2) „ 27. Earth, its qualities, two kinds of earth: atomical and developed. Division of developed earth into three kinds: body, sensory (organ of smell) and object. Subdivision and description of these three kinds.

3) „ 35. Water, similar order of treatment as in 2). The bodies, consisting of water, live in Varuṇa's world.

4) „ 38. Fire; its qualities and its kinds: atomical and developed. Developed fire divided into: bodies living in Āditya's world, the eye as organ of sight, objects. Four kinds of objects: fire on earth, heavenly fire (lightning &c.), heat of the animal body, mineral fire or gold &c.

5) „ 44. Wind, its qualities; its kinds: atomical and developed. Developed wind of *four* kinds: body (world of the Maruts), organ of touch, object and prāṇa (vital air).

6) „ 48. The creation and destruction of the world (specially of the four developed elements).

7) „ 58. Physical space, as the substance which possesses sound as a quality. Inference to prove its existence. The qualities of physical space (oneness, infinite greatness, &c). Explanation of deafness.

8) „ 63. Time; inference to prove its existence; time as a cause of our temporal notions; time as a cause of origin, existence and perdition; its qualities; though really one, called many in consequence of its upādhis.

9) „ 66. Mathematical space, cause of the notion of the ten directions; its qualities; though really one, the ten names of the regions invented by the Ancient Wise for the use in profane and daily language; the mythological names of the regions.

10) „ 69. Soul. Proofs for its existence: 1. as the subject of sensorial knowledge, (p. 69 l. 6—16), 2. as the doer of the movements, executed by the body, 3. as the cause of the activity of the vital airs, 4. as the of the (unconscious) movements) of the eyelids,

5. as the cause of the states of our body (growth, health &c.), 6. as the agent, who directs the movement of the internal organ and thus causes the conjunction between an external organ and a desired object, 7. as the one perceiver of visual and gustatory impressions (saliva is formed in the mouth immediately after seeing a certain object), 8. as the substance in which pleasure, pain, wish, aversion and volition inhere. — Proofs for the proposition that pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are qualities of the soul (and not of the body). Complete enumeration of the qualities of the soul.

11) p. 89. The internal organ. Proofs for its existence: 1. necessity of the cooperation of attention in the arising of intellections, pleasures &c., 2. the arising of remembrances, whilst the external sense-organs are inactive, 3. the existence of other perceptibles (nam. pleasures &c.) which cannot be perceived by the external sense-organs. — The qualities of *manas* (*saṃkhyā*, *parimāṇa*, *pṛthaktva*. *saṃyoga*, *vibhāga*, *paratva*, *aparatva*, *saṃskāra*). Other characteristics (*dravya-anārambhakatva*, *mūrtatva*, *ajñatva*, *parārthatva*, *āçusaṃcāritā*).

BOOK III. Quality.

Chapter 1. Characterisation of the qualities.

1— 6) p.	94— 95.	Characterisation in respect to the substances in which they inhere.
7— 8) „	95— 96.	Distinction between common and special (typical) qualities.
9—12) „	96— 97.	The qualities with reference to the organs of sense.
13—24) „	98—100.	The qualities, considered with reference to other qualities, as their causes or effects.
25) „	101.	Qualities which have movements as their effects.
26—29) „	101—102.	The qualities, considered with reference to causality in general.
30—31) „	103.	Qualities which „cover" a portion or the whole of the substance.
32—33) „	103.	Qualities, considered with reference to the duration of the substance.

36) p. 237. the second member (*apadeça*).
37) „ 238. possible faults in this member.
38) „ 246. the third member (*nidarçana*).
39) „ 247. possible faults in this member.
40) „ 249. the fourth member (*anusandhāna*).
41) „ 250. the fifth member (*pratyāmnāya*). — Summary of § 35—41. Necessity of the five *avayavas*.
42) „ 255. assurance.
43) „ 256. remembrance.
44) „ 258. inspired knowledge.
45) „ 258. *siddhadarçana*.
46) „ 259. Pleasure.
47) „ 260. pain.
48) „ 261. desire.
49) „ 262. aversion.
50) „ 263. volition.
51) „ 263. weight.
52) „ 264. fluidity.
53) „ 266. adhesion.
54) „ 266. *saṃskāra* (physical inertia, latent preservation of psychical impressions, physical elasticity).
55) „ 272. merit.
56) „ 280. demerit.
57) „ 280. *saṃsāra*.
58) „ 281. liberation.
59) „ 287. sound.

BOOK IV. Action.

1) p. 290. General characterisation of action.
2) „ 291. Definition of *utkṣepaṇa*.
3) „ 291. of *apakṣepaṇa*.
4) „ 291. of *ākuñcana*.
5) „ 292. of *prasāraṇa*.
6) „ 292. of *gamana*.
7) „ 292. Division of action into: *satpratyayam*, *asatpratyayam*, *apratyayaṃ karma*. Discussion of the thesis that there are no more than five kinds of actions.
8) „ 296. Discussion of the difficulty (*saṃçaya*): is *gamana* equipollent or subordinate to *karman*.
9) „ 297. *Satpratyayaṃ karma*: explanation of the movement of a pestle, held with the hand.
10) „ 300. *Asatpratyayaṃ karma*. Explanation of the movement

---

Section 4.

Table A.

THE CONTENTS OF PRAÇASTAPĀDA'S BHĀṢYA,
Book I, Chapter 3, in detail.

The properties of all or some of the six categories.

	Substance.	Quality.	Movement.	Generality.	Difference.	Inherence.	
1) astitvam, abhidheyatvam, jñeyatvam	"	"	"	"	"	"	
2) āçritatvam	"[1]	"	"	"	"	"	1) anyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ.
3) samavāyitvam, anekatvam	"	"	"	"	"		
4) nirguṇatvam, niṣkriyātvam		"	"	"	"	"	
5) sattāsambandhaḥ, sāmānyavattvam, viçeṣavattvam, svasamayārthaçabdābhidheyatvam, dharmādharmakartṛtvam	"	"	"				
6) kāryatvam, anityatvam	"[1]	"[1]	"				1) kāraṇavatām eva (cf. § 7).
7) kāraṇatvam	"[1]	"[1]	"				1) anyatra pārimaṇḍalyādibhyaḥ.
8) dravyāçritatvam	"[1]	"	"				1) anyatra nityadravyebhyaḥ.
9) svātmasattvam, buddhilakṣaṇatvam, akāryatvam, akāraṇatvam, asamānyatvam, aviçeṣatvam, nityatvam, arthaçabdānabhidheyatvam				"	"	"	

Table B.

THE CONTENTS OF PRAÇASTAPĀDA'S BHĀṢYA, Book II, Chapter 1, in detail.

The properties, common to all or some of the nine substances.

	pṛthivī	āpas	tejas	vāyu	ākāça	kāla	diç	ātman	manas	
1) dravyatvayogaḥ svātmanyārambhakatvam guṇavattvam kāryakāraṇāvirodhitvam antyaviçeṣavattvam	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
2) anāçritatvam, nityatvam	1)	1)	1)	1)	"	"	"	"	"	1) anyatrāvayavidravyebhyaḥ.
3) anekatvam, aparajātimattvam	"	"	"	"				"	"	
4) kriyāvattvam, mūrtatvam paratvāparatvavattvam vegavattvam	"	"	"	"					"	
5) sarvagatatvam paramamahattvam sarvasaṃyogisamānadeçatvam					"	"	"	"		
6) bhūtatvam, indriyaprakṛtitvam bāhyaikaikendriyagrāhya-viçeṣaguṇavattvam	"	"	"	"	"					
7) dravyārambhakatvam sparçavattvam	"	"	"	"						
8) pratyakṣatvam, rūpavattvam dravatvam	"	"	"							
9) gurutvam, rasavattvam	"	"								
10) vaiçeṣikaguṇavattvam	"	"	"	"	"			"		
11) caturdaçaguṇavattvam	"	"						"		(Cf. here table D).
12) kṣaṇika-ekadeçavṛtti-viçeṣa-guṇavattvam					"			"		
13) pañcaguṇavattvam sarvotpattimatāṃ nimitta-kāraṇatvam						"	"			(Cf. table D).
14) naimittikadravatvayogaḥ	"		"							

Table C.

CONTENTS OF THE BHĀṢYA,

Book III, Chapter 1.

Characterisation of the qualities.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	
	rūpa	rasa	gandha	sparça	saṃkhyā	parimāṇa	pṛthaktva	saṃyoga	vibhāga	paratva	aparatva	buddhi	sukha	duḥkha	icchā	dveṣa	prayatna	gurutva	dravatva	sneha	saṃskāra	dharma	adharma	çabda	
aracterisation in respect to the substances in which they inhere.																									
guṇatvābhisambandhaḥ dravyāçritatvam ..... nirguṇatvam . niṣkriyatvam .	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
2 mūrtaguṇāḥ ...	"	"	"	"						"	"							"	"	"	[1])				[1]) vegaḥ.
3 amūrtaguṇāḥ...												"	"	"	"	"	"				[1])	"	"	"	[1]) bhāvanā.
4 ubhayaguṇāḥ ..					"	"	"	"	"																
5 anekāçritāḥ....					[1])		[2])	"	"																[1]) dvitvādayaḥ. [2]) dvipṛthaktvādayaḥ.
6 ekaikadravyavṛttayaḥ	"	"	"	"	[1])	"	[2])			"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	[1]) ekatvam. [2]) ekapṛthaktvam.
istinction between common & special (typical) qualities.																									
7 vaiçeṣikaguṇāḥ.	"	"	"	"								"	"	"	"	"	"		[1])	"	[2])	"	"	"	[1]) sāṃsiddhikadravatvam. [2]) bhāvanā.
8 sāmānyaguṇāḥ..					"	"	"	"	"	"	"							"	[1])		[2])				[1]) naimittikadravatvam. [2]) vegaḥ.
he qualities with reference to the organs of sense.																									
9 bāhyaikaikendriyagrāhyāḥ..	"	"	"	"																				"	
10 dvīndriyagrāhyāḥ					"	"	"	"	"	"	"								"	"	[1])				[1]) vegaḥ.
11 antaḥkaraṇagrāhyāḥ........												"	"	"	"	"	"								
12 atīndriyāḥ.....																		"			[1])	"	"		[1]) bhāvanā.
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	

	1 rūpa	2 rasa	3 gandha	4 sparça	5 saṃkhyā	6 parimāṇa	7 pṛthaktva	8 saṃyoga	9 vibhāga	10 paratva	1 aparatva	2 buddhi	3 sukha	4 duḥkha	5 icchā	6 dveṣa	7 prayatna	8 gurutva	9 dravatva	20 sneha	1 saṃskāra	2 dharma	3 adharma	4 çabda	
The qualities, considered with reference to other qualities as their causes or effects.																									
13 kāraṇa-guṇa-pūrvakāḥ....	¹)	¹)	¹)	¹)	²)	"	³)											"	"	"	⁴)				¹) apākaja°. ²) ekatvam. ³) ekapṛthaktvam. ⁴) vegaḥ.
14 akāraṇa-guṇa-pūrvakāḥ....												"	"	"	"	"	"				¹)	"	"	"	¹) bhāvanā.
15 saṃyogajaḥ....	¹)	¹)	¹)	¹)		²)		³)		"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"		⁴)		⁵)	"	"	"	¹) pākajāḥ. ²) tūla-parimāṇaḥ. ³) uttara-saṃyogaḥ. ⁴) naimittika-dravatvam. ⁵) bhāvanā.
16 karmajāḥ......								"	"												¹)				¹) vegaḥ.
17 vibhāgajau.....									¹)															"	¹) uttaravibhāgaḥ.
18 buddhy-apekṣāḥ.					¹)		²)			"	"														¹) dvitvādayaḥ. ²) dvipṛthaktvādayaḥ.
19 samānajāty-ārambhakāḥ..	"	"	"	¹)	²)	"	³)													"				"	¹) anuṣṇasparçaḥ. ²) ekatvam. ³) ekapṛthaktvam.
20 asamānajāty-ārambhakāḥ..													"	"	"	"	"								
21 samānāsamānā-rambhakāḥ..				¹)	"			"	"			"						"	"		"	"	"		¹) uṣṇasparçaḥ.
22 svāçraya-samavetārambhakāḥ.												"	"	"	"	"					¹)			"	¹) bhāvanā.
23 paratrā-rambhakāḥ...	"	"	"	"		"											"			"					
24 ubhayatrā-rambhakāḥ..					"		¹)	"	"									"	"		¹)	"	"		¹) ekapṛthaktvam. ²) vegaḥ.
Qualities which have movements as their effects. The qualities, considered with reference to causality in general.																									
25 kriyāhetavaḥ ..								"									"	"	"		¹)	"	"		¹) vegaḥ.
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	
	rūpa	rasa	gandha	sparça	saṃkhyā	parimāṇa	pṛthaktva	saṃyoga	vibhāga	paratva	aparatva	buddhi	sukha	duḥkha	icchā	dveṣa	prayatna	gurutva	dravatva	sneha	saṃskāra	dharma	adharma	çabda	
26 asamavayi-kāraṇatvam...	"	"	"	¹)	"	"	²)													"				"	¹) anuṣṇasparçaḥ. ²) ekapṛthaktvam.
27 nimitta-kāraṇatvam...												"	"	"	"	"	"				¹)	"	"		¹) bhāvanā.
28 ubhayathā-kāraṇatvam...				¹)				"	"									"	"		²)				¹) uṣṇasparçaḥ. ²) vegaḥ.
29 akāraṇatvam...					¹)		²)			"	"														¹) dvitvādi. ²) dvipṛthaktvādi.
Qualities which „cover" a portion or the whole of the substance.																									
30 pradeça-vṛttitvam...								"	"			"	"	"	"	"	"				¹)	"	"	"	¹) bhavanā.
31 āçraya-vyāpitvam...	"	"	"	"	"	"	"			"	"							"	"	"	¹)				¹) vega.
Qualities, considered with reference to the duration of substances.																									
32 yāvaddravya-bhāvitvam...	¹)	¹)	¹)	¹)	²)	"	³)											"	⁴)	"					¹) apākaja°. ²) ekatvam. ³) ekapṛthaktvam. ⁴) sāṃsiddhika-dravatvam
33 ayāvaddravya-bhāvitvam...	¹)	¹)	¹)	¹)	¹)	"	¹)	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"		¹)		"	"	"	"	¹) with the exception of the kinds mentioned in §3[illegible]
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	20	1	2	3	4	

Table D.

TABLE SHOWING THE DISTRIBUTION

of the twenty-four qualities over the nine substances and the Içvara.

(The table has been composed with the help of Bhāṣya, Book II, Chapter 2), with the exception of the last column but one, which is based on Ny.-kandalī p. 57 l. 20 &c.

	pṛthivī	āpas	tejas	vāyu	ākāça	diç	kāla	ātman	manas	Īçvara	viçeṣa-guṇās	
1 rūpa	"	"	"								"	
2 rasa	"	"									"	
3 gandha...	"										"	
4 sparça ...	"	"	"	"							"	
5 saṃkhyā .	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"		
6 parimāṇa.	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"		
7 pṛthaktva.	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"		
8 saṃyoga .	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"		
9 vibhāga ..	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"		
10 paratva...	"	"	"	"					"			
11 aparatva .	"	"	"	"					"			
12 buddhi ...								"		"	"	
13 sukha....								"			"	
14 duḥkha ..								"			"	
15 icchā								"		"	"	
16 dveṣa								"			"	
17 prayatna..								"		"	"	
18 gurutva ..	"	"										
19 dravatva..	"	"	"								" [1])	1) sāṃsiddhika-dravatva.
20 sneha		"									"	
21 saṃskāra .	"	"	"	"				" [1])	"		"	1) bhāvanā.
22 dharma ...								"			"	
23 adharma .								"			"	
24 çabda					"						"	

Table E.

LIST OF PROPERTIES WHICH CHARACTERISE KARMAN;

Praçastapāda-bhāṣya, Book IV § 1 p. 290.

1. karmatva-sambandhaḥ
2. ekadravyavattvam
3. kṣaṇikatvam
4. mūrtadravyavṛttitvam
5. aguṇavattvam
6. gurutva-dravatva-prayatna-saṃyogajatvam
7. sva-kārya-saṃyoga-virodhitvam
8. saṃyoga-vibhāga-nirapekṣakāraṇatvam
9. asamavāyi-kāraṇatvam
10. sva-parāçraya-samaveta-kāryārambhakatvam
11. samānajātīyānārambhakatvam
12. dravyānārambhakatvam
13. pratiniyata-jāti-yogitvam
14. dig-viçiṣṭa-kāryārambhakatvam

NOTE to this list: N°. 1 is an example of a tautological definition, no rare occurence in Vaiçeṣika works. N°. 2, 4, 5 characterise movement with reference to inherence (movement inheres in one substance; in a solid substance only; it does not possess itself qualities); n°. 3 states the transient nature of movement. N°. 6—14 characterise movement with reference to causality, namely: n°. 6 sums up the qualities from which movement originates (this list is not complete: physical *saṃskāra* or *vega* and *adṛṣṭa* are left out), n°. 7 expresses the incompatibility of movement and its result '*saṃyoga* &c.' (cf. V.S. I, 1, 14); n°. 8 sums up the qualities of which *karman* is the immediate cause (scil *saṃyoga* & *vibhāga*; cf. V.S. I, 1, 17; to these, however, *vega* is added in V.S. I, 1, 20); n°. 9 determines. the kind of causality which belongs to *karman* (cf. V.S. I, 1, 15—17, where this is only done for *dravya*); n°. 10 states that the result of movement (*saṃyoga* & *vibhāga*) inheres in the substance which was moving as well as in another substance; n°. 11 & 12 state the categories (*dravya* & *karman*) which cannot be result of movement; by n°. 13 the fact is expressed that the generality '*karman*' contains a limited number (*niyata*) of classes (*jāti*) [such as *utkṣepaṇa* &c.]; by n°. 14 the fact that the *saṃyoga* & *vibhāga*, originated by movement, are determined with reference to space.

Table F.

CLASSIFICATION OF LOGICAL FALLACIES,

according to Praçastapāda and Dignāga.

NOTE. The following table is based on Praçastapāda-bhāṣya, book III chapter 2 § 35—39 and the account of Dignāga's Nyāya-praveça, given by Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his *Mediaeval School* p. 89 &c.

a. The fallacies of thesis.

According to Praçastapāda.	According to Dignāga.
1. Thesis refuted by perception: fire is cold.	1. Thesis refuted by perception: sound is inaudible.
2. Thesis refuted by inference: physical space is solid.	2. Thesis refuted by inference: a pot is eternal.
3. Thesis refuted by the Çruti: a Brahman ought to drink *surā*.	3. Thesis refuted by public opinion: man's head is pure, because it is the limb of an animate being.
4. Thesis refuted by one's own school: the effect is existent [before its production].	4. Thesis refuted by one's own school: a Vaiçeṣika philosopher saying: „sound is eternal".
5. Thesis refuted by one's own words: word does not give us information about anything.	5. Thesis refuted by one's own words: my mother is barren.
	6. Thesis with unfamiliar *pakṣa*.
	7. Thesis with unfamiliar *sādhya*.
	8. Thesis with both terms unfamiliar
	9 Thesis universally accepted.

b. The fallacies of the probans.

I. The unproved (*asiddha*).

According to Praçastapāda.	According to Dignāga.
1. Probans, unproved for both disputants: word is transient, because it consists of parts.	1. Probans, unproved for both disputants: sound is not eternal, because it is visible.
2. Probans, unproved for one of the disputants: word is transient, because it is an effect. [The Mīmāṃsakas deny that word is an effect: it is only revealed by speaking].	2. Probans, unproved for one of the disputants: sound is evolved, because it is a product.
3. Probans, unproved in its own nature: there is fire here, because I get tears in my eyes. [The tears, however, arose by another cause than smoke].	3. The truth of the probans is questioned: the hill is fiery, because there is vapour.
4. The *anumeya* [i. e. *pakṣa*] does not exist [in the form in which it is supposed to exist in the argumentation]: shade is an earthly substance, because it possesses a dark colour [the possession of a quality cannot be attributed to shade, which is no substance].	4. It is questioned whether the *pakṣa* can be predicated by the probans; physical space is a substance, because it has qualities [it is questioned whether physical space has qualities].

II. The uncertain (*sandigdha*).

According to Praçastapāda.	According to Dignāga:
1. Probans too general (not excluded from the *vipakṣa*): this is a cow, because it has horns.	1. Probans too general: sound is eternal, because it is knowable.

(Cf. the fallacy, called *anadhyavasāya* by PRAÇASTAPĀDA).	2. Probans not general enough: sound is eternal, because it is audible [there is no *sapakṣa*, besides the *pakṣa*]. 3—5. Special cases connected with 1 and 2 (see VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA p. 94). 6. Non-erroneous contradiction: i. e. when a thesis and its contradictory are both supported by what appear to be valid reasons: The Vaiçeṣika speaking to the Mīmāṃsaka: sound is non-eternal, because it is a product. The Mīmāṃsaka speaking to the Vaiçeṣika: sound is eternal, because it is always audible.

III. The doubtful (*anadhyavasita*).

According to PRAÇASTAPĀDA.	According to DIGNĀGA.
1. Probans too narrow (no *sapakṣa* besides the *pakṣa*): a product is existent [before its origination], because it originates.	(Cf. the fallacy n°. 2 of DIGNĀGA's *sandigdha*).

IV. The contradictory (*viruddha*).

1. The supposed probans is absent in the *sapakṣa* and present in the *vipakṣa*: this is a horse, because it has horns.	1. The supposed probans is absent in the *sapakṣa* and present in the *vipakṣa*: sound is eternal, because it is a product. 2. Special case of *viruddha* 1) 3. The probans is consistent with the *pakṣa*. 4. Special case of *viruddha* 3). [NOTE. See VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA p. 95].

c. The fallacies of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*).

I. Positive examples (*sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*)

(i. e. examples used for showing that the *sādhyasāmānya* goes together with the *liṅgasāmānya*).

According to PRAÇASTAPĀDA.

1. Fallacious with reference to the probans:
   sound is eternal,
   because it is incorporeal,
   that which is incorporeal is an eternal substance,
   as an atom,
   [the atom is corporeal].
2. Fallacious with reference to the probandum:
   sound is eternal,
   because it is incorporeal,
   that which &c.
   as a movement.
3. Fallacious with reference to both:
   sound is eternal,
   because it is incorporeal,
   that which is &c.
   as a pot.
4. Example showing a lack of universal connection between probans and probandum:
   sound is eternal,
   like physical space
   [in this argumentation the connection between probans and probandum is not explicitly stated, cf. Nyāya-kandalī p. 247 l. 24].

According to DIGNĀGA.

1. Fallacious with reference to the probans:
   sound is eternal,
   because it is incorporeal,
   that which is incorporeal is an eternal substance,
   as an atom.
2. Fallacious with reference to the probandum:
   sound is &c.
   because &c.
   that which &c.
   as intelligence.
3. Fallacious with reference to both:
   sound is &c.
   because &c.
   that which is &c.,
   as a pot.
4. Example showing a lack of universal connection between probans and probandum:
   this person is passionate,
   because he is a speaker,
   whoever is a speaker is passionate,
   as a certain man in Magadha.
   [cf. VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA p. 97].

5. Example showing an inverse connection between probans and probandum:
[wind is a substance],
that which is a substance, is observed to possess movement
[the opposite of this argumentation holds true: whatever possesses movement, is a substance, cf. Nyāya-kandalī p. 248].

6. Fallacious with reference to the abode:
sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal, that which incorporeal, is an eternal substance,
as a shade
[shade is not an existing substance].

5. Example showing an inverse connection between probans and probandum:
sound is non-eternal,
because it is a product of effort,
whatever is non-eternal, is a product of effort,
as a pot
[the connection between probans and probandum has been inverted i. e.: all products of effort are non-eternal; but all non-eternals are not products of effort].

II. Negative examples (*vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāsa*).

In both sources the classification of the fallacious negative examples is completely parallel with the classification of the positive fallacious examples.

SECTION 5.

TABLE OF CONCORDANCE

between Praçastapāda-bhāṣya and Vaiçeṣika-Sūtra.

The next table gives in a more concise form the Sūcīpattra which VINDHYEÇVARĪPRASĀDA DVIVEDIN has composed for his edition of the Bhāṣya. Although his references are often rather forced and arbitrary, and must sometimes be rejected, yet on the whole his concordance has proved of the greatest help to my study.

References to the Vaiç.-Sūtra in the Bhāṣya.

The paragraphs of the Bhāṣya are indicated by italic types.

Division of Bhāṣya.	Title.	Division of V.S.	References.
I, 1	Enumeration of categories	I, 1	*1* cf. 1; *2—3* cf. 1—4.
I, 2	Species of categories	I, 1	*1* cf. 5; *2* cf. 6; *3* cf. 7.
		I, 2	*4* cf. 3—5; *5* cf. 6.
		VII, 2	*6* cf. 26.
I, 3	Characterisation of categories	I, 1	*4* cf. 16, 17; *5* cf. 8.
		I, 2	*4* cf. 9; *5* cf. 7; *9* cf. 3, 10, 12, 14, 16.
		VII, 1	*4* cf. 15.
		VII, 2	*9* cf. 26.
		VIII, 2	*5* cf. 3.
II, 1	Characterisation of substances	I, 1	*1* cf. 5, 9, 10, 12, 15, 18; *7* cf. 23; *15* cf. 13—14.
		II, 1	*7* cf. 1—4; *8* cf. 1—3, 6, 7; *9* cf. 1, 2; *11* cf. 1, 2, 6; *13* cf. 31; *14* cf. 6, 7.
		II, 2	*11* cf. 2, 5; *13* cf. 8, 9, 14.
		III, 2	*11* cf. 4, 20, 21.
		IV, 1	*11* cf. 11.

Division of Bhāṣya.	Title.	Division of V.S.	References.
		V, 1	*4* cf. 17; *9* cf. 7, 18; *11* cf. 7, 17, 18.
		V, 2	*4* cf. 1—7, 12—14; *9* cf. 3; *11* cf. 1, 3, 4—6, 8, 11.
		VI, 1	*11* cf. 5.
		VII, 1	*5* cf. 22, 24, 25; *11* cf. 22; *13* cf. 24, 25.
		VII, 2	*4* cf. 21; *13* cf. 22.
		VIII, 2	*6* cf. 5, 6.
		IX, 2	*11* cf. 6.
		X, 2	*1* cf. 1—2.
II, 2	Detailed treatment of substances	II, 1	*2* cf. 1, 6; *3* cf. 2; *4* cf. 3, 7; *5* cf. 4, 9—16; *6* cf. 18, 19; *7* cf. 24—31; *8* cf. 31; *9* cf. 31; *11* cf. 21,
		II, 2	*2* cf. 1—2; *3* cf. 5; *4* cf. 4; *7* cf. 21, 31; *8* cf. 6—9; *9* cf. 10, 12—16.
		III, 1	*10* cf. 2—5; 18—19.
		III, 2	*10* cf. 4; 6—18; 20—21; *11* cf. 1—3.
		IV, 1	*2* cf. 1—5, 11; *3* cf. 1—5, 11; *4* cf. 1—5, 11; *5* cf. 1—5, 7, 12.
		IV, 2	*2* cf. 1, 5, 6—10; *3* cf. 1, 6—11; *4* cf. 1, 6—11; *5* cf. 1, 6—11.
		V, 1	2 cf. 7, 16—18; *3* cf. 17; *4* cf. 17; *5* cf. 14.
		V, 2	*2* cf. 1; *3* cf. 3—6, 8, 11; *4* cf. 8, 13; *6* cf. 1, 12: *11* cf. 17.
		VI, 1	*10* cf. 5.
		VII, 1	*2* cf. 6, 10, 21; *3* cf. 20, 21; *4* cf. 20, 21; *5* cf. 20, 21; *7* cf. 22; *8* cf. 25; *9* cf. 21; *10* cf. 22; *11* cf. 23.

Division of Bhāṣya.	Title.	Division of V.S.	References.
		VII, 2	*6* cf. 9—10; *7* cf. 22; *8* cf. 25; *9* cf. 24; *10* cf. 22; *11* cf. 23.
		VII, 2	*6* cf. 9—10; *8* cf. 22; *9* cf. 22; *11* cf. 21.
		VIII, 2	*2* cf. 5; *3* cf. 6; *4* cf. 6; *5* cf. 6.
		IX, 2	*10* cf. 6.
		X, 2	*6* cf. 2.
III, 1	Characterisation of qualities	I, 1	*1* cf. 16; *5* cf. 15; *16* cf. 20; *19* cf. 28; *21* cf. 27, 29; *26* cf. 19; *27* cf. 19; *28* cf. 19; *29* cf. 19.
		II, 2	*9* cf. 21; *15* cf. 31; *17* cf. 31; *19* cf. 31; *21* cf. 31; *22* cf. 31.
		III, 1	*15* cf. 18.
		IV, 1	*10* cf. 11; *12* cf. 10.
		V, 1	*16* cf. 17; *25* cf. 1, 2, 5—7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18.
		V, 2	*1* cf. 22; *15* cf. 15; *25* cf. 1—7, 13, 17; *26* cf. 24.
		VI, 2	*22* cf. 10; 14.
		VII, 1	*1* cf. 14—16; *13* cf. 6; *19* cf. 6; *23* cf. 6.
		VII, 2	*1* cf. 3—5, 11, 12, 14—16, 23, 25; *15* cf. 9, 21; *16* cf. 9—10; *17* cf. 10; *18* cf. 21; *21* cf. 9, 10.
		VIII, 1	*1* cf. 8.
		VIII, 2	*9* cf. 5, 6.
		IX, 2	*22* cf. 6.
		X, 2	*26* cf. 4.
III, 2 §1—§6	Detailed treatment of qualities. First group	II, 1	*2* cf. 1—3; *3* cf. 1—2; *4* cf. 1; *5* cf. 1—4.
		II, 2	*4* cf. 2.
		IV, 1	*2* cf. 6, 8; *3* cf. 9; *4* cf. 9; *5* cf. 9; *6* cf. 3.

Division of Bhāṣya.	Title.	Division of V.S.	References.
		V, 2	*6* cf. 1.
		VII, 1	*2* cf. 2—7; *3* cf. 2—7; *4* cf. 2—7; *5* cf. 2—7; *6* cf. 6—7.
		VII, 2	*6* cf. 9—10.
		VIII, 2	*2* cf. 6; *3* cf. 6; *4* cf. 5; *5* cf. 6.
		IX, 1	*6* cf. 2.
§7—§12	Mathematical qualities	I, 1	*10* cf. 27, 29.
		II, 2	*11* cf. 31.
		III, 1	*7* cf. 11.
		V, 1	*10* cf. 1—6, 10, 14, 17.
		V, 2	*10* cf. 1, 5, 6, 8, 15.
		VII, 1	*8* cf. 9—13; 17—20, 22, 24, 25.
		VII, 2	*7* cf. 1; *9* cf. 2; *10* cf. 9; *11* cf. 10; *12* cf. 21—22.
		VIII, 1	*7* cf. 9.
		X, 2	*10* cf. 2, 5, 6, 7.
§13—§20	General intellectual states	II, 2	*15* cf. 17; *16* cf. 17—20.
		III, 1	*20* cf. 18.
		IX, 2	*15* cf. 7, 10—12; *17* cf. 10; *19* cf. 7—9; *20* cf. 1, 6, 13.
§21—§45	Perception and inference &c.	I, 1	*27* cf. 3.
		II, 1	*26* cf. 8.
		II, 2	*21* cf. 21; *27* cf. 32.
		III, 1	*21* cf. 18; *22—23* cf. 15; *25* cf. 15; *26* cf. 7—14; *34—35* cf. 15; *37* cf. 15—17; *39* cf. 15.
		IV, 1	*21* cf. 6, 8, 9, 11, 13.
		VI, 1	*27* cf. 1—3.
		VIII, 1	*21* cf. 4—7.
		IX, 1	*21* cf. 11—15.
		IX, 2	*15* cf. 7, 10—12; *17* cf. 10; *19* cf. 7—9; *20* cf. 1, 6, 13; *22—23* cf. 1; *24* cf. 1; *26* cf. 1, 2; *27* cf. 3, 4; *28—33* cf. 5; *34—35* cf. 1, 2; *36* cf. 1; *38* cf. 1, 3; *40—41* cf. 1, 2; *42* cf. 12; *43* cf. 6; *44—45* cf. 13.

Division of Bhāṣya.	Title.	Division of V.S.	References.
		X, 1	*42* cf. 3.
		X, 2	*27* cf. 9.
§46—§59	Remaining qualities: psychical and physical	I, 1	*48—50* cf. 6; *55* cf. 2.
		II, 1	*52* cf. 2, 6, 7; *53* cf. 2; *59* cf. 27.
		II, 2	*59* cf. 21; 25—32.
		V, 1	*50* cf. 1; *51* cf. 7, 18; *54* cf. 17.
		V, 2	*46—47* cf. 15; *50* cf. 14; *51* cf. 3; *52* cf. 4, 8; *58* cf. 16, 18.
		VI, 1	*55* cf. 5; *56* cf. 5, 7, 8.
		VI, 2	*46—49* cf. 10—14; *50* cf. 14; *55* cf. 1, 2, 5, 8, 9; *56* cf. 3, 4, 6, 7; *57* cf. 15; *58* cf. 16.
		IX, 2	*54* cf. 6.
		X, 1	*46—47* cf. 1—6.
		X, 2	*55* cf. 8.
IV	Movement	I, 1	*1* cf. 7, 11, 14, 17, 20—22, 24, 26, 29—31.
		I, 2	*2—6* cf. 7.
		II, 1	*1* cf. 21; *16* cf. 21.
		II, 2	*1* cf. 25.
		V, 1	*9* cf. 1—5; *10* cf. 1, 2, 9, 10, 17, 18; *11* cf. 1, 2, 16—18; *13* cf. 7, 18; *15* cf. 17.
		V, 2	*12* cf. 1, 12; *13* cf. 1, 12, 3; *14* cf. 4; *16* cf. 12, 21; *17* cf. 2, 7, 12, 13, 14, 17.
V	*Sāmānya*	I, 2	*1* cf. 3—5, 7—10, 17; *2* cf. 11—16.
VI	*Viçeṣa*	I, 2	cf. 6.
VII	*Samavāya*	V, 2	*1* cf. 23.
		VII, 2	*1* cf. 26—28.

SECTION 6.

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA.

The following table of contents of four books of the Nyāya-sūtra has been composed with the help of VIÇVANĀTHA's Vṛtti, of which I have used the edition of 1828. Moreover, I have added in this table the following facts: in the first column the number of the section (*prakaraṇa*), given to it in this edition; in the second the number of the *prakaraṇa* in the *āhnika*; in the third the number of the sūtras according to the edition of 1828; in the fourth the number of the sūtras according to the edition of the Nyāya-bhāṣya (edition 1896). The fifth contains the title of the different *prakaraṇa*s. For a short account of the system cf. MAX MÜLLER's Six Darçanas.

	Āhn.	Ed. '28.	Ed. '96.	Title.
1	I, 1, 1	I, 1— 2	I, 1, 1— 2	The topic of the book and its interest.
2	„ „ 2	„ 3— 8	„ „ 3— 8	Definition of trustworthy source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).
3	„ „ 3	„ 9— 22	„ „ 9—22	Definition of *prameya* (object of knowledge).
4	„ „ 4	„ 23— 25	„ „ 23—25	Definition of *saṃçaya*, *prayojana* and *dṛṣṭānta*.
5	„ „ 5	„ 26— 31	„ „ 25—31	Definition of *siddhānta*.
6	„ „ 6	„ 32— 38	„ „ 32—38	Definition of the five *avayava*s.
7	„ „ 7	„ 39— 40	„ „ 39—40	Definition of *tarka* and *nirṇaya*.
8	I, 2, 1	„ 41— 43	I, 2, 1— 3	Definitions of *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*
9	„ „ 2	„ 44— 49	„ „ 4— 9	*Hetvābhāsa*.
10	„ „ 3	„ 50— 57	„ „ 10—17	*Chala*.
11	„ „ 4	„ 58— 60	„ „ 18—20	Definitions of *jāti* and *nigrahasthāna*
12	II, 1, 1	II, 1— 7	II, 1, 1— 7	Examination of doubt.
13	„ „ 2	„ 8— 19	„ „ 8—19	Examination of trustworthy knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in general. [1]
14	„ „ 3	„ 20— 32	„ „ 20—32	Examination of perception (*pratyakṣa*).
15	„ „ 4	„ 33— 36	„ „ 33—36	Examination of the aggregate (*avayavin*).

	Āhn.	Ed. '28.	Ed. '96.	Title.
16	II, 1, 5	II, 37— 38	II, 2, 37—38	Examination of inference (*anumāna*).
17	„ „ 6	„ 39— 43	„ „ 39—43	Examination of present time.
	„ „ 7	„ 44— 48	„ „ 44—48	Examination of the trustworthiness of comparison (*upamāna*).
18	„ „ 8	„ 49— 56	„ „ 49—56	Examination of verbal authority (*çabda*) in general.
19	„ „ 9	„ 57— 68	„ „ 57—68	Examination of verbal authority in detail.
20	II, 2, 1	„ 69— 80	II, 2, 1—12	The fourfold set of trustworthy sources of knowledge.
21	„ „ 2	„ 81—105	„ „ 13—37	The transiency of word.
22	„ „ 3	„ 106—122	„ „ 38—54	The changes of word.
23	„ „ 4	„ 123—134	„ „ 55—56	The denotative power of word.
24	III, 1, 1	III, 1— 3	III, 1, 1— 3	The soul different from the sense-organs.
25	„ „ 2	„ 4— 6	„ „ 4— 6	The soul different from the body.
26	„ „ 3	„ 7— 15	„ „ 7—15	The soul different from the body (no duality of visual perception).
27	„ „ 4	„ 16— 18	„ „ 16—18	The soul is different from the internal organ.
28	„ „ 5	„ 19— 27	„ „ 19—27	Soul without beginning or annihilation.
29	„ „ 6	„ 28— 32	„ „ 28—29	Examination of the body. [1]
30	„ „ 7	„ 33— 51	„ „ 30—50	Examination of the sense-organs. Polemical passage against the Sānkhyins.
31	„ „ 8	„ 52— 60	„ „ 51—60	Manifoldness of the sense-organs. [2]
32	„ „ 9	„ 61— 71	„ „ 61—73	Examination of the object (*artha*).
33	III, 2, 1	III, 72— 81	III, 2, 1— 9	Transiency of intellection (*buddhi*). Polemics against Sānkhyins and Buddhists.
34	„ „ 2	„ 82— 89	„ „ 10—17	Discussion of the *kṣaṇabhaṅga* (a Buddhistic dogma).
35	„ „ 3	„ 90—113	„ „ 18—43	Intellection a quality of soul.
36	„ „ 4	„ 114—117	„ „ 44—48	Origination and annihilation of intellection.

1) Garbe, *Sāṃkhya-Philosophie* p. 335 note 4.
2) Ibidem p. 322 note 1.

	Āhn.	Ed. '28.	Ed. '96.	Title.
37	III, 2, 5	III, 118—127	III, 2, 49—58	Intellection different from the qualities of the body.
38	„ „ 6	„ 128—131	„ „ 59—62	Examination of the internal organ (*manaḥ*).
39	„ „ 7	„ 132—144	„ „ 63—77	Influence of *adṛṣṭa* in the origination of the body.
40	IV, 1, 1	IV, 1— 2	IV, 1, 1— 2	The faults of activity (*pravṛtti*) in general.
41	„ „ 2	„ 3— 9	„ „ 3— 9	Examination of faults (*doṣa*).
42	„ „ 3	„ 10— 13	„ „ 10—13	Examination of the condition after death (*pretyabhāva*).
43	„ „ 4	„ 14— 18	„ „ 14—18	Refutation of the dogma of *çūnyatā*.
44	„ „ 5	„ 19— 21	„ „ 19—21	The dogma of the existence of a Lord (*īçvara*).
45	„ „ 6	„ 22— 24	„ „ 22—24	The theory of mere chance (*ākasmikatva*).
46	„ „ 7	„ 25— 28	„ „ 25—28	Refutation of the transiency of everything.
47	„ „ 8	„ 29— 33	„ „ 29—33	Refutation of the eternality of everything.
48	„ „ 9	„ 34— 36	„ „ 34—36	Refutation of the separateness (*pṛthaktva*) of everything.
49	„ „ 10	„ 37— 40	„ „ 37—40	Refutation of the *çūnyatā* of everything.
50	„ „ 11	„ 41— 54	„ „ 41—54	Examination of fruit (phala). —This *prakaraṇa* contains a polemical egression against the *saṃkhyaikāntavādins*, i. e. those who limit number to one: the advaitins. NOTE. The *prakaraṇas* 4—11 contain principally polemics against the Buddhists; three of their dogmas: *sarvaṃ çūnyam, sarvam anityam, sarvam pṛthak* [1]) are successively discussed.
51	„ „ 12	„ 55— 58	„ „ 55—58	Examination of pain (*duḥkha*).
52	„ „ 13	„ 59— 67	„ „ 59—67	Examination of liberation (*apavarga*).

	Āhn.	Ed. '28.	Ed. '96.	Title.
53	IV, 2, 1	IV, 68— 70	IV, 2, 1— 3	The origination of the knowledge of truth.
54	„ „ 2	„ 71— 82	„ „ 4—17	Component parts and aggregate.
55	„ „ 3	„ 83— 90	„ „ 18—25	Things, devoid of parts.
56	„ „ 4	„ 91—102	„ „ 26—37	Refutation of the theory of constant annihilation of exterior things (*bāhyārthabhaṅga*). [1] NOTE. The *prakaraṇas* 2—4 from one polemical egression against the Buddhists.
57	„ „ 5	„ 103—114	„ „ 38—49	The evolution of the knowledge of truth.
58	„ „ 6	„ 115—116	„ „ 50—51	The maintenance of the knowledge of truth.

1) Cf. however here book I chapter III appendix II p. 50.

Section 7.

A. TWO POLEMICAL PASSAGES FROM ÇABARASVĀMIN'S BHĀṢYA ON MĪMĀṂSĀ-SŪTRA I, 1, 5.[1])

translated by H. Jacobi, J.A.O.S. XXXI (1911) p. 18.

First passage.

[An opponent objects]: All cognitions (*pratyaya*) are without foundation (in reality) just like a dream; for we recognise in a dream that it is the nature of cognition to be without foundation. A waking person also has cognitions, e. g. of a post or a wall; and therefore this cognition also is without foundation.

[We answer]: A waking man's notion (e. g.) 'this is a post' is a positively ascertained one; how is it possible that it should turn out wrong?

[Opponent]: The notion in a dream also was, just in the same way, a well ascertained one; previous to the awakening there was no difference between the two.

[Answer]: You are wrong; for we find that [what we saw] in a dream, turns out wrong; but we find that [what we see] in the other case [i. e. in the waking state], does not turn out wrong.

If you say: that on account of the class-characteristic [cognition as a genus] [the same predication] will hold good in the other case;

[we reply as follows]: If you mean that the cognition in a dream is wrong because it is a cognition, then of course the cognition of a waking man must be wrong too. But if cognition is [taken to be] the reason that something is so as it is cognised [and not different], then it is impossible to say that this cognition [viz. one in a dream] is different [i. e. wrong] because it is a cognition. [Not from the nature of cognition by itself], but from something else we come to know that cognition in a dream is wrong on account of its being opposed to truth.

[Opponent]: How do you ascertain this?

[Answer]: In the following way: because a sleepy mind is weak, sleep is the reason for the wrongness [of cognition] in a

---

1) Cf. p. 558 sub II ("Refutation of the Mādhvamikas"); and book I p. 63 (appendix

dream; in a dreamless sleep it [the mind] is absent altogether; for one without any consciousness whatever, is said to be in a dreamless sleep. Therefore the cognition of a waking man is not wrong.

[Opponent]: But the sensorium of a waking man also may be vitiated by some defect.

[Answer]: If so, the defect may be found out.

[Opponent]: While one dreams, a defect is not found out.

[Answer]: It is, for on awaking we find out that the mind had been vitiated by sleep.

Translation of the second passage (p. 19).

[The opponent says]: [The cognition itself] is a void. For we do not perceive a difference of form in the object and the idea of it; our idea is directly perceived, and therefore the so-called object which should be different from the idea, is a non-entity.

[Answer]: Well, this would be the case, if the idea had the form (or shape) of its object. But our idea is without form, and it is the external object which has the form; for the object is directly perceived as being in connexion with a locality outside of ourselves. An idea caused by perception is concerned with an object, and not with another idea; for every idea lasts but one moment, and does not continue to exist while another idea comes up.

[The opponent says]: While the second idea is originating, it becomes known to the first idea and at the same time, it makes known to it the object, just as a lamp [illumines and makes thus known things].

[We reply]: This is not so. For before the object has become known, nobody is conscious of having the idea, but after the object has become known [to us], we become aware by inference that we have an idea concerning it; it is impossible that both these processes should be simultaneous.

[The opponent says]: We do not contend that we know the object before the idea has originated, but after it has originated; therefore the idea originates first, and afterwards the object becomes known.

[We reply]: Quite right. The idea originates first, but it is not the idea that first becomes known. For as will occur occasionally, we say of an object which we do know that we do not know it [i. e. we are not concious of having an idea concerning it].

Moreover it is the very nature of every idea to be always necessarily bound up with the name of [or a word

denoting] its objects. Therefore an idea is 'intimately connected with a name', but that which is 'not intimately connected with a name' is termed directly perceived.

And furthermore, if [the object and the idea] had the same form, this would sublate the idea and not the object which is directly perceived. But there is no such uniformity [between the object and its idea, as you assume]; for by inference we become cognisant of the intrinsically formless idea, but we directly perceive the object together with its form. Therefore cognition is based on the object.

And furthermore, the notion of [e. g.] a piece of cloth has an individual cause [in this sense that we have the idea of the cloth] only when threads form the material cause [of the object, viz. the cloth]. For if this were not the case, a man of sound senses might have the notion of a jar though threads had been used [in the production of the object in question], but that is not the case. [The meaning of this argument is that the object is not caused by the idea, but it has a cause which is independent of the idea, viz. the material from which the object or the thing is produced]. Therefore cognition is not without foundation [in external objects], and consequently direct perception does not convey erroneous knowledge.

B. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF BĀDARĀYAṆA'S VEDĀNTA SŪTRA & ÇAṂKARA'S BHĀṢYA, II, 2, 18—27; TRANSLATIONS OF VEDĀNTA SŪTRA II, 2, 28—32.[1])

I. Refutation of the Sarvāstivādins (Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas).

1°. Refutation of the *dhātu-skandha* theory.

Sūtra 18. *a.* ÇAṂKARA's introduction, exposition of the *dhātu-skandha* theory: Elements of the world of two kinds: *bāhyaṃ vastu* & *āntaraṃ vastu*. Four kinds of *bāhyāni vastūni*: earth, water, fire and air; each element characterised by one quality: earth by touch, water by taste &c. Five kinds of *āntarāṇi vastūni: rūpa, vijñāna* &c.

b. Çaṃkara's explanation of the sūtra: refutation of this *dhātu-skandha* theory. 1. The *dhātus* cannot

begin forming aggregates because they lack intelligence, and the *skandhas* can neither do so, because no material body yet exists. 2. Refutation of the notion of a spontaneous entering upon activity. 3. Refutation of the idea that the *ālayavijñāna-pravāha* (the train of self-cognitions) is the cause of aggregation.

2°. Refutation of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, as a basis for the *dhātu-skandha* theory.

Sūtra 19. *a.* Introduction: enumeration of the twelvefold chain. *b.* Refutation: 1. The argumentation of the Bauddha... merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. 2. No aggregate possible on the assumption of momentary atoms and a mere fluxus of psychical states. 3. No eternal series of aggregates to be accepted. 4. No aggregate on behalf of somebody's enjoyment, for according to the doctrine of general impermanency there is no permanent enjoyer.

3°. Refutation of the *kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda*.

Sūtra 20. Contradiction between the *pratītya-samutpāda* and the *kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda*. Different arguments brought forward, i. a. On the admission [of the momentary existence of everything] it is impossible to establish between two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or has ceased to be and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.

Sūtra 21. Contradiction between the explanation of perception as caused by the four *pratyayas* and the *kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda*. [NOTE. Cf. MĀDHAVA's account of the Sautrāntika doctrine in DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's translation Muséon, N.S. II, p. 194].

Sūtras 22—24. Discussion on the triad: *pratisaṃkhyā-virodha*, *apratisaṃkhyā-virodha*

and *ākāça*. [Cf. Çlokavārttika, translation-GAṄGANĀTHĀ JHĀ, p. 413, *kārikā* 22].

Sūtra 25. The *kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda* refuted by the fact of remembrance.

Sūtras 26—27. The *kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda* would lead to the absurd consequence that entity springs from non-entity.

II. Refutation of the Mādhyamikas (according to the translation, given by H. JACOBI with the help of the Vṛtti-passage, quoted by ÇABARA-SVĀMIN in his comments to Mīm. Darçana I, 1, 5). (See p. 554).

Sūtra 28. The objects of cognition are not non-entities [i. e. cognition is not without foundation in the external world], because we actually perceive external objects.

Sūtra 29. Nor is our cognition similar to dreams &c. because there is a real difference of cognition in the state of waking and that of dreaming.

Sūtra 30. [An idea] cannot be the real object [underlying cognition, as proved in sūtra 28 & 29], because [the idea] is not the object of direct perception.

Sūtra 31. And because cognition has but momentary existence [i. e. one idea cannot perceive another, for while the first exists, the second has not yet come into existence, and when the second has come into existence the first has ceased to be].

Sūtra 32. And because it is unreasonable in every way.

III. Refutation of the Vijñānavādins. (Interpretation of the sūtras 28—32 by ÇAṂKARA, as translated by G. THIBAUT).

Sūtra 28. The non-existence [of external things] cannot be maintained on account of [our] consciousness [of them].

Sūtra 29. And on account of their difference of nature, [the ideas of the waking state] are not like those of a dream.

Sūtra 30. The existence [of mental impressions] is not possible [on the Bauddha view] on account of the absence of perception [of external things].

Sūtra 31. And on account of the momentariness [of the *ālaya-vijñāna*] it cannot be the abode of mental impressions].

Sūtra 32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.

C. LIST OF QUOTATIONS FROM GARBE'S BOOK

Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie.

In the following list I have collected from GARBE's book *Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie* all information which might be useful for the study of the relation between the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiçeṣika. I have divided this material under a few headings and put numbers before the separate paragraphs in order to make references easy.

	Ancient authorities.	Sāṃkhya-sūtra ± 1400.	Aniruddha ± 1500.	Vijñānabhikṣu ± 1575.
a. Logical maxims which GARBE considers to be typical for the Sāṃkhya (Garbe p. 216):				
1. Eine theoretische Erwägung *kalpanā* hebt nicht das durch die Erkenntnissmittel festgestellte auf.		II, 25		
2. Die Theorie muss sich im Einklang mit der Empirie halten (*dṛṣṭa*).		V, 49	I, 45	I, 20 &c.
3. Wo die einfache, natürliche, nahe liegende Erklärung (*lāghava*) ausreicht, ist die complicirtere Erklärung (*gaurava*) abzulehnen			passim (see Garbe's index)	passim (see Garbe's index)
b. Mistakes against logic, which, according to GARBE, the Sāṃkhya teaches to avoid, more than is done by any other system (p. 218);				
4. Die Erklärung eines Dings durch das Ding selbst (*ātmāçraya*).			For 4—9 see Garbe's indices to Aniruddha & Vijñānabhikṣu.	
5. Der circulus vitiosus (*anyonyāçraya*).				
6. Der Mangel eines ausreichenden Grundes (*niyamakābhāva*)				

	Ancient authorities.	Sāṃkhya-sūtra ± 1400.	Aniruddha ± 1500.	Vijñānabhikṣu ± 1575.
7. Die Unmöglichkeit sich für eine der beiden Seiten einer Alternative zu entscheiden (*vinigamakābhāva*, *vinigamanaviraha*)				
8. Der regressus in infinitum (*anavasthā*, *anavasthāna*) . .				I, 122, Einl. zu III, 46.
9. Die zu weit gehende Uebertragung, vermöge deren man eine Eigenschaft, die nur bestimmten Dingen angehört, fälschlich auch anderen zuschreibt (*atiprasakti*, *atiprasañga*, *ativyāpti*				
c. Propositions on general relations (p. 217):				
10. Die Nichtexistenz eines Dinges ist nicht anderes als der Ort, an dem das Ding sich nicht befindet				I, 113, V, 56.
11. Kein Ding kann seines Wesens entkleidet werden; denn das Wesen dauert so lange, als das Ding selbst				I, 7, 144.
12. Die Individuen und die Gesammtheit sich identisch (*vyastisamastyor ekatā*)				II, 18.
13. Die Eigenschaft ist nicht etwas von ihrem Substrat verschiedenes (*dharma-dharmy-abheda*)				I, 61, 62
14. Dasselbe gilt von den Kräften (*çakti-çaktimad-abheda*).				II, 13, 16
15. Einunddasselbe Ding kann nicht zugleich Subject und Object sein (*karmakartṛ-virodha* oder: *kartṛkarma-virodha*)		VI, 49		
d. Polemical passages in Sāṃkhya-writings against				

	Ancient authorities.	Sāṃkhya-sūtra ± 1400.	Aniruddha ± 1500.	Vijñānabhikṣu ± 1575.
Nyāya- or Vaiçeṣika theories: (Garbe p. 178):				
1°. *Doctrine of categories & Ontology.*				
16. Gegen die Aufstellung der 6, resp. 16 Kategorien...		I, 25		
17. Das Produkt vor der Entstehung und nach der Vernichtung ohne Realität?...	Tattvakaum. on Kār. 9.	V 85, 86. I, 113, 114, 121.		
18. Gegen die Berechtigung des Begriffes der Inhärenz....		V 99.		
19. Combination mehrerer Kategorien (*jātisāṃskarya*) unzulässig................				I 109, II 32.
2°. *Cosmology*:				
20. Gegen die Lehre dass es nur 9 Substanzen gebe.......		VI, 38.		
21. Gegen die Lehre, dass der innere Sinn, Zeit, Raum, Aether und die Atome von Erde, Wasser, Feuer und Luft ewig seien.........		V 72.		
3°. *Physics*:				
22. Gegen die Atomistik.....		V 87, 88.		I 62.
23. Die Leitung der Körperbildung von Seite der Seele durch das *adṛṣṭa* vermittelt?				VI 62.
24. Gegen die Lehre der *antyā viçeṣāḥ*.................	„Vārṣagaṇya" author quoted Yogabhāṣya III, 52 (Garbe p. 74).			
4°. *Theology*:				
25. Ist der Veda von Gott erfasst?		V 46, 47.		
26. Gegen die Annahme eines persöhnlichen Gottes (cf. Garbe p. 119 n. 122)....	Gauḍapāda on Kārikā 61.	I 92—94,		
5°. *Psychology*:				
27. Gegen die Lehre dass der innere Sinn ein Atom sei — (denn dieser trete gleichzeitig	Vācaspatim. on Kārikā 57.	V 2—12, 46, 126, 127, VI 64.		

	Ancient authorities.	Sāṃkhya-sūtra ± 1400.	Aniruddha ± 1500.	Vijñāna-bhikṣu ± 1575.
mit mehreren äusseren Sinnen in Verbindung)......		V 71.		II 32.
28. Besitzt die Seele als solche Qualitäten?............	Kārikā n°. 19, 20	I 15, 146, 164; V 13 &c.		
29. Erlösung als Aufhebung besonderer Eigenschaften der der Seele..............		V 75.		
6°. *The doctrine of external perception.*				
30. Ny. & Vaiç. Lehre von dem Zustandekommen der Wahrnehmung & Erkenntnis...				I 87, 91, 145—147,
31. Gegen die *anyathā-khyāti*, d. h. die Vorstellung dass ein Ding unter einer anderen als seiner eigenen Form erscheinen könne..............		V 55.		II 33.
32. Sind die Sinnen aus den Elementen gebildet? (Cf. Garbe p. 322 n. 3 & Nyāya sūtra III 60)..........		V 84.		
e. Passages in Sāṃkhya-writings, explaining Nyāya- or Vaiçeṣika-theories (Garbe p. 208):				
33. The theory of *anumāna*...	Tattva-kaumudī on Kārikā 5			I, 103.
34. The opinions on *vyāpti*...		VI 27—36.		
35. Epitome of the Nyāya- & Vaiçeṣika-sūtras..........			V 85, 86.	
36. „Eine Verbindung kann nur da eintreten, wo eine Verscheidenheit besteht" (Garbe p. 216).				I, 142.

Other passages, in GARBE's book of importance for the study of the Nyāya & Vaiçeṣika:

p. 308 n. 1 Sāṃkhya-psychology.

p. 317 bottom „*prāṇa*".

p. 321 Explanation of external perception; the term „*vṛtti*".

p. 322 n. 1 Is there one external sense-organ, or are there more; reference to Nyāya Sūtra III 53—69.

p. 322 n. 3—6 Do the organs of sense consist of the elements?

p. 335 n. 4 The gross body consists only of earth; S.s. III 19; V 102, 112 & Vaiç. S. IV 2, 2, 3, Nyāya Sūtra III, 28—32.

p. 347 n. 4 Space and time.

p. 361 n. 2 The extension and number of souls.

p. 374 n. 6 The term „*akhaṇḍopādhi*".

p. 386 n. 4 The nature of „*mokṣa*".

D. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTER ON BUDDHISM IN THE SARVA-DARÇANA-SAṂGRAHA.

References to De la Vallée Poussin's translation.

Introduction: *Anumānasya pramāṇatvaṃ* p. 56—61.

The Mādhyamika-school p. 62—177.
- 1. *kṣaṇabhaṅga* p. 62—75.
  - *a.* discussion of the *kṣaṇabhaṅga* itself.
  - *b.* the refutation of *sāmānya* 71—73, the theory of *apoha* 73.
- 2. *duḥkha* p. 171.
- 3. *svalakṣaṇa* p. 172.
- 4. (*sarva*)-*çūnyatā* p. 172—177.
  - *a.* voidness of all objective and subjective forms of existence proved by the example of the dream and *adhyāsa.*
  - *b.* the fourfold formula „*sarvam anityam* &c."
  - *c.* *prāsaṅgaka* formula about the nature of things.
  - *d.* The standpoint of relative truth.

The Yogācāra-school.
- 1—3. *kṣaṇabhaṅga*, *duḥkha* & *svalakṣaṇa* p. 177.
- 4. *bāhya-çūnyatā* p. 177—185.
  - *a.* Reality of self-consciousness p. 177.
  - *b.* & *c.* Two *prasaṅga*-argumentations to show that external objects do not exist p. 178.
  - *d.* *avayavi-nirākaraṇa* p. 177—179.
  - *e.* *ekatvaṃ nīla-taddhiyoḥ* p. 180—185.

The Sautrāntika-school p. 185—200.

A. Causality between the external thing and its mental representation p. 185—190. The existence of external things proved p. 190—193. Explanation of *pratyakṣa* and its four *pratyaya*s p. 193—194.

B. Definition of the five *skandha*s (*rūpa*, *vijñāna*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā* & *saṃskāra*) p. 195—196.

C. The threefold formula: *sarvaṃ duḥkham*, *duḥkhāyatanaṃ* & *duḥkhasādhanam*. The four noble truths (*duḥkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* & *mārga*) p. 196.

D. Egression: Explanation of the *pratītya-samutpāda* as a corollary to *samudaya*, the origination of *duḥkha* p. 197—199. Continuation of *C*. Definition of *nirodha* and *mārga* p. 199. [In the explanation by JINADATTA, quoted p. 205 &c., *mārga* & *nirodha* are confounded and *āyatana* is introduced as the second member of the Four Noble Truths].

The Vaibhāṣika-school p. 200—203.

A. Explanation of *pratyakṣa* by the Vaibhāṣikas. *Savikalpikam* & *nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam*.

B. Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas agree in other matters.

E. PARALLEL PASSAGES OF THE NYĀYA-KANDALĪ

and the chapter on Buddhism in the Sarvadarçanasaṃgraha.

The references are taken from L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN and arranged in accordance with the subjects.

Subject.	Nyāya-kandalī.	Muséon II.	Division of the chapter, mentioned.
sattā & sāmānya	p. 12 & p. 17 l. 10	p. 63 n. 20	Mādhyamika School, *kṣaṇabhaṅga.*
		p. 71 n. 40	
		p. 72 n. 43	
	p. 317—320	p. 72 n. 43	
		p. 73 n. 47	
kṣaṇikatva	p. 73 & 74	p. 62 n. 19	
		p. 63 n. 21	
		p. 67 n. 31	
		p. 70 n. 36	
avayavin & paramāṇu. . . .	p. 42 & 43	p. 178 n. 75	Yogācāra School,
dvitva.	p. 122—123	p. 178 n. 73	*bāhyaçūnyatā.*
		p. 189 n. 111	Sautrāntika School,
		p. 190 n. 113	A. Causality between the exterior thing and our representation &c
	p. 126 l. 9 & 17	p. 180 n. 80	Yogācāra School,
		p. 182 n 85	*bāhyaçūnyatā.*
	p. 130	p. 183 n. 87	
pratyakṣa.	p. 190 l. 18 & 19	p. 202 n. 153	Vaibhāṣika School,
		p. 203 n. 156	Explanation of *pratyakṣa.*
anumāna.	p. 206—207	p. 57 n. 3	Introduction:
		p. 58 n. 7	*anumānasya pramāṇatvaṁ.*
pratijñā	p. 234	p. 61 n. 13	
anumānasya pramāṇatvaṁ	p. 255 l. 5—22	p. 60 n. 11	
prasaṅgānumāna.	p. 197 l. 12	p. 64 n. 25	Mādhyamika School.
mahodaya.	p. 3 l. 24	p. 185 n. 24	Sautrāntika School.

F. PASSAGE IN THE PŪRVA-MĪMĀṂSĀ-SŪTRA ON SOUND.

M.S. I, 1, 6—23.

6 *Karmaike tatra darçanāt.*
7 *Asthānāt.*
8 *Karotiçabdāt.*
9 *Sattvāntare yaugapadyāt.*
10 *Prakṛtivikṛtyoçca.*
11 *Vṛddhiçca kartṛbhūmnāsya.* —
12 *Samaṃ tu tatra darçanāt.*
13 *Sataḥ param adarçanaṃ viṣayānāgamāt.*
14 *Prayogasya param.*
15 *Ādityavad yaugapadyam.*
16 *Varṇāntaram avikāraḥ.*
17 *Nādavṛddhiḥ parā.* —
18 *Nityas tu syād darçanasya parārthatvāt.*
19 *Sarvatra yaugapadyāt.*
20 *Saṃkhyābhāvāt.*
21 *Anapekṣatvāt.*
22 *Prakhyābhāvācca yogyasya.*
23 *Liṅgadarçanācca.*

Translation by Ballantyne.

6. Some say that it [viz. sound] is a product, for in the case of it, we see [what constitutes it such].
7, Because of its transitoriness.
8. Because [we employ, when speaking of sound] the expression 'making'.
9. From its simultaneousness in another person.
10. And [the Naiyāyikas infer that sound is not eternal, from the observation] of the original and altered forms [of sound].
11. And, by a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it. —
12. But alike [according to both opinions: that of these objectors and of ourselves] is the perception thereof — [both agreeing that **this** is only for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to sound itself's being so].
13. Of this [sound] while it really exists, the non-perception at another time [than that when the sound is perceived] arises from the non-arrival [of the manifester] at the object.
14. This [expression 'making'] means [merely] employing.
15. The simultaneousness is as in the case of the sun.
16. This [viz. the letter *y* — referred to in aph. 10 — when it comes in the room of the letter *i*] is another letter, not a modification [of that whose place it takes].
17. It is the increase of noise [not of sound] that is [in that case] augmented. —
18. But it must be eternal, because its exhibition is [available — [illegible]] for the sake of another.

19. [Sound is proved to be eternal] by there being everywhere simultaneousness [in the recognition of it by ever so many hearers].
20. [Sound is proved to be eternal] by its absence of number.
21. [Sound is proved to be eternal] by there being no ground for anticipation [of its destruction].
22. And [the case is not as the doubter, under aph. 21 comments, suggests], because [if it were so] there would be no perception [by the organ of hearing] of any object appropriate to it.
23. And [sound is proved to be eternal] by our seeing a proof [of this, in a text of the scripture[1]) which will be cited in the commentary here following].

Translations and references by Gaṅgānātha Jhā.

Some of these sūtras are translated, others referred to, by GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, in his translation of KUMĀRILA's Çlokavārttika (Bibl. Ind.) To wit: sūtras 6—11 on p. 410 (adhikaraṇa 6) kārikā 8—18.

sūtra	12	on	p.	413	kārikā	19	sūtra	18	on	p.	448	kārikā	230
„	13	„	„	414	„	33	„	19	„	„	470	„	356
„	14	„	„	434	„	158	„	20	„	„	472	„	368
„	15	„	„	435	„	163	„	21	„	„	484	„	443
„	16	„	„	443	„	201	„	22	„	„	484	„	445
„	17	„	„	445	„	211	„	23	deest.				

G. SŪTRAS IN THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA, ON SOUND,

as far as referred to, in book I.

Ed. '28.	Ed. '96	
II, 81	II, 2, 13.	*Ādimattvād aindriyakatvāt kṛtakavadupacārācca.*
86	18	*Prāguccāraṇād anupalambhād, āvaraṇādy-anupalabdheḥ.*
89	22	*Asparçatvāt.*
92	25	*Sampradānāt.*
94	27	*Adhyāpanād apratiṣedhaḥ.*
96	28	*Abhyāsāt.*
100	32	*Vināçakāraṇānupalabdheḥ.*
106	38	*Vikārāpadeçopadeçāt saṃçayaḥ.*
122	54	*Guṇāntarāpatty-upamarda-hrāsa-vṛddhi-leça-çleṣebhyas tu varṇavikāropapatter varṇavikāraḥ.*

1) *Liṅga* in this meaning, often occurring in Mīmāṃsaka writings, cf. here p. 186.

Translation by Ballantyne.

81. From its having an origin, from its being cognisable by sense, and from its being spoken of as factitious, [sound is not eternal].
86. [Sound is not eternal], because it is not perceived antecedently to pronunciation, and because we do not perceive any veil, &c. [so that it might exist unperceived].
89. Because it is intangible.
92. By reason of traditionary teaching, [suggests some one, sound must be eternal].
94. You have not set aside [my argument — says the objector], because there is the lecture.
100. [Sound, says some one, must be eternal], because we discern no cause why it should perish.
106. From the injunction under the character of a change, there arises a doubt.
122. But there is [what may allowably be called] change of letters, because such change of letters does occur through the attainment of another quality, substitution, prolongation, contraction and augmentation.

H. COLLECTION OF PASSAGES FROM BHĪMĀCĀRYA'S NYĀYAKOÇA, BEARING ON SOUND.

First group of passages bearing on the substantiality of sound.

Nyāya-koça p. 791 l. 9: *Çabdo dravyam iti Bhaṭṭa-mīmāṃsakā āhuḥ.*
l. 1. note 3. *Atrānumānam pramāṇam:*
Çabdo dravyam;
sākṣādindriya-sambandha-vedyatvāt;
ghaṭavad, iti.

Çrotraṃ dravya-grāhakam;
niravayavendriyatvād;
manovad, iti.

Guṇavattvācca çabdo dravyam;
saṃkhyādayo 'pi hi çabdadharmā anubhūyante.
(References to VALLABHĀCĀRYA's *Nyāyalīlāvatī*).

l. 1. note 3. *Çābdikās tu çabdam ubhaya-svarūpam icchanti;*
(continued) *tāratvādayo guṇāḥ çabdaniṣṭhāḥ,*
tadāçrayatvāc chabdasya dravyatvam;
ākāçarūpadravyāçrayatvād guṇatvaṃ ca, iti.
(References to Nāgeçabhaṭṭa's *Laghu-mañjūṣā*).

Second group of passages, bearing on the eternality of sound.

Nyāya-koça p. 791 l. 9: *Çabdo nityaḥ, iti Prābhākarā Bhaṭṭāç cāhuḥ.*

l. 1. note 4. (in reference to the Prābhākaras): *Etanmate çabdasya nityatve pramāṇam anumānam; tac ca:*
Çabdo nityaḥ;
vyomamātraguṇatvād;
vyoma-parimāṇavad, iti.

Çabdo nityaḥ;
adravyadravyatvāt;
pratyabhijñānācca. [1])
(References to Jānakīnātha's *Nyāya-siddhāntamañjarī*; to Çrīkaṇṭha's *Tarkaprakāça*; and Vallabhācārya's *Nyāya-līlāvatī*).

l. 1. note 4. *Atrāyam āçayaḥ: so 'yaṃ gakāraḥ, iti pra-*
(continued) *tyabhijñā-bālāc chabdasya nityatvam. Gakāra utpannaḥ, vinaṣṭaçca, iti pratyayas tu çabda-vyañjaka-vāyūtpatti-viṣayaka eveti.*
(References to Jānakīnātha's *Nyāya-siddhāntamañjarī*):

---

[1]) This argumentation presupposes the *çābdika*-conception, mentioned by the grammarian Nāgeça bhatta (see above).

Section 8.

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE NYĀYA-KANDALĪ.

The Nyāya-kandalī consists partly of paraphrases and short explanations of the Bhāṣya-text, and partly of longer egressions which as a rule show a polemical character. In most cases Çrīdhara does not mention the authors or schools whom he attacks. But for us it is a matter of importance to make out who are meant by these different *kecit*, *anye* &c. Sometimes the verses, quoted in the text, afford us some help.

In the following table I have shortly indicated the contents of the most important egressions. For its composition I have made ample use of the alphabetical Sanskrit index, which Dvivedin has added to his edition.

The reader is referred to my table of contents of the Bhāṣya (here p. 527) for the division into books and chapters.

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book I. The six categories. Chapter 1. Introduction & enumeration of categories.
1) Mangala	p. 1, l. 11	Importance of a *mangala*.
	p. 2, l. 13	Explanation of the name Kaṇāda.
	p. 3, l. 6	Praçastapāda rightly mentions at the beginning of his book its *prayojana* (aim) and its relation (*sambandha*). This relation is twofold: *vācyavācakabhāva* between the categories and the book, *sādhyasādhanabhāva* between the knowledge of the *padārthas* and liberation.
	p. 3, l. 21	This egression contains four discussions:
	p. 3, l. 21— p. 4, l. 11	*A*) Refutation of four definitions of *mokṣa*. NOTE. It will be seen by comparing a parallel passage in the Sarvadarçanasamgraha [1]) that these definitions belong

[1]) Cowell's translation p. 167. De la Vallée Poussin's translation of the chapter on Buddhism p. 176 (n° 65), p. 185 (n° 91), p. 190 (n° 145).

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book I. The six categories. Chapter 1. Introduction & enumeration of categories.
		respectively to the Mādhyamikas, the Vijñānavādins, the Sāṃkhyins and Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña. The definition, given by ÇRĪDHARA himself, agrees with the Nyāya Sūtra.
	p. 4, l. 11—p. 5, l. 4	*B*) The Vedāntas (Upaniṣads) prove the existence of *mokṣa*. Authoritativeness belongs to sacred and wordly language. (This last thesis has been contradicted by the Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakas).
	p. 5, l. 4—p. 6, l. 3	*C*) Can words themselves express their separate meanings by the function denotation, or do they only express an action or something connected with an action? (This was an important subject of controversy between the Kumārila- and Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakas. Cf. GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, *The Prābhākara School*, p. 63. [1])
	p. 6, l. 3	*D*) How do we understand sentences in which a verb is lacking.
2) The knowledge of the six *padārthas* and liberation.	p. 6, l. 18	Pleasure which arises from objects, even the pleasure of heaven, is momentary (transient). Refutation of the opinion of MAṆḌANA's that the extirpation of a characteristic quality amounts to the extirpation of the *ātman* itself.
	p. 6, l. 25	*Mokṣa* is a desirable aim for mankind, for pleasure is always intermixed with pain and is like poisoned honey.
	p. 7, l. 7	Reason, why the *padārthas* are mentioned in the order substance, quality &c. — Why is *abhāva*, though a seventh category, not mentioned.

1) Cf. Ny. kandalī p. 231 l. 24.

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book I, Chapter 2. The species of categories enumerated.
1) Enumeration of substances.	p. 9, l. 1	Darkness is no substance. Neither can we say that darkness is merely the „non-existence of light'', nor that it is „our not-seeing of light''. Darkness is a kind of colour (blueness, blackness) which is thrown over (*āropita*) those places where light is lacking. [1])
	p. 10, l. 8	Though the Lord possesses only six qualities [2]) and the individual soul, subject to *saṃsāra*, is characterised by fourteen qualities, yet the *Içvara* is to be considered as a kind of *ātman*. The number of nine *padārthas*, therefore, is not transgressed.
2) Enumeration of qualities.	p. 10, l. 18	Psychical qualities as heroism &c. are subordinated to the general qualities (*buddhi* &c.), mentioned in the Bhāṣya.
4) The two forms of generality.	p. 12, l. 4	Discussion of the notion „being''. This passage has been translated above p. 360.
	p. 12, l. 28	The notions *dravyatva*, *karmatva* and *guṇatva* must be accepted. The perception of an individual as wel as the perception of the circumstances (*samaya*) are a cause of the [arising of this] notion *guṇatva* (p. 13 l. 3). F. i. when, on meeting a person, we say „this is a Brahman'', then this statement presupposes a previous knowledge of his parentage. But when once this knowledge has been obtained, then this perception „this is a brahman'' is a perception, nothing else. Finally the author discusses in connection with this perception of *guṇatva* the ques-

1) Cf. Ny. Kandalī p. 179 l. 8—17.

2) Cf. [illegible]

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book I. Chapter 3. The properties, common to all or some of the categories.
		tion: whether the chastity of women has ever been perceived. Undoubtedly, the author says, provided that strict guards have watched over them.
6) Definition of inherence.	p. 14, l. 26	Discussion about the technical term „*ayuta-siddhi*".
		Book I, Chapter 3.
		The properties, common to all or some of the categories.
9) Properties, common to three of the categories.	p. 19, l. 7	Argument for the thesis, that no *sāmānya* is to be accepted in reference to *sāmānya* itself, *viçeṣa* and *samavāya* [in other words, though the notions *dravatva, guṇatva* & *karmatva* are required by reason, the same thing cannot be said of a corresponding *sāmānyatva* &c.]
	p. 19, l. 20	Argument for the thesis that we cannot say that generality, (ultimate) difference and inherence are produced (or effects). NOTE. A different view is held in reference to *samavāya* by the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas, see GAṄGANĀTHĀ JHĀ, *The Prābhākara-School* p. 89.
		Book II. Substance.
		Chapter 1. *The properties, common to all or some of the nine substances.*
4) Properties, common to the four elements and *manas*.	p. 21, l. 25	Opponent: The ideas of farness and nearness are not to be accepted [namely as underived notions], in as far as they simply mean the greater or lesser number of conjunctions of things conjoined. — Refutation.

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book II. Substance. Chapter I. The properties, common to all or some of the nine substances.
	p. 22, l. 6	*Vega* (speed, physical inertia) is something else than the series of actions [i. e. movements considered as existing during one moment]. For *vega* is not seen in things which move slowly.
6) Properties, common to the four elements and physical space.	p. 23, l. 4	Sensual perception is brought about by the organs of sense on reaching the object. NOTE. A translation of the passage is given here p. 361. The author has in view only the organ of sight. A similar theory in reference to sound was held by the Sāṃkhyins, cf. *Çlokavārttika*, translation-GAÑGANĀTHĀ JHĀ p. 430 n°. 127—128).
13) Properties, common to (mathematical) space and time.	p. 25, l. 14	(Mathematical) space and time should be called *nimitta-kāraṇāni* (efficient or occasional causes) of produced things, in as far as every form of causation obeys the formula: in that time and place, where the causes are working, there the effects arise.
14) Properties, common to earth and fire.	p. 26, l. 1	Why does the Bhāṣyakāra mention the accidental fluidity not only of earth, but also of light; are not then gold [and the other metals] of earthly nature? — No; because earth, by intense heat, turns into ashes [i. e. a portion of the earthly substance passes over from the solid or fluid state into a gaseous condition, whilst a remnant is left behind in the form of ashes]; but however intense the heat may be, still the metals remain fluids. The weight which is observed in metals, may be the result of their

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book II. Substances. Chapter I. The properties, common to all or some of the nine substances.
		being mixed with earth. The objection that metals cannot be light, because they are not illuminous of themselves, is not convincing, in as far as the „colour", peculiar to light, may be here in an undeveloped condition.
		NOTE. Both the explanation of ÇRĪDHARA's and the paragraph of the Bhāṣya refer to Vaiç. Sūtra II, 1, 6 & 7, in which clarified butter, lac and wax are mentioned apart from tin, lead, iron, silver, gold. It is a priori clear that this distinction was due to the peculiar glance which is typical for metals and which is still accepted as such by modern European chemistry in its definition of this rubric of elements; on the other hand the explanation which ÇRĪDHARA gives, owes its origin probably to objections as the one, referred to at the end of his gloss.
15) The threefold method.	p. 26, l. 15	The threefold method of the Vaiçeṣika system: enunciation, definition and examination. [See translation, given here p. 363].
		Book II. Chapter 2.
		Detailed treatment of the nine substances.
2) Earth.	p. 28, l. 21	The usefulness of definition. Refutation of the opinion that defining leads to an endless regress. [See translation, given here p. 364].
	p. 30, l. 2	The explanation of variegated colour. [See translation given here p. 365].

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book II. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the nine substances.
	p. 31, l. 16	Atom-theory. Proof for the existence and eternality of atoms (or infinitesimal parts). Two atoms, united, form a double atom (*dvyaṇuka*). Double atoms conjoin, three pairs together at least; thus one *tryaṇuka* is three *dvyaṇukas*; for the rest the number of *dvyaṇukas* which can conjoin, is unlimited. [See translation here p. 367].
	p. 33, l. 5	The bodies of the gods and *ṛṣis* are not orginated from blood and seed. Even when a body is originated from blood and seed, this mixture is first dissolved into atoms.
	p. 35, l. 2	Proof for the existence of the olfactory sensory.
	p. 35, l. 5	Proof for the thesis that the olfactory sensory consists of earthly matter. The olfactory sensory, being of earth, possesses smell as its quality. But we do not perceive this smell. Similarly we do not perceive the flavour, the colour, the touch of the gustatory, visual and tactual organs. The case is different with the auditory organ; the sound, perceived, is really a quality of this organ itself.
3) Water.	p. 38, l. 5	Refutation of the theory that the body is built up of five elements. [See translation here p. 369].
	p. 38, l. 14	Proof for the thesis that the gustatory organ consists of water-atoms.
4) Fire.	p. 40, l. 6	Proof for the thesis that the visual organ consists of light.
	p. 41, l. 2	Proof for the thesis that the objective things are not yet included in their

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book II. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the nine substances.
		qualities; in other words: the thing is not merely its qualities. Refutation of a Buddhistic theory according to which the outward reality only corresponds to such elementary sensations as blue &c., but not to our conception of things. [See translation here p. 18).
	p. 41, l. 12	This refutation continued. Proof for the existence of aggregates. *A*) General part. *B*) Contradiction which exists (according to the Buddhist) between simultaneous movement of a part and the rest of an aggregate; is *yutasiddhi* between part and aggregate to be admitted? *C*) We only perceive the side of a thing, that which is turned towards us; thus the contradiction arises (according to the Buddhist) that a thing is perceived and not perceived at the same time; *D*) Does an aggregate abide only partially or totally in each of its several parts? If no aggregates should exist, then (according to the Vaiçeṣika) the notions, used in argumentations, such as *dharma* &c, would become baseless. Validity of perception. [See translation here p. 371].
	p. 43, l. 17	Discussion between a Buddhist and a Vaiçeṣika about the existence of the atoms. [See translation here p. 375].
5) Wind.	p. 45, l. 16	Proof for the thesis that the organ of touch consists of wind. Refutation of the opinion that the skin, which surrounds the whole body and its organs,

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book II. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the nine substances.
		is the seat of the common sensory for all sensorial impressions.
	p. 46, l. 1	The existence of wind is not known by perception, but by inference. For we perceive only the cold touch of wind, but not the wind itself as a thing. NOTE. In the term *nivṛtty-anumāna* in line 10, *nivṛtti* = *vyāvṛtti*.
6) The creation and destruction of the world.	p. 54, l. 3	Explanation of the term *mānasa.* How the use of language is restored at the time of creation by the *Prajāpatis* &c. [See translation here p. 376].
	p. 54, l. 10	Proof for the existence of the Lord. [See translation here p. 376].
	p. 56, l. 22	The eternality of the divine cognition, wish and volition. [See translation here p. 381]. Egressions: *A*) The individual souls cannot direct the atoms at the time of world-creation; *B*) Is there one Lord or more? *C*) The qualities of the Lord; *D*) Is the Lord a bound or a liberated soul? [See translation here p. 382].
8) Time.	p. 65, l. 4	How is it that we have a notion [i. e. a notion of a thing as] defined by time, although time itself is imperceptible? — By perception I realise the existence of the thing, by inference I realise the relation of the thing towards time, thus since I am the one and same person who ascertains both facts, this notion of the *viçiṣṭatva* of things by time can arise. Reference to the discussion on *surabhaṃ candanam* (Nyāya-kandalī p. 117 l. 1)

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book II. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the nine substances.
		and to the Mīmāṃsaka example of *aghaṭaṃ bhūtalam*, used for the explanation of this difficulty of *kālena viçiṣṭatvam*.
10). Soul.	p. 73, l. 19—p. 82, l. 21	Discussion of the *kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*. [See translation, given here p. 384, and detailed analysis in next section].
	p. 86, l. 23	Discussion between a Vaiçeṣika and an Advaita-Vedāntin, on the oneness or plurality of *ātman*.
	p. 89, l. 2	Discussion of the question: does not the belief in the eternality of *ātman* counteract the striving for liberation? In this passage we meet with the psychical concatenation: *sukhatṛṣṇā*, *rāga & dveṣa*, *pravṛtti & nivṛtti*, *dharmādharmau*, *saṃsāra* (cf. Vaiç. Sūtra VI, 2, 10—15).
11) Manas.	p. 90, l. 22	The difference between sentiment &c. and cognition. [See translation here p. 403].
	p. 90, l. 27	Discussion on the question whether reflection is a necessary part or accidental addition of intellection (p. 403).
	p. 91, l. 23	Refutation of the *tripuṭīpratyakṣatāvāda* and the theory that knowledge and soul are self-illumined at every act of perceiving (p. 405).
11) The internal organ.	p. 92, l. 7	*Manas* is one in number in every body, because every moment only one notion or one volitionary act takes place in our soul-life. The simile of the *alātacakra* is used for the explanation of those cases in which several notions seem to occur at the same moment. Although our soul contains only one

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Bhapter II. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
	p. 119, l. 4	How is it that the notion of number, e. g. of hundred, can arise with regard to destroyed substances? This seems to be contradictory to the theory, given by PRAÇASTAPĀDA. Some say (l. 7): this use of number is metaphorical (*gauṇa*). Others declare (l. 8 &c.) that the past can still be active as an inherential cause [i. e. a past object can be an abode for qualities, attributed to it by our soul at the present]. In the course of the argumentation the necessity of assuming the notion *saṃskāra* (latent impression) is upheld; — then the following example of the proposition to be proved is given: the first speech-sounds of a word are only remembered during the pronuntiation of the last sounds, and still they are together the occasional cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the concept (*arthapratīti*) expressed by the word; — finally we meet with a remark on the activity of the internal organ; this is fit for making a remembrance arise, and also a perceptional impression, but the latter in accordance with the organs of sense [in other words: we can direct our attention to things remembered as wel as things perceived]..
	p. 122, l. 22	Discussion on duality between a Vijñānavādin and a Vaiçeṣika. [See translation, given here p. 416, and detailed analysis in next section].

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
8) Dimension.	p. 132, l. 8	How can we infer from the existence of certain words the existence of the corresponding objects? In the first place words are not identical with their corresponding objects; by the word 'fire' e. g. our mouth is not set on fire; neither are the words originated from the objects, for they are produced by our expired breath. Answer: words are not merely produced by breath, because they are capable of expressing — or concealing — the speaker's intentions. Further discussion, in which a quotation from the Çlokavārttika (p. 94 çl. 161) is met with, and which mainly turns on the question: how have we to explain the relation between words and objects in the case of a *bhrānta* (a confused person whose words, although without sense, may sometimes be understood by another in a certain way) and of a deceiver. Conclusion: words [which have been shown to be not merely products of breath] are moreover not simply expressions of intentions, but principally bear on objects, otherwise we could not say that in a dispute one speaker is the winner and the other the loser.
	p. 133, l. 3	The thesis that an object and its dimensions are identical cannot be upheld. Thus, for instance, we see the object itself from a distance, but its great size is then perceived as small by optical delusion (*bhrānti*).

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Quality. Chapter 1. Characterisation of the qualities.
		notion at the time, still such a notion may have several objects for its contents.
		Book III. Quality.
		Chapter 1. *Characterisation of the qualities.*
11) The qualities, with reference to the organs of sense.	p. 96, l. 21	Discussion of the question: is knowledge directly perceived by internal perception or must its existence be proved by inference? The Vaiçeṣika defends the first alternative. In the course of the discussion the Mīmāṃsaka notions: *jñātatva*, *jñānasya svaprakāçā*, *saṃvedana*, the innate spirituality of soul, are fully examined. Soul, according to the Vaiçeṣikas, is the abode of intellections, but is not intellection itself. [See translation, given here p. 406].
		Book III. Chapter 2.
		Detailed treatment of the qualities.
2) Colour.	p. 104, l. 18	When a substance is destroyed, then its qualities: colour &c. are also annihilated. The latter destruction follows the former so quickly that they seem to be simultaneous.
	p. 104, l. 24	Proof for the thesis that thing and quality are not identical [in other words that the notions of thing and quality must be both accepted next to each other]. [See translation, given here p. 409].

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
6) Qualities, produced by the influence of fire.	p. 109, l. 6	The changes in earth, caused by fire, result from the conjunction between fire and the atoms of earth, and not from a conjunction between fire and an eartly aggregate. — The porosity of a pot &c. contradicted. — Explanation of how recognition is possible with reference to the unbaked and baked pot. — The stages in which the process of baking can be divided. [See translation, given here p. 410].
7) Number.	p. 113, l. 22	Discussion between a Vaiçeṣika and a Vijñānavādin concerning the question: does number posses an objective reality? [See translation, given here p. 412]. [NOTE: It deserves our notice that here the reality of number is advocated by the Vaiçeṣika, who himself elsewhere defends number as a mere result of *apekṣābuddhi*].
	p. 116, l. 21	After having explained the *dvitva*-theory of the Bhāṣya with regard to the *indriyārthasaṃnikarṣa*, the *ekatva-sāmānyajñāna* and the *apekṣābuddhi*, the author of the Kandalī gives an argumentation for the thesis: objective twoness arises from the perceiver's intellection. This argumentation leads to the following egression:
	p. 116, l. 25	Discussion on the notions: *viçeṣaṇa* and *viçeṣya*. They are contained in two separate intellections. Explanation by means of the example of the intellection *surabhi candanam*. The difference between *viçeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*. [See translation, given here p. 414].

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
10) Conjunction.	p. 143, l. 2	Refutation of the proposition: „the aggregates do not originate from conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of constituent materials, but from non-existence; for instance the sprout arises in consequence of the annihilation (non-existence) of the seed &c." On occasion of this proposition ÇRĪDHARA enters upon an:
	p. 143, l. 5	Exposition of the *satkāryavāda*, which is the main doctrine of the Sāṃkhya-system. Quotation and explanation of IÇVARAKṚṢṆA's Sāṃkhyakārikā IX. In this explanation we meet again with another quotation (p. 143 l. 13).
	p. 143, l. 25	Refutation of the *satkāryavāda*. The order of these passages on the Sāṃkhya may be shown in the following table: *asadakāraṇāt* Comm. p. 143, 6; refutation p. 144, 9. *upādānagrahaṇāt* p. 143, 9; refutation p. 144, 19. *sarvasambhavābhāvāt* p. 143, 11; refutation p. 144, 16. (*asambaddhatvāviçeṣe* &c.); (*asato 'sambaddhasya*). *çaktasya çakyakaraṇāt* p. 143, 15; examination of *çakti* p. 144, 24. *kāraṇabhāvāt* p. 143, 20; refutation p. 145, 18: „the not performing, thus the non-existence, of the *nityāni karmāṇi* causes the existence of sin", the discussion on *çakti* continued. REMARK. With the discussion of *çakti* p. 144, 24 &c. we may compare the exposition of the Mīmāṃsa-doctrine

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
		(GAṄGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, *Prābhākara School* p. 90).
11) Disjunction.	p. 158, l. 6	Relative value of perception and inference. [See translation, given here p. 433].
	p. 159, l. 1	The annulment of an intellection. [See translation, given here p. 434].
13) Intellection.	p. 171, l. 18	Definition of *buddhi*, *jñāna* and *upalabdhi* according to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy. Quotation from the Bhāṣya on Yoga Sūtra II, 20 and comments on these quotations; refutation of these doctrines. [See translation, given here p. 435].
15) Species of intellections.	p. 173, l. 1	The Bhāṣyakāra has enunciated four forms of *avidyā*: *saṃçaya*, *viparyaya*, *anadhyavasāya* and *svapna*. Must *tarka* (false supposition, made for the purport of refuting a wrong opinion and used as a basis for a reductio ad absurdum) not be considered as a fifth form of *avidyā*? *Tarka* is an important means for reaching the truth [and should therefore be considered as a form of *vidyā*]. Whosoever does not accept *tarka* [as *vidyā*], should neither make use of *prasaṅga* [absurd consequence, used for the refutation of an adversary]. Translation, given here p. 436.
17) *Viparyaya*.	p. 180, l. 7	Discussion between a Vaiçeṣika and a Pūrva-Mīmāṃsaka on the question: does *viparyaya* exist? [Translation, given here p. 438].
21) Perception.	p. 189, l. 13	Discussion between a Buddhist who does not accept *savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam* and a Vaiçeṣika. [Translation here p. 442].

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
	p. 194, l. 13	Discussion between a Pūrva-Mīmāṃsaka and a Vaiçeṣika on the question: do we perceive or infer movement? [Translation here p. 450].
	p. 196, l. 4	The perception of the yogins. We may distinguish in this passage three parts:
	p. 196, l. 4	*A*. We, ordinary men, perceive our soul under the aspect of *ego* or *meus*, i. e. as an agens or a possessor; but the yogins perceive the *ātman* in its pure nature, as it is taught in the Vedānta. During this perception the yogin's internal organ stands still in a certain spot of his *ātman*. With reference to other men's souls, to space &c., another process takes place: here the yogin's internal organ leaves his body for some time and enters into conjunction with other *ātman*s &c. Inference with respect to this subject: *ātmākāçādiṣv abhyāsapracayas tattvajnānahetur,* *viçiṣṭābhyāsatvāt,* *vidyāçilpādy-abhyāsavat.*
	p. 196, l. 18	*B*. Other inference with regard to the perception of yogins: *buddhes tāratamyaṃ kva cin niratiçayam,* *sātiçayatvāt,* *parimāṇatāratamyavat.* Discussion on this inference; corrections, necessary to it.
	p. 197, l. 9	*C*. Discussion on an inference, upheld by an opponent:

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
		yogino 'tīndriyārthadraṣṭāro na bhavanti, *prāṇitvāt,* *asmadādivat.* [Translation here p. 452].
24) The inferential probans.	p. 202, l. 14	Discussion of *prakaraṇasama* and *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa.*
	p. 202, l. 15	The exclusively positive probans.
	p. 203, l. 1	The exclusively negative probans.
	p. 204, l. 17	Conclusion to the two last-mentioned passages. [Translation of these four passages here p. 453].
26) *Dṛṣṭam & sāmānyato dṛṣṭam.*	p. 206, l. 17	Discussion of *avinābhāva.* According to the Buddhist regular concomitance is based on identity or causality. This is denied by ÇRĪDHARA. In the argumentation the *apohavāda* of Buddhism is often referred to. [Translation here p. 458].
27) *Çabda* as a form of inference.	p. 214, l. 6	Verbal authority a form of inference.
	p. 215, l. 19	Is there a *svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ* between word and object?
	p. 217, l. 23	*Svataḥprāmāṇya* of word specially and of knowledge in general. [Translation here respectively p. 465, 469, 470]. NOTE. These three passages are directed against the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.
29) *Upamāna.*	p. 220, l. 21	Polemics against the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, and especially against ÇABARASVĀMIN. [Translation here p. 475].
30) *Arthāpatti.*	p. 222, l. 9	Polemics against the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. According to the Vaiçeṣika *arthāpatti* a form of inference. The distinction of *çrutārthāpatti* from *arthāpatti* in general not accepted. [Translation, here p. 478].

Number of paragraph.	Pege in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
32) *Abhāva.*	p. 225, l. 16	*Abhāva* rejected as a separate source of knowledge. [Translation here p. 483].
	p. 228, l. 26	*Abhāva* as a separate category. [Translation p. 489].
	p, 230, l. 4	Division of this category „non-existence" into four kinds: *prāgabhāva, pradhvaṃsābhāva, itaretarābhāva, atyantābhāva.*
34) *Parārthānumāna.*	p. 231, l. 24	Discussion of the *anvitābhidhāna-vāda* and the *abhihitānvaya-vāda* [i. e. two psychological theories on language by KUMĀRILA and PRABHĀKARA]. Translation here p. 492.
	p. 233, l. 11	The *parārthatva* of *anumāna*, is contradicted by an opponent: if inference could be „for another", then also an information about a perception should be called „*parārtham pratyakṣam*". The defendent argues as follows: not the fact that in a *parārthānumāna* we use words directed against somebody else, but the fact that the fivefold verbal information causes the force of the argument to arise in somebody else, is a reason why the *parārthānumāna* should be considered as an *anumāna*.
35) The five *avayavas*.	p. 234, l. 15	Polemics against Buddhists who deny the necessity of *pratijñā*. [NOTE. Cf. *The Prābhākara School* p. 49].
37) The fallacious probantia.	p. 242, l. 19	Explanation of Vaiçeṣika Sūtra II, 2, 18—19.
40) *Anusandhāna*	p. 249, l. 25	The order of the four first *avayavas* explained

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
41) *Pratyāmnāya.*	p.252,l.15—p. 253, l. 15	Necessity of the fifth *avayava.*
	p.254,l.18—p. 255, l. 4	Two other explanations for this necessity.
	p. 255, l. 5	The trustworthiness of inference. Passage, taken from a Buddhistic source and refuting the opinion of those who only accept perception as a trustworthy source of knowledge. [Translation here p. 495].
46) *Sukha.*	p. 260, l. 16	Refutation of the opinion that pleasuse is merely the negation of pain.
51) *Gurutva.*	p. 264, l. 3	Refutation of the opinion that weight is perceived by the organ of touch: if weight were perceived by touch, then also the weight of an object under our hand would be perceived. Really weight is inferred: thus an object, placed on our hand, will move our hand; and from this movement we infer the weight.
	p. 264. l. 9	Refutation of the opinion that weight does not reside in the aggregate, but only in the component parts.
54) *Saṃskāra.*	p. 272, l. 24	Discussion on *sphoṭa.* [Translation here p. 496 and detailed analysis book IV section IX table *C*].
55) *Dharma.*	p. 273, l. 21	This eggression may be divided into two parts: *A*) Discussion between a Vaiçeṣika and an opponent [i. e. a Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka]; according to the Vaiçeṣika an act, i. e. a religious act, effectuates an unseen quality residing in the soul (*adṛṣṭa*); according to the opponent the act itself creates a power (*apūrva*;

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
		karmasāmārthya; çakti) which is of an objective nature and does not reside in the soul, nor in the act. Division of the dialogue:
	p. 273, l. 21—24	the opponent: l. 24—p. 274, l. 1 answer.
	p. 274, l. 1—7	the opponent; l. 8—11 answer.
	p. 274, l. 11—12	the opponent; l. 12—16 answer.
	p. 274, l. 16—19	the opponent; l. 20 answer.
		[NOTE. Cf. *The Prābhākara School*, p. 160; ibidem p. 166 we find a description of KUMĀRILA BHAṬṬA's opinion which agrees with the theory defended by the Vaiçeṣika. See moreover M. MÜLLER, *Six Darçanas* p. 276].
	p. 274, l. 21	*B*) Refutation of the opinion upheld by MAṆḌANA in his *Vidhi-viveka*; the *apūrva* is an effect (*kārya*), but not a power (*çakti*) of the sacrifice. The *apūrva*, when helped by auxiliaries (*sahakārin*), such as favourable place, time and circumstance, brings about bliss. — Answer by the Vaiçeṣika: when we find the expression *dharma* with reference to a sacrifice (cf. Nyāyakandalī p. 273 l. 21), then this word is used metaphorically. Really *dharma* is a property of soul.
	p. 228, l. 21	The path to liberation: renunciation of *kāmyāni karmāṇi* (acts, sacrifices which aim at the fulfilment of a wish), application to *samādhi*; gradual increase of *dharma* and *samādhi*, whilst

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
		alternating. An opponent asks: why is it not sufficient to study the nature of the *ātman* in the Çruti; why do we want application to *samādhi*? Because we must intuitively, directly realise the nature of the soul and must thoroughly feel that the soul is neither agent, nor possessor, but neutral (*na kartā, na bhoktā, kiṃtūdāsīna eva*); the notions 'I' and 'mine' are caused by exterior factors (*upādhis*): body &c. From this wrong knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*) attachment and aversion arise; from this, activity and non-activity; from this, merit and demerit; from this, *saṃsāra*.
		As the Buddhists have said: as long as we talk of self, we have the notion of other; from this distinction between self and other love and hatred arise.
		Importance of immediate knowledge; insufficiency of knowledge, only based on study. Quotation of a Sāṃkhyin verse in which perfect knowledge is described.
		[NOTE. The whole passage is interesting for the eclecticism, or rather syncreticism which we may already observe in the Nyāya-kandalī and which was still more developed in recent Indian thought].
58) *Apavarga.*	p.283, l.12—p. 286, l. 19	He who is about to obtain *mokṣa*, must give up the *kāmyāni karmāṇi*, but is obliged to perform the *nitya-naimittika-karmāṇi* (daily and periodical sacrifices).

Number of paragraph.	Page in Dvivedin's edition.	Book III. Chapter 2. Detailed treatment of the qualities.
	p. 286, l. 20	Refutation of the opinion that the innate nature of the soul is bliss (*ānanda*). Division of the dialogue:
	p. 286, l. 21—24	Vaiçeṣika; l. 24 opponent.
	l. 24—25	Vaiçeṣika; l. 25—26 opponent.
	l. 26—p. 287 l. 1	Vaiçeṣika; p. 287 l. 1—7 opponens.
	l. 7—10	Vaiçeṣika; l. 10 opponent; l. 10—16 Vaiçeṣika.
59) Sound.	p. 289, l. 19	Importance of the *kauṣṭhyavāyu* (wind emitted from the centre of the lungs) for the space through which sound is transmitted.
		Book V.
		Generality.
2) Additional notes on generality.	p. 315, l. 5	The eternity of generality. [Translated here p. 501].
	p. 317, l. 24	The denial of generality by the Buddhist. [Translated here p. 503].

SECTION 9.

Table A.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE KṢAṆABHAṄGAVĀDA.

(Nyāya-kandalī p. 73 l. 20).

We may distinguish three main divisions:

A. General refutation of the thesis of momentary destruction *73*, 20.

B. The theory of momentary destruction repugned by the fact of human recognition *80*, 7.

C. The notion „*saṃsāra*" is incompatible with the Buddhistic theory of universal momentariness *82*, 2.

A.

We may subdivide division *A* into four parts.

Part I.

73, 20. Buddhist: *Arthakriyā* shows itself as succession or simultaneïty. As to the first point, something that is — that is lasting — cannot perform actions at different times. As concerns the second point see *74*, 21.

73, 24. Opponent: Something that is — that is lasting — can indeed perform actions at different times, in as far as it has recourse to different subsidiaries at different times.
Buddhist: The applied subsidiary must at any rate give a certain additament to the lasting thing, otherwise the applied subsidiary might just as well remain absent. This additament is either distinct from the lasting being (*a*) or it is identical with it (*b*).
In the first case (*a*) we can reason thus. It follows from agreement and contrariety that not the lasting thing, but the additament is cause of the action. For the second case see *74*, 4.

74, 1. Opponent: The lasting thing performs its action, when it is accompanied by its additament, produced by the applied subsidiary.
Buddhist: Does not the additament in its turn begin a new additament or does it do so? In the first case there is no question of accompaniment between the lasting thing

and its additament. In the second case regressus ad infinitum takes place.

74, 4. The additament, produced by the applied subsidiary, cannot be identical (*b*) with the old being, as the latter can not arise anew.

74, 6. Opponent: The old being, which does not possess the additament, disappears and a new being, identical with the additament arises.
Buddhist: By this you have proved what I had to demonstrate.

74, 7. Egression: dialogue between the Buddhist and his opponent on the notion: „subsidiary (*sahakārin*)".

74, 20. Conclusion. Buddhist: Something that is — that is lasting — cannot perform actions at different times; succession of events is only possible, when all existence is momentary.

74, 21. Short argumentation for the thesis: something that is permanent, cannot perform its actions at the same time (cf. this table sub 73, 20).

74, 24. The two conclusions summarised: neither succession, nor simultaneity is possible for the permanent.

Part II.

74, 25. 1) *Anumāna* for the Buddhistic thesis of the universal momentariness.

75, 1. 2) Objections on the part of the opponent: there is no *vipakṣa*, and thus one cannot demonstrate the *vyāvṛtti* concerning the *vipakṣa*.

75, 2. 3) Several subterfuges of the Buddhist:
a. *Vājiviṣāṇa* as an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) for the *vipakṣa*.

75, 10. b. *Stambhaḥ piçāco na bhavati* as an example how one can predicate something with regard to an imperceptible object.

75, 17. c. New definition for *akṣaṇika* by which the Buddhist makes it seem as if the *akṣaṇika*, the existence of which he denies, were perceptible.

76, 4. d. Further examination of the argumentations given. The argumentative force of a *bādhaka* discussed. Can the concept 'to be' serve as terminus medius between the twelve *āyatana*s and momentariness? DHARMOTTARA's opinion put aside.

Part III.

76, 21. 1) A further consideration of the two notions *arthakriyā* and momentariness.

77, 5, 2) Refutation of the theory that permanence should signify the not-perceiving of the difference between very similar *kṣaṇa*s succeeding each other without interruption.

77, 8. 3) Refutation of the *kṣaṇa*-theory and maintenance of the idea *sahakārin*.

Part IV.

78, 8. 1) A full Buddhistic explanation of the argumentation: because beginning things are perishable, they must also be momentary.

78, 22. 2) Discussion between a Buddhist and a Vaiçeṣika with respect to that point.

B.

We may subdivide division *B* into three parts.

Part I.

80, 7. Can one state of consciousness, called „recognitive perception" (*pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa*), relate to a previous as well as a present time?

Part II.

81, 8. Is this recognitive perception illusionary? Does there exist any sublative cognition (*bādhaka*) with reference to the trustworthiness of this recognitive perception?

Part III.

81, 12. Do we know the momentariness of things by direct data of knowledge (*anubhava*)? Reference to the author's *Tattvaprabodha* & *Tattvasaṃvādinī*.

C.

82, 2. The Buddhist defends here the theory that the first thought of a new-born babe arises from the last thought of another series of states of consciousness. The Vaiçeṣika refutes this theory and upholds the substantiality and eternality of soul.

Table B.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE DISCUSSION OF DUALITY.

(Nyāya-kandalī p. 122 l. 23).

122, 23. I. The duality of object and representation doubted by the Vijñānavādin:

122, 26. *a.* By reason of the difference in time that exists between the influencing object and the representation:

b. For the reason that sense-organ and object are the cause of the representation, so that these two should be perceived in the representation.

123, 11. II. The duality of object and representation maintained by the Vaiçeṣika.

a. Grāhya-grāhaka-bhāvaḥ follows from *viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāvaḥ.*

123, 13. *b.* We always perceive a particular object, [whereas abstract thought has to do with objects in general, thus with classes]. That we should see thus particular objects, is a matter of *svabhāva.*

123, 16. *c.* The form of the objects penetrates the mind, where it gives its own form to the representation; [from the form of the representation we infer the form of the object, and so the object itself]:

123, 25. III. The problem concerning the notion *ākāra* formulated and examined by the Vijñānavādin.

a. Do we perceive the object and its form (image, constitution, *ākāra*) at the same time? No.

124, 1. *b.* Do we perceive the object by means of the *ākāra*-possessing representation?

125, 1. *c.* Do we perceive the form of the object by means of the *ākāra*-possessing representation? Explanation of the *nirālambanatva-vāda.*

125, 5. Only the representation exists; an object corresponding to it, does not. Neither the thing, nor its causal relation to our consciousness are perceived.

125, 22. The regular going together of *vedya* and *vedaka* prove their identity; the identity of *sārvajñya* and *asārvajñya* quoted as a *dṛṣṭānta.*

126, 14. The notion „duality" is an illusion and indeed the result of a beginningless *vāsanā.*

Table C.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE PASSAGE ABOUT SPHOṬA.

Preliminary note.

The *sphoṭa*-theory, attributed by tradition to Pāṇini, teaches that the becoming conscious of the word as a whole takes place immediately after the separate perceptions of the speech-sounds of the word, by means of a mind-action, not allowing more accurate description. This theory can just as well be united with the doctrine of the eternity of the word as with the doctrine of the perishability of it. On the other hand the *sphoṭa*-theory is rejected both by the Mīmāṃsakas [1]), who adopt eternity and the Vaiçeṣikas, who teach perishability. ÇRĪDHARA seems to have made use of different sources for his argumentation, without having sufficiently watched against inconsistencies.

Survey of the discussion in the Nyāya-kandalī.

Defender of the *sphoṭa*-theory.	Opponent.
p. 268, 27. I. The speech-sounds, coming into existence one after the other and separately, can originate no word-meaning. On the other hand a whole consisting of speech-sounds, is not possible, because the speech-sounds are perishable.	I. Such a whole exists, because the speech-sounds are eternal.
p. 269, 3. II. Even accepting that the speech-sounds and the words are eternal, even then, since the perception takes place sound after sound, the difficulty remains that there is not a single comprehensive perception.	II. The impressions of the speech-sounds, deposited in memory, are the causes of the apprehension.
p. 269, 6. III. The original order of speech-sounds is preserved in the	III. The perception of the last speech-sound, characterised by the

remembrance; thus here is there neither one single comprehension, taking place during one moment.

impression left behind by the preceding sounds, is this comprehension.

p. 269, 11.

IV. Order in the objective sounds is not possible, because [according to the opponent] these are eternal. A comprehension of remembrance would signify sublation of order. It is thus necessary to adopt the *sphoṭa*.

IV. The successive speech-sounds are not able to cause such a simultaneous *sphoṭa*.

p. 269, 21.

V. The rushing in the air, belonging to every speech-sound, reveals gradually, but indistinctly the *sphoṭa*. The traces of former object-impressions help to originate it afterwards completely.

V. Should first the speech-sounds be perceived as unreal impressions and then the *sphoṭa* as a real impression, so must one, just as in the case of optical illusion (mother-of-pearl for silver) become conscious of it. This, however, is not the case.

p. 270, 7.

VI. One cannot explain the origin of word-signification in the human soul without adopting the existence of *sphoṭa*.

VI. The *sphoṭa*, as has been said, is not perceived. Should a not-perceived *sphoṭa* effect the beginning of word-signification, then word-significations would at all times arise in the soul. A not-perceived *sphoṭa* is like a flower in the sky.

p. 270, 2.

VII. Speech-sounds alone cannot be the cause of the signification of word, because otherwise word-meanings would originate notwithstanding change in the sound-order, interchange of speaker, and an interval.

VII. One should learn the causality of the phenomena from experience; this teaches us that the speech-sounds effectuate word-significations only under special circumstances. Because speech-sounds are eternal and omnipresent, therefore they can possess order and from difference in order difference in signification will ensue.

p. 270, 20.

VIII. The speech-sounds do not possess order, how could their order then be an accessory factor?

VIII. The temporary speech-sounds do possess order. Refutation of the argument, given by the defender sub I: „the loose speech-sounds are not able to effectuate a word-signification." Repetition of that which has been said sub II.

p. 270, 26.

IX. From impressions which have for contents sounds, the understanding of a word-meaning cannot originate, only a comprehension of sound could be their effect. (Quotation from MAṆḌANA).

IX. There is no difficulty in attributing such a causal ability to the *saṃskāra*s of the speech-sounds (cf. the answer sub VII beginning). Moreover one is obliged to make a similar supposition in the *sphoṭa*-theory, where one thus falls into the logical fault, called *kalpanā-gaurava*.

SECTION 10.

IDENTIFIED QUOTATIONS IN THE NYĀYA-KANDALĪ.

A. *Quotations from Kumārila's Çlokavārttika.*
(References to the edition of the Chowkhambī Series).

	Ny. kand. p.	l.	Çl. vārt. p.	çl.
anityatvaṃ vināçākhyaṃ &c.	18,	9	569,	13
jñāpakatvād dhi sambandhaḥ	216,	1	647,	32
tatra yat pūrvavijñānam	257,	22	396,	158
na hi tat karaṇaṃ loke	173,	18	507,	37
paricchedāntaraṃ yo 'yam	129,	10	172,	[1])
bhrāntasyānyavivakṣāyām	132,	16	94,	161
yatrāsādhāraṇo dharmas	242,	10	375,	88
yady api smṛtihetutvam	271,	10	536,	102
yāvanto yādṛçā ye ca	270,	17	527,	69
vyāpakatvagṛhītas tu	248,	9	348,	7
sāmānyavac ca sādṛçyam	221,	6	444,	35
siddhaç ca gaur apohyeta	320,	7	587,	83

B. *Quotations from Kumārila's Tantra-vārttika.*

			T. Vārtt.	
pūrvavijñānaviṣayam &c.	257,	19	69,	18
phalāya vihitaṃ karma	274,	6	360,	1
çaktiḥ kāryānumeyā hi	274,	18	372,	11

C. *Quotations from the Nyāyabhāṣya.*
(References to the edition of the Vizianagram Series).

			Ny. Bh.	
asati hetau kasya sādhanabhāvaḥ pradarçyate	250,	23	44,	17

D. *Quotations from Içvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhyakārikā.*

			S. k. n°.
asadakaraṇād &c.	143,	23	9
evaṃ tattvābhyāsād	279,	4	64
tena nivṛttaprasavām	279,	23	65
samyagjñānādhigamād	284,	20	67

---

[1]) In the *Nyāyaratnākara.*

E. Quotations from Patañjali's Yogasūtra and the Yogasūtrabhāṣya.

	Ny k. p.	l.	Ny. Bh. p.	l.
apariṇāminā hi bhoktṛçaktir &c.	177,	22	Bh. II,	20
abhyāsavairāgyābhyām	279,	2	S. I,	12
ahiṃsāsatyāsteya°	278,	8	S. II,	30
kleçakarmavipākāçayair	58,	3	S. I,	24
çruddho 'pi puruṣaḥ	172,	2	S. II,	20
çaucasantoṣa°	278,	10	S. II,	32

F. Passages, quoted in the Nyāya-kandalī and the Sarvadarçana-saṃgraha.

(References to the Poona-edition).

			S. d. s.	
arthena ghaṭayaty enām, &c.	123,	22	15,	12
kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā[1])	207,	8	5,	25
ghaṭo 'stīti na vaktavyam	319,	11	35,	8
pramāṇetarasāmānya°	255,	18	7,	5
bhedaç ca bhrāntivijñānair[2])	126,	17	13,	15
yat sat, tat kṣaṇikam	74,	26	10,	5
vikalpo vastunirbhāsād	190,	18	18,	19

---

1) Cf. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, *Muséon II*, p. 57 n. 3.

2) Cf. ibidem p. 182 n, 85 & SATĪÇ CANDRA VIDHYĀBHŪṢAṆA, *Mediaeval School*, p. 105 S. 82.

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE BOOK

MATERIAL FOR REFERENCE.

CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS.

The relative chronology of Vātsyāyana and Praçastapāda.

P. 10 n. 1; p. 15 § 3; p. 28 sub 3; p. 174 l. 14 & 23.

Sūtra II, 2, 22 *is* quoted in the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya, although not in the paragraph on *saṃçaya* (III Ch 2 § 16), still in connection with *hetv-ābhāsa* (III Ch. 2 § 37, p. 239 l. 14). This fact helps us to settle the relative chronology of VĀTSYĀYANA and PRAÇASTAPĀDA.

SUALI in his *Introduzione* (p. 31) considers it 'indubitabile' that Vātsyāyana precedes Praçastapāda, because the former is a faithful explainer and follower of GOTAMA's Darçana, whereas the latter is a reformer in his school.

BODAS (*Historical Survey of Indian Logic*, J.R.A.S., Bombay Br. XIX p. 332), on the other hand, is sure that Vātsyāyana qnotes the Praçastapāda-bhāṣya. However Vātsyāyana's commentary on N.S. I, 1, 9 does not refer to Praç. Bh. I, 1 § 2, but to V.S., I, 1, 4. Bodas' error is based on his wrong admission that the last-mentioned aphorism did not yet exist in Praçastapāda's time; cf. here p. 107 § 3. A decisive argument for Suali's opinion is the quotation of V.S. II, 2, 22 by Praçastapāda. For as I have shown (p. 174) this aphorism is an insertion, taken from the Nyāyabhāṣya; ergo Praçastapāda is posterior to Vātsyāyana.

The main dogmas of ancient Buddhism.

P. 80 § 2.

The three first dogmas are all found in the *Mahāvagga*, respectively: M.V. I cap. I; M.V. I cap. VI § 19—28; M.V. I cap. VI § 36—46 (= *anatta-lakkhaṇa-sutta*).

The explanation of perception.

P. 289 sub *B*.

Perception is discussed by KAṆĀDA in V.S. VIII, 1, 1—9, given here p. 285. In sūtra 5 there occurs an erratum, it should

be read: „In consequence of the non-existence of genus and species in genus and species, cognition [of them] is due to that alone."

I here wish to give a new and (I hope) clearer explanation of the sūtras 4—8. In the first place we must notice that NANDA LAL SINHA's translation of sūtra 5 is wrong; *tata eva* does not mean: 'due to that alone', i. e. due to substance only, but 'due to those alone', i. e. due to those genera and species only.

We can see that of the sūtras mentioned, sūtra 4 stands by itself and 5—8 form a group. In order to understand their meaning we must remember that the Vaiçeṣikas, like the Buddhistic Sautrāntikas, explain perception as a causal process; and that causality is itself based either on conjunction, or inherence, or both relations combined (see here p. 141).

Thus sūtra 4 teaches: the substance which is conjoined with our sensory, causes an indirect connection (*saṃnikarṣa*) between its qualities or action and our sensory, and thus gives rise to knowledge concerning them.

Qualities and actions inhere in substances, but not in other qualities and actions (cf. here p. 533 sub 4); generality and difference inhere in *artha*s (i. e. substances, qualities and actions), but not in other generalities and differences. When we now perceive a substance (sūtra 7), then in the first place this substance is the agent in the causal process, and secondly it is distinguished from other substances by its qualities and actions (sūtra 7), by generalities and differences which inhere in it (sūtra 6). We distinguish qualities from each other, and similarly actions, not because other qualities and actions inhere in them (sūtra 8), but only in consequence of inherent generalities and differences (sūtra 6); we distinguish generalities and differences directly, without the help of other generalities and differences (sūtra 5).

So then this whole theory of perception is not based on experience, but is a deduction from the fundamental table of categories.

The axioms of logic.

P. 338 § 5.

The axioms which European school-logic distinguishes, are not yet mentioned in Vaiçeṣika Sūtra or Bhāṣya.

ÇRĪDHARA gives formulations of the principia tertii exclusi & contradictionis, although they are rather hidden in his argumentation. See Nyāya-kandalī p. 73 l. 22; p. 174 l. 7; p. 241 l. 20; p. 129 l. 25.

ERRATA.

P. 9 l. 7. *Read*: sporadically.
P. 11 l. 6 from below. *Read*: grammar, as a science, as old as mathematics.
P. 20 n. 1. See p. 289 sub *B*.
P. 27 l. 5 from below. *Read*: to give this table in a more concise form so that it can easily be consulted in reversed order as well (see p. 545). He who uses this table, &c.
P. 29 n. 1. *Read*: section IV. — Cf. p. 540 sub 4.
P. 38 l. 4. „ *çarīrārambhaç ca.*
P. 45 l. 3 from below. *Read*: implicitly *dharma.*
P. 73 l. 3 „ „ *Add the note*: Cf. p. 375 sub 10.
P. 86 l. 11. *Read*: cap. VI—XII.
P. 86 l. 12. „ *upādāna.*
P. 90 l. 2 from below. *Read*: as the duality which.
P. 93 l. 6. *Read*: a complex of thoughts.
P. 97 l. 2 in § 2. *Read*: book II chapter V section 4, and see p. 314—323.
P. 120 l. 15. *Dele*: mutatis mutandis; l. 27, *read*: *yad anyad asat.*
P. 129 l. 7. *Read*: chapter III section 1, p. 189.
P. 134 l. 3 & 20. *Read*: component parts; l. 20, *read*: produced by.
P. 136 l. 1. *Read*: book IV § 1; here p. 539.
P. 147 l. 20 „ VIII, 2, 1 & 2; — l. 28, *read*: Bh. III, 2 § 8, see here p. 219 & 220.
P. 154 l. 24. *Read*: IV, 1, 1.
P. 173 l. 6. „ Bh. III, 2 § 16; — l. 18 *read*: *yathādṛṣṭam* in sūtra 19.
P. 177 l. 4 from below. *Read*: V.S. II, 2, 32.
P. 181 l. 9. *Read*: V.S. VIII, 2, 5 & 6.
P. 187 l. 3 from below. *Read*: In the sūtras 89, 92, 94, 96 and 100 five *pūrvapakṣa*-arguments... Each of the sūtras is &c.
P. 203 l. 19. *Read*: the decline of the quality.
P. 207 l. 3 „ *jñātatā.*
P. 209 l. 7 & 9. *Omit the brackets round* combination & combinative.
P. 210 l. 2 from below. *Read*: II, I, 29.
P. 219 l. 2 „ „ „ *anityam parimāṇam.*
P. 225 l. 12. *Read*: V, 1, 16.
P. 255 l. 8 from below. *The quotation ends with the word: pramāṇasiddhena*]".
P. 265 l. 17. *Read*: Bh. II chapter 1; — l. 2 from below V.S. VI, 2, 10.
P. 288 l. 19 from below. *Read*: *sāmānasyodbhavasya.*
P. 307 l. 2 in § 1. *Read*: objects], because [conjunction].
P. 458 under the title of fragment 39. *insert*: Ny.-kand. p. 204 l. 17.
P. 489 „ „ „ „ „ 49, „ „ p. 228 l. 26.
P. 568 after sūtra 94, *insert*: 96. [Sound must be permanent, says some one], because it is dwelt upon.

Lines in remembrance of H. KERN and J. S. SPEYER.

I wish to express my gratitude towards Prof. SPEYER, who drew my attention to the Vaiçeṣika System and encouraged my studies up to the last days of his life, and to Prof. KERN, who with Prof. W. CALAND recommended my work to the *Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam*, but to my regret by death was prevented from uttering his wishes concerning the final redaction.

B. FADDEGON.

Doorn, October 8, 1918.

BOOK II. EXPOSITION OF THE VAIÇEṢIKA SYSTEM.

Preliminary Note.

Chapter I.

General questions of metaphysics.

Chapter II.

Physics.

Chapter III.

Mathematical notions (number, time, space, movement).

Chapter IV.

Psychology.

Chapter V.

The sources of knowledge.

Chapter VI.

Ethics and theology.

BOOK III. TRANSLATIONS OF FRAGMENTS FROM THE NYĀYA-KANDALĪ.

GENERAL TABLE OF CONTENTS.

BOOK I. INTRODUCTION.

Chapter I.

The study of Indian philosophy in Europe.

Chapter II.

Description of the Vaiçeṣika texts.

Chapter III.

Analysis of the Nyāyà-sūtra,

Chapter IV.

Sources of information concerning the other Brahmanic and the Buddhistic schools.

BOOK IV. MATERIALS FOR REFERENCE.
